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(16070)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MOROCCO

PART LXXVII

1939 AND 1940

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Further Correspondence respecting Morocco.

PART 77.—1939 and 1940.

[W 1848/162/28]

No. 1.

Italian Embassy to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.—(*Received February* 1, 1939.)

(Translation.)

THE Italian Embassy present their compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of their Government, have the honour to make the following communication to his Excellency:—

The Italian Government, having learned of the terms of the treaty signed on the 18th July, 1938, between His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the President of the French Republic, acting on behalf of His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco, are obliged to affirm that the said treaty, in contrast with the principle of liberty and economic equality confirmed by the Algeciras Act—

(1) Aims at establishing in favour of French Morocco the principle of reciprocity, inasmuch as Great Britain grants thereby to French Morocco advantages of a customs nature and undertakes to accord equitable treatment to Moroccan imports in the event of quantitative regulation;

(2) Agrees to French Morocco being released from the present fixed customs charge of 10 per cent. *ad valorem*, replacing it by duties varying according to the products, in part *ad valorem* and in part (the duties relating to products of greatest interest to British exportation) specific;

(3) Contains a clause whereby Great Britain henceforward gives its consent to the possible introduction into Morocco of the system of quantitative regulation, and regulates minutely, to its own advantage, the conditions to which such regulation shall be subject; and

(4) Agrees to the abrogation of the "Regulations respecting the Customs of the Empire" (chapter V of the Act of Algeciras).

In view of the foregoing and of the fact that the treaty in question inflicts damage on Italian interests, inasmuch as special duties are therein stipulated for goods of British origin, and the greatest advantages reserved to Great Britain, especially in the matter of quantitative regulation, relate to products constituting a good portion of Italian exports to Morocco, the Italian Government cannot refrain from making due reservations regarding the legality of the aforesaid treaty and from stating that, while they desire to maintain intact the rights they derive from the provisions of the Algeciras Act, they would be unable at the same time to be a non-participant in all the modifications which it is considered necessary to make in the commercial and economic clauses of that Act.

Italian Embassy, February 1, 1939.

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[W 3146/14/28] No. 2.

Mr. Howard to Mr. Keeling (Tangier).

(No. 46.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1939.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 27 of the 4th February regarding the control of wireless communications in the Tangier Zone, I am directed by Viscount Halifax to inform you that M. Cambon, the French Minister in London, saw Sir George Mounsey on the 20th February in order to discuss developments on this question.

2. M. Cambon said that the case dealing with the Tangier law prohibiting broadcasting had been tried in the Court of First Instance, and the court had decided that the law was contrary to the terms of the Tangier Statute. An appeal had been made to the Mixed Court on the ground, as Sir George Mounsey was given to understand, that the Tangier courts have no powers to give any decisions in regard to the operations of the statute, but can only carry out its terms. M. Cambon thought nevertheless that the Mixed Court would confirm the decision of the lower tribunal. If the appeal is carried, the French authorities would bring the case back to the Committee of Control, and the French Government feared that in that event there would be a revival of international intrigues over this question. They were, therefore, desirous of bringing the whole question away from the local atmosphere and placing it on a political basis by discussions between His Majesty's Government and themselves. M. Cambon proceeded to explain the French Government's point of view, which is already familiar to His Majesty's Government, to the effect that they are opposed to the establishment of a high-power wireless transmitting installation at Tangier, and that they consider that Tangier has no right to establish any such installation without the consent of the Shereefian Government.

3. Sir George Mounsey thereupon remarked that this point of view would be a reversion to the original standpoint. His Majesty's Government, however, had agreed not to support the particular application for a wireless installation at Tangier, which had given rise to the controversy, but had reserved their rights on the question of principle which they were ready, if the French Government desired, to discuss with them. Sir George Mounsey agreed that it was undesirable to leave this question to local decision, and that it would be preferable for the two Governments to come to some agreement and then instruct their representatives as to their attitude when the matter was again brought up in the Committee of Control. If that course was to be adopted, however, time must be given for its discussion, and the Committee of Control must not be informed of the matter until the two Governments had completed their exchange of views.

4. M. Cambon then said that he proposed to put the case to his Government in the following manner. There were three alternative ways of dealing with this question :—

(i) Some provisional arrangement.

(ii) Tangier should be recognised as part of Morocco, and the installation of wireless would come within the monopolies enjoyed by the Shereefian Government.

(iii) If no agreement on point (ii) between the two Governments could be reached, some compromise might be come to by determining the conditions under which a wireless installation might be established, with special regard to the strength of transmission and the control of the machinery in the event of war or local troubles.

5. Sir George Mounsey expressed the view that course (iii) presented the most hopeful prospect of agreement, and that His Majesty's Government would await the French Government's reactions to M. Cambon's proposed communications.

6. You will observe that the course favoured by Sir George Mounsey in the above conversation is in accordance with the provisional proposals of His Majesty's Government as set out in the Foreign Office despatch No. 14 of the 16th January. Lord Halifax will be glad therefore to receive as soon as possible your considered views on these proposals.

I am, &c.

D. F. HOWARD.

[W 4006/14/28] No. 3.

Draft Instructions to Tangier Committee of Control.—(Communicated by French Embassy; Received March 8, 1939.)

SE fondant sur l'article 30 du statut, le Comité de Contrôle estime que la loi du 12 novembre 1938 a été régulièrement mise en vigueur et que, par conséquent, l'administrateur, tenu, en vertu de l'article 35 du statut, d'en assurer l'exécution, ne peut déférer à aucune injonction contraire.

En raison toutefois de l'intérêt que présente pour la zone le règlement du statut de la radiodiffusion et réserve faite des questions juridiques que soulève le problème, le comité invite l'administrateur à saisir l'Aseemblée, dans un délai d'un an à compter de la date de la promulgation de la loi, d'un projet à cette fin.

Les principes dont devra s'inspirer ce texte sont les suivants :

1. Interdiction de toute propagande politique, ainsi que de toute diffusion en langue arabe;
2. Surveillance des émissions par un organisme formé de représentants du Mendoub et de chacune des Puissances siégeant au comité et ayant le pouvoir à tout moment de suspendre l'exploitation;
3. Limitation de la puissance, de manière à ne pas gêner la navigation maritime et aérienne, et, après consultation de techniciens notamment anglais et français, déterminer des précautions à prendre pour garantir la sécurité de la navigation dans le Détroit de Gibraltar;
4. Respect des accords internationaux en la matière et en particulier subordination de l'entrée en service à l'attribution en propre d'une longueur d'ondes;
5. Prohibition de toute publicité commerciale.

Ambassade de France à Londres,
le 4 *mars* 1939.

[W 4558/306/28] No. 4.

Mr. Keeling to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 48.)

My Lord, *Tangier, March* 6, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of an interesting despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan regarding a conversation with the High Commissioner.

2. As regards Colonel Beigbeder's remarks about his attitude during the past two and a half years, I can confirm very much of what he told Mr. Monypenny. As I have often had occasion to report, I have always found him most friendly disposed to us in general, and always ready to take my advice in matters concerning Tangier. I might mention that I am the only one of the foreign representatives here who is on really friendly relations with him, as my Italian colleague contrived to quarrel with him, while my Portuguese colleague inspires such distrust that Colonel Beigbeder is ready to go to almost any lengths to avoid having to receive him.

3. Colonel Beigbeder was for many years military attaché in Germany and Central Europe, and although it is a subject on which he never enlarges, I think, like many other Spaniards, he has a considerable dose of sympathy for the Germans. For a Spaniard he has an unusual comprehension of European politics. As regards the Italians, I think he both distrusts and dislikes them. I have had this impression from the time I arrived here, and I am quite convinced he has had to resist considerable pressure to avoid having at least an Italian and German military mission at Tetuan. The two nations are too near in affinity to be really sympathetic to one another, and from the many Spaniards whom we see here I have no doubt they will be delighted when the Italians go.

4. As regards Colonel Beigbeder's apprehensions about Spain being dragged into an eventual European conflict, among the Spaniards we see residing or passing through here there is certainly a fear that in spite of their desire to steer

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out of European troubles, they are not going to have the easy time in the next few years, and that although there is no great tangible evidence at present of Italian designs on Spain, Signor Mussolini is not the man to let such an advantageous position slip completely between his fingers.

5. As regards Colonel Beigbeder's observations concerning the new Pope, the feeling of most Spaniards I have seen is one rather of distrust of His Holiness, on account of his alleged sympathies for the democratic States, on which point so much play has been made in certain organs of the British and French press.

6. I am sending copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Burgos.

I have, &c.
E. KEELING.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Consul Monypenny to Mr. Keeling.

(No. 24. Secret and Confidential.)

Sir, *Tetuan, March* 6, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following account of an interview which I had with the High Commissioner on the 2nd March.

2. After the exchange of suitable expressions of goodwill on the occasion of the recognition of General Franco, Colonel Beigbeder discoursed at some length on the political situation.

3. He spoke of the difficulties of his position in the Zone during the two and a half years since the outbreak of civil war, adding that he was tired and would like a change. He felt, he said, that with the end of the war in sight, his task here was more or less finished. He enlarged on the anxieties he had undergone at various periods of the war when there had been serious risk of "Red" incursions into the Zone, and was proud of the fact that although the Zone had been denuded of troops no serious disturbances had occurred. He hinted, incidentally, that in spite of pressure from various quarters he had succeeded in preventing the penetration into this Zone of any form of "foreign" military influence.

4. I took the opportunity to mention to Colonel Beigbeder that I had recently heard rumours that Italian troops might be sent to this Zone. Colonel Beigbeder replied that the rumours were entirely baseless. He could, he said, give me his word of honour on this point. If at any time there were matters on which he could give me no definite information, he would quite frankly say so. His reply in such cases would be simply that he was not in a position to say yes or no. But on this subject of the alleged arrival of Italian troops, he could give his definite assurance that the rumours were false.

5. To support his contention that he had always been quite frank in his dealings with the British consulate, he wished, he said, to remind me of his attitude during the international crisis of September last, when he had not waited for a move on my part, but had asked me to keep constantly in touch with him and had quite frankly discussed the position in this Zone, giving me full information of the military situation. He was, in fact, always not only willing, but anxious that the British authorities should be able to satisfy themselves that no undue military activities were taking place in this Zone. He would gladly give all possible facilities for any number of British officers at any time to travel freely about the Zone and see the situation for themselves. The French military attaché had on occasion paid him a visit. He would be glad if a British military officer would do likewise.

6. The High Commissioner then talked of the international situation. Anxiety, he said, about the continued presence of Italian troops in Spain was misplaced. Of course the Nationalists were indebted to their friends the Germans and Italians. Italy was a sister nation, and Mussolini was a most remarkable man. But the Italian troops in Spain were no longer wanted. A visit to Cadiz, for instance, would give an indication of popular feeling towards the Italian troops. Even if it was true that there were still some 4,000 Italian troops in Cadiz, their presence was not welcome to the people. They were not to be seen

mixing freely with the populace, in cafés or places of popular entertainment. Officially, of course, all honour and gratitude must be shown to their brothers-in-arms. The public, however, no longer relished their presence among them. Italian troops had been given the place of honour at the head of the army parade in Barcelona. But the war had been won by Spaniards—and no one else.

7. The British public and press should not therefore attach so much importance to the presence of Italian troops in Spain. Such outward manifestations of Italian influence meant little. The real danger lay in Mussolini's future policy, and Rome was the focal point. That extraordinary man, said Colonel Beigbeder, was capable of anything. A genius, but a gangster, he would stop at nothing to carry out his plans. Colonel Beigbeder was of the opinion that the outcry about Tunis, Corsica and Nice did not necessarily mean that the trouble would start in any of those areas. It was just as likely, for instance, that Algiers would be the scene where the drama would be staged. It was easy to create an incident—even political assassination must not be ruled out—involving the honour of Italy, and in Mussolini's eyes, of Spain also. Spain had no axe to grind. She was exhausted after her terrible ordeal, but we must not lose sight of the possibility that Spain might be dragged into a quarrel. Mussolini would take full advantage of the rôle he was assuming as a protector of Spain. His scheme would be, as Colonel Beigbeder put it, to make of Spain his Foreign Legion. Therein lay the great danger of the next eighteen months or two years.

8. Colonel Beigbeder next mentioned the election of the Pope (which had not then been decided), and stated that ecclesiastic circles in Spain were not at all happy as to the outcome of the election. It was feared that Mussolini would do his utmost to influence the course of events for political ends and that the true interests of the Church would suffer. Mussolini, said Colonel Beigbeder, was utterly without religion.

9. I do not know to what extent these remarks of the High Commissioner may be taken as reflecting opinions generally held among Spaniards, or to what extent they were inspired by the feeling that Italians have received an undue share of credit for the successes in Spain. But I gained the impression that that High Commissioner was quite genuine when expressing anxiety regarding the possibility that Spain might in the not distant future be involved, however unwillingly, in Italy's quarrel.

I have, &c.
R. G. MONYPENNY.

[W 5522/14/28] No. 5.

Note communicated by French Ambassador.—(*Received April* 3, 1939.)

LE Gouvernement français a appris qu'un poste de radiodiffusion espagnol, portant le nom de "Radio-Phalange-Tanger" vient d'être établi dans la zone internationale et a effectivement commencé ses émissions le 29 mars. Le Foreign Office trouvera ci-joint la traduction d'un article publié le 26 mars par le *Presente*, journal espagnol de la zone,(1) et qui contient des indications sur l'activité de ce nouveau poste.

La mise en service de "Radio-Phalange-Tanger" constitue une première conséquence de l'arrêt rendu par le tribunal dans l'affaire de la radiodiffusion, arrêt qui, en déniant à l'Assemblée législative et au Comité de Contrôle le droit d'interdire les émissions, laisse le champ libre à toute initiative politique analogue à celle du poste espagnol.

Si ce poste continue à fonctionner sans que les Puissances statutaires aient marqué leur opposition, il est à craindre qu'à brève échéance un poste similaire de propagande italienne ne soit créé.

Sur le plan local, il semble que l'administrateur soit désarmé pour empêcher le fonctionnement de "Radio-Phalange-Tanger," puisque l'arrêt du tribunal a déclaré illégale la loi d'interdiction.

Quant au Comité de Contrôle, il faudrait, pour qu'il fût en droit de s'interposer, qu'il commencât par déclarer que l'arrêt du tribunal est inconstitutionnel et, par conséquent, sans valeur.

(1) Not printed.

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A défaut du Comité de Contrôle, l'initiative appartiendrait aux Gouvernements intéressés dans le cas où ils jugeraient opportune une action auprès du Gouvernement de Burgos.

En portant les indications qui précèdent à la connaissance du Foreign Office, l'Ambassade de France croit devoir insister sur les dangers que comporte la création du poste espagnol et sur l'intérêt qu'il y aurait en conséquence pour les Gouvernements britannique et français à adresser le plus tôt possible des instructions communes à leurs représentants à Tanger.

Londres, le 31 *mars* 1939.

[W 5078/14/28] No. 6.

Note communicated by French Ambassador.—(Received March 27, 1939.)

BIEN que le premier paragraphe du projet d'instructions communes au sujet de la radiodiffusion à Tanger eût pour intérêt d'empêcher le fonctionnement du poste qui s'est établi contre le gré du Gouvernement français, celui-ci accepte bien volontiers de déférer au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique à condition que les instructions comportent un paragraphe final conçu dans les termes suivants :

> " Le Comité de Contrôle invite l'administrateur à s'opposer, dès maintenant, au fonctionnement de tout poste ne fournissant pas l'ensemble des garanties énumérées ci-dessus."

Au cas où cette suggestion rencontrerait l'agrément du Foreign Office, le Gouvernement français, tout en maintenant sa thèse juridique sur le monopole de l'office, consentirait à supprimer au second paragraphe les mots " toutefois " et " réserve faite des questions juridiques que soulève le problème."

M. Georges Bonnet accepterait d'autre part de ramener le délai d'un an à celui que le Gouvernement britannique jugera nécessaire pour l'élaboration du nouveau projet de loi.

Sur les principes de ce projet, le Gouvernement français :

(1) Renonce à exclure la langue arabe;
(2) Insiste par contre sur l'absolue nécessité que le représentant du Mendoub participe à la surveillance—étant donné d'ailleurs qu'il conviendra de contrôler les émissions en langue arabe;
(3) Accepte la formule " techniciens nommés par le comité " et l'insertion d'une clause précisant que le poste sera de faible puissance et sur ondes moyennes;
(4) Est d'accord pour remplacer l'expression " accords internationaux " par des références expresses aux textes indiqués par le Foreign Office;
(5) Accepte que la publicité commerciale ne soit pas interdite.

Si la mise au point ci-dessus indiquée rencontre l'assentiment du Foreign Office, il conviendrait, semble-t-il, que le Gouvernement britannique donnât à son représentant à Tanger des instructions lui permettant, soit d'effectuer dès lundi prochain (27 mars) cette déclaration commune avec son collègue français, lors de l'examen de l'affaire par le comité, soit de demander, d'accord avec M. Avonde, le renvoi de cet examen jusqu'à réception des instructions communes.

Londres, le 24 *mars* 1939.

[W 5078/14/28] No. 7.

Memorandum communicated to Mr. Cambon.—(Received March 27, 1939.)

HIS Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have given careful consideration to the question of broadcasting at Tangier in the light of the recent judgment of the appeal section of the Tangier Mixed Tribunal and of the views of the French Government set out in the memorandum of the French Embassy of the 4th March and in their subsequent memoranda Nos. 141 and 155 of the 24th and the 31st March respectively.

2. His Majesty's Government are glad to observe that they are in general agreement with the French Government with regard to the nature of the safeguards to ensure the proper control of broadcasting. His Majesty's Government also share what they understand to be the view of the French Government that there is no foundation for the contention of the Mixed Tribunal that the Act of Algeciras or any other instrument applicable to Tangier prevents any regulation and limitation of broadcasting by a Tangier law. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government must maintain their view that there is not at present in Tangier any Shereefian Government monopoly over broadcasting, and they trust that the French Government will agree to facilitate collaboration with His Majesty's Government in order to ensure the object which they have in common in this matter by refraining from insisting upon this pretension.

3. In their desire to formulate a speedy and non-controversial solution to the difficulties which have arisen, His Majesty's Government have reached the following conclusions as to the most suitable procedure to be adopted, which they confidently expect will meet with the concurrence of the French Government.

4. In the first place, having regard to the recent judgment of the Mixed Tribunal to the effect that the law passed at Tangier last November was void, His Majesty's Government are convinced that any attempt to ensure the issue of instructions by the Committee of Control to the Administrator, as suggested in the French Embassy's memorandum of the 24th March, and similarly any attempt to obtain a declaration by the Committee of Control in the sense suggested in the French Embassy's memorandum No. 155 of the 31st March would lead to further useless controversy and seriously hamper the solution desired by His Majesty's Government and the French Government. His Majesty's Government consider that a simple and effective course to follow would be to secure the fulfilment of the necessary formalities in order to regularise Tangier's position under the Madrid Telecommunications Convention of 1932 and the relevant instruments thereunder.

5. According to their recent judgment, the Appeal Court of the Mixed Tribunal have ruled that the Tangier Zone is not a party to the Madrid Convention of 1932 on the grounds that the Committee of Control have not informed the Administrator that the convention is enforced in all countries parties to the Act of Algeciras, that the convention has not been promulgated in the Zone by publication in the *Official Bulletin*, and that none of the measures necessary for the application of the convention in the Zone has been taken by the Administration. Nevertheless, according to the information of His Majesty's Government, all the Algeciras Powers are in fact parties to the Madrid Convention of 1932 and the General Radiocommunication Regulations thereunder, and, therefore, by virtue of article 8 of the statute, the Administration are under an obligation to make effective the application of these instruments in the Tangier Zone. His Majesty's Government suggest, therefore, that the French Government should take the initiative at the earliest possible date in order to set in motion in the Tangier Legislative Assembly the necessary measures to make effective the application in the Tangier Zone of the Madrid Telecommunications Convention of 1932 and the General Radiocommunication Regulations, and, further to notify the acceptance by the Tangier Zone of the Radiocommunication Regulations as amended by the Cairo Conference of 1938. His Majesty's Government would further suggest that the Assembly should also take steps to accede to the Lucerne Broadcasting Convention of 1933, which was concluded in accordance with the Additional Protocol to the Acts of the International Radiotelegraph Conference of Madrid, 1932, and, in due course, to the revised convention concluded at the recent conference at Montreux. These measures, which in the opinion of His Majesty's Government should give rise to no controversial issues, would give the Tangier Administration full authority to refuse to allow broadcasting stations to operate in the Tangier Zone except under licence, and the licence could be made subject to the conditions which His Majesty's Government and the French Government desire and which would be embodied in a new law. The effect, moreover, would be to limit to a low power medium wave the working of any broadcasting station so licensed.

6. As regards the conditions to which the licence should be subject, His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree to the safeguards referred to in the French Embassy's memorandum of the 24th March.

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7. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tangier is being informed of the views of His Majesty's Government as set out above, and the latter hope that the French Government will feel able to issue the necessary instructions at an early date in order to set in motion the machinery suggested by His Majesty's Government.

8. The view expressed in paragraph 4 above is solely due to the desire as far as possible to avoid complicating the present discussions concerning broadcasting in Tangier with the controversial question whether or not the Mixed Tribunal has the power to hold laws *ultra vires* if it considers them to be contrary to treaties or the Tangier Codes. In case, however, it should not be possible to avoid this question entirely, and because the question may arise in the future, the French Government may desire to know what is the opinion of His Majesty's Government on this question. Lord Halifax is advised that, although on a reading of the provisions of the Tangier Statute and Organic Dahir as a whole it may be arguable whether the Mixed Tribunal has this power or not, the better legal view would appear to be that the tribunal has not this power, and that under the statute and organic dahir the intention was to leave this question to the Committee of Control. It is unlikely that the framers of the Tangier Statute intended that there should be two separate authorities to decide this question, and the duty of vetoing laws which are contrary to the treaties, &c., is in terms entrusted to the Committee of Control, the representatives of the Powers, and in these circumstances it is most improbable that the Powers who elaborated the statute wished to give to the Tangier Mixed Tribunal the power to override the decision of their representatives on the Committee of Control.

Foreign Office, April 11, 1939.

[W 5816/14/28] No. 8.

Mr. Keeling to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received April* 11.)

(No. 76.)

Tangier, April 6, 1939.

My Lord,

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of broadcasting in Tangier, I have the honour to report that the Spanish Phalange have recently inaugurated a small station which works on short wave, about 42 metres, from about noon to 2·30 P.M. and from 8 to 9·30 P.M.

2. My French colleague informs me it is situated somewhere on a large Spanish Government property on the mountain, and that, while it mainly broadcasts Spanish internal news, it has a strongly pro-totalitarian tone, and there have been certain cases of definite attacks on the French Government. M. Avonde Froment understood that the French Embassy in London had called your attention to this station, with particular reference to the undesirability of any form of propaganda being broadcast from Tangier.

3. My Italian colleague has also begun broadcasting from his official residence. He also uses a short wave-length of about 40 metres, and begins about noon and comes on again about 9 P.M., but so far this station has confined itself to broadcasting the official Italian radio news, which, however, is itself often extremely tendentious.

4. M. de Rossi told me a few days ago that, the necessary formalities having been concluded with the International Bureau at Berne regarding tariffs, &c., he proposed very shortly to open his ordinary station to the general public for wireless telegraphic communications. The station, which has been equipped with new material, would be powerful enough to communicate with Australia or any part of the world. Officially, it would depend directly from the Italian Ministry of Communications.

I have, &c.
E. KEELING.

P.S.—Since writing the above my French colleague has supplied me with a translation (copy enclosed herewith(1)) of the original programme of "Radio Falange."

E. K.

(1) Not printed.

[W 6875/14/28] No. 9.

Note communicated by French Embassy.—(*Received April* 28.)

PAR un mémorandum en date du 11 de ce mois, le Foreign Office a bien voulu faire connaître à l'Ambassade de France à Londres la manière de voir du Gouvernement britannique sur les conditions les plus propres, selon lui, à mettre fin aux difficultés provoquées actuellement par les émissions radiodiffusées dans la zone de Tanger.

Après avoir étudié ce mémorandum, le Gouvernement français a cru pouvoir en dégager la conclusion suivante.

Dans la pensée du Gouvernement britannique, le texte de la loi tangeroise qui constaterait (par application de l'article 8 du statut) l'application à Tanger des règlements internationaux sur la radiodiffusion, serait immédiatement applicable aux postes fonctionnant actuellement. Les propriétaires de ceux-ci ne pourraient arguer du principe de la non-rétroactivité des lois pour échapper à l'obligation de se procurer une licence.

Si le Gouvernement britannique est bien d'accord sur ce qui précède avec le Gouvernement français, celui-ci est prêt à mettre en œuvre la procédure suggérée dans le mémorandum du Foreign Office du 11 de ce mois. M. Georges Bonnet a demandé au Résident général à Rabat de préparer, d'accord avec le Représentant français à Tanger, le projet de texte dont il conviendrait de saisir d'urgence l'assemblée législative.

L'Ambassade de France serait en outre heureuse de savoir si le Foreign Office verrait des objections à ce que les indications contenues dans le mémorandum britannique fussent communiquées au Gouvernement néerlandais.

Londres, le 27 *avril* 1939.

[W 6311/162/28] No. 10.

Viscount Halifax to the Italian Ambassador.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 29, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the Italian Embassy's *note verbale*, dated the 1st February, relating to the treaty between the United Kingdom and France, signed on the 18th July, 1938, concerning commercial relations between the United Kingdom and the French and Tangier Zones of the Shereefian Empire.

2. I have the honour to explain that the treaty does not, and cannot, affect the rights in the French Zone of Morocco of any State other than the United Kingdom, and that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom there can be no question of the legality or validity of this treaty, seeing that it does not purport to require the authorities of the French Zone of Morocco to take advantage of any of the derogations from existing treaty provisions to which His Majesty's Government have agreed, but merely embodies His Majesty's Government's agreement, for their own part, with regard to these matters and the conditions upon which such agreement is given.

I have, &c.
HALIFAX.

[W 6875/14/28] No. 11.

Memorandum communicated to French Embassy.

HIS Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agree with the views of the French Government contained in the French Embassy's memorandum No. 221 of the 27th April with regard to measures for the control of wireless broadcasting in the Tangier Zone.

2. His Majesty's Government see no objection to the French Government's proposal to communicate to the Netherlands Government the substance of Foreign Office memorandum of the 11th April. His Majesty's Government propose to make a similar communication to the Portuguese Government.

Foreign Office, May 4, 1939.

[W 8117/14/28] No. 12.

Mr. Keeling to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 22.)

(No. 100.)
My Lord, *Tangier, May* 16, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 76 of the 6th April, 1939, I have the honour to transmit herewith extract(1) from the *Vedetta di Tangeri* of the 7th instant showing the rates of the new Italian wireless station which my Italian colleague has now opened to the public in the grounds of his official residence.

2. My French colleague has reported this to his Government, but, I understand, has not yet received any instruction as to whether he is to protest. The notice in the paper describes the station as depending directly from the Ministry of Communications in Rome, and he thinks it possible that the Italian Government will refuse even to discuss the matter in Tangier, and perhaps keep it as bargaining counter for their general Mediterranean negotiations with France.

3. When the matter came up originally in 1937 (see Foreign Office despatch No. 23 of the 22nd January, 1937), I was instructed to take the line that "the right to erect an Italian wireless station for public use must be based on express treaty provision or the consent of the sovereign authority, and that the right cannot be exercised on the plea that there exists no treaty provision against it." As a matter of fact, when the subject came up before us, the Italian Minister declared that he knew nothing about it, and denied that there was any Italian wireless station open for public use. The French Minister accepted this startling assertion, and the matter was left at that, though in practice the station did continue to transmit messages, but only to Italy.

4. The whole wireless position here having now evolved on rather different lines, I should be grateful for instructions as to what attitude I should take if my French colleague brings the question before the Committee of Control, unless perhaps, should my Italian colleague refuse to discuss the question and maintain it should be treated direct with the Italian Government, you would prefer me to reserve the opinion of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
E. KEELING.

(1) Not printed.

[W 8703/14/28] No. 13.

Aide-mémoire communicated by French Embassy.—(*Received June* 3.)

LE journal italien de Tanger, *La Vedetta di Tangeri*, a publié récemment un avis officiel ouvrant au public le service télégraphique du poste de T.S.F. du Consulat général d'Italie et publiant les tarifs des correspondances.

Un incident analogue s'était produit en janvier 1937. Toutefois, la tentative du Gouvernement italien avait échoué à cette époque devant l'opposition du Comité de Contrôle. Le Gouvernement britannique avait, pour sa part, pris position contre les prétentions italiennes.

En conséquence, l'Ambassade de France serait reconnaissante au Foreign Office de lui indiquer s'il est disposé à confirmer l'opinion qu'il avait exprimée il y a deux ans.

Au cas où les assurances alors fournies seraient réitérées, le Gouvernement français inviterait son représentant à Tanger à saisir le Comité de Contrôle. Aussi attacherait-il du prix à ce que le représentant de la Grande-Bretagne intervînt dans le même sens que son collègue français.

En portant les indications qui précèdent à la connaissance du Foreign Office, l'Ambassade de France croit devoir souligner que l'affaire dont il s'agit est entièrement distincte de celle du règlement général de la radiodiffusion à Tanger, qui suit son cours conformément au programme établi d'accord entre les Gouvernements britannique et français.

Londres, le 1er juin 1939.

[W 3352/306/28] No. 14.

Foreign Office to Mr. Keeling (*Tangier*).

(No. 72.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 27, 1939.

IN paragraph 8 of his despatch to you No. 10 of the 28th January (a copy of which was enclosed in your despatch No. 32 of the 14th February) His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan reported an observation by the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan to the effect that in principle the abandonment of British Capitulations in Morocco could not be limited to the French Zone.

2. In order that His Majesty's Government should have all the necessary information at their disposal when a request is received from the Spanish Government for the surrender of British capitulatory rights in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, I am directed by Viscount Halifax to request that in consultation with Mr. Consul Monypenny you will consider the whole question carefully and, bearing in mind the documents forming the convention with France of the 29th July, 1937, for the abolition of British Capitulations in the French Zone of Morocco (Treaty Series, No. 8, of 1938), you will report fully as to the extent to which you consider the provisions of that convention suitable *mutatis mutandis* for the Spanish Zone of Morocco.

3. In this connexion Lord Halifax desires to emphasise the importance of steps being taken to secure a settlement of any outstanding disputes in the Spanish Zone affecting the interests of individual British subjects and arising out of the failure of the Spanish local authorities to recognise British capitulatory rights in full.

I am, &c.
WALTER ROBERTS.

[W 9697/306/28] No. 15.

Mr. Keeling to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 23.)

(No. 127.)
My Lord, *Tangier, June* 19, 1939.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 72 of the 27th March last on the question of British capitulatory rights in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a report from His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan on the subject.

2. I concur with Mr. Monypenny's views.

I have, &c.
E. KEELING.

Enclosure in No. 15.

Consul Monypenny to Mr. Keeling.

(No. 59.)
Sir. *Tetuan, May* 12, 1939.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 20 of the 5th April, enclosing copy of despatch No. 72 from the Foreign Office calling for a report on the question of British capitulatory rights in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, I have the honour to submit the following observations :—

2. The extent and nature of these rights, similar to those which were surrendered in the French Zone, were clearly summarised in Foreign Office memorandum of the 5th October 1933, from which the following extract might conveniently be quoted :—

3. "Our extra-territorial rights in Morocco are based on the General Treaty with the Sultan of 1856, and consist for practical purposes of the following main privileges :—

"(1) Immunity of British subjects from the local jurisdiction (mainly articles VIII, IX and XIV).
"(2) Immunity of British subjects from local taxation (article IV).
"(3) Extra-territorial privileges for consular officers (article III)."

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4. In addition to our extra-territorial rights proper, we have certain important commercial rights, principally :—

(1) A fixed maximum rate of duty for goods imported by British subjects of 12½ per cent. (article VII of the Commercial Convention of 1856 and article 66 of the Act of Algeciras).

(2) The general guarantee of "commercial equality and economic liberty" (articles I and VI of Commercial Convention, article 4 of Anglo-French Declaration of 1904, article 4 of Franco-German Convention of 1911). The extent of our rights under this heading is not accurately defined, *e.g.*, it is doubtful whether we are entitled in all respects to national as well as most-favoured-nation treatment. These rights in Morocco are, however, more important than those conferred by the usual most-favoured-nation treaties, since they entitle us in any case to equal treatment with the French and Spaniards in their respective zones.

(3) Adjudications : public contracts to be put up to open tender (articles 74 and 105–111 of the Act of Algeciras). In a footnote to the above it was stated that the immunities from local jurisdiction are not absolute, *e.g.*, British subjects sue as plaintiffs in the local courts; certain local taxes are by treaty applicable to British subjects, and in practice the bulk of local taxation is applied to them by King's Regulation.

5. Such in theory and according to our treaty rights are the extra-territorial privileges which British subjects and protégés enjoy in this zone. These privileges were an adequate safeguard for British interests in normal times. But abnormal measures imposed since the beginning of the Spanish civil war have completely altered the situation except as regards jurisdictional immunity and the special privileges enjoyed by consular officers. In every other respect the privileges obtained by treaty are no longer effective. In practice, for instance, British subjects are not exempt from the many municipal dues, consumption taxes, gate taxes and other forms of revenue charges imposed in the last three years, whether these taxes have been endorsed by King's Regulation or not. In fact, no King's Regulation has been issued since November 1935. A protest lodged by this consulate against a recently imposed 5 per cent. increase of the 12½ per cent. tax on imports, in the disguised form of an additional Charity Quota Tax, has remained unanswered.

6. As regards commerce, the gradual extension, since the beginning of the civil war, of Government control over all forms of economic life in this zone, has abolished all trace of "commercial equality and economic liberty." Freedom of trade and movement are at present severely restricted. Special permits are required, for instance, to enter and leave the zone, and even to travel from one town to another. A Central Economic Committee has authority to grant or refuse permits for all exports and imports. Foreign exchange is controlled, and all prices, wholesale and retail, are fixed by regional branches of the Central Economic Committee. Trade is carried on largely under the barter or compensation system, with discrimination in favour mainly of Spanish and German interests. The result of these methods has been the virtual extinction of British trade in this zone, except for an insignificant business in the hands of British Indian merchants who import goods by parcel post through the British post office at Tetuan. As an instance, of the loss of British trade, it is sufficient to quote the case of one British firm whose turnover during the past three years has been reduced from six figures to practically nil.

7. Possibly these restrictions, imposed in war time, will eventually be relaxed. But there is as yet no evidence to support this view, the tendency on the contrary seems to be towards the establishment of complete economic totalitarianism in this zone.

8. The British community in Spanish Morocco is very small, and mostly not from the United Kingdom. And as already stated, British trade—which before the civil war was worth, in imports, about 10 million pesetas, has practically ceased to exist. The abolition of Capitulations would seem, therefore, of little immediate consequence in the commercial field. At the same time, as a

potential market, this zone is perhaps not altogether unimportant, and it would seem necessary, if the question of our existing privileges should come up for discussion, that the opportunity be taken to obtain some measure of fair play for British commercial interests in the future.

9. There are indications that it may not be long before the Spanish Government will raise the subject. To judge from articles now appearing in the local Spanish press, the Spanish view is that the Treaty of Algeciras is no longer valid, Great Britain having contravened its provisions by signing a separate commercial treaty with the French Zone last year. In the view of these newspapers, France and Britain have violated the spirit of treaties by raising economic barriers between different zones of an indivisible Morocco and by concluding new treaties to the exclusion of one of the interested parties to the Act of Algeciras. in at least two of the countries signatory to the treaty, the form of Government has altogether changed and, with it, their attitude to the Act of Algeciras. The attitude of most of the other signatories is that of complete indifference; they regard the Act as effete. It is therefore time to concert a new treaty, and a new, strong, independent Spain will now know how to defend her rights, both economically and geographically.

10. A reply to such arguments could perhaps be to the effect that we are prepared to conclude an agreement similar to the Anglo-French Convention in respect of the Spanish Zone. It is not clear how the provisions of such an agreement could be applied to a zone in which the totalitarian system is established in economic life. But it would perhaps be possible to obtain some degree of equality of treatment for British imports; equality of opportunity in future mining enterprises; the maintenance of the system of adjudications whereby public contracts are put up to public tender; these and similar commercial rights to which we are in theory entitled under existing treaties to be reaffirmed in any new agreement.

11. As regards outstanding disputes affecting the interests of individual British subjects, attempts to effect a settlement of trade debts have failed owing partly to the refusal of General Franco's Government to accept responsibility for engagements entered into before July 1936 and partly to existing exchange restrictions.

12. In addition, there are a few British claims still unsettled, of which details will be furnished later. The following are the most important :—

(*a*) Erzini : land confiscated for the enlargement of aerodrome at Tetuan. No compensation paid, although Erzini has been negotiating direct with the High Commissioner for adequate compensation.

(*b*) Isaac Joseph Cohen and Co., Tetuan. Cowhides requisitioned at Melilla. (Foreign Office despatch No. 20 of the 20th March, 1937, received u.f.s. through Tangier; and Tetuan despatch No. 23 of the 6th May, 1937, to Foreign Office, u.f.s. Tangier.

(*c*) Albert Benolol : *vide* correspondence beginning with Tetuan despatch to Tangier, No. 96 of the 24th March, 1937.

13. There is also outstanding a debt of some £20,000 to Messrs. Walter Kenyon and Co., of Manchester, for clothing material supplies through two army contractors in Morocco for the Spanish army.

14. As already stated, British commercial rights in this zone are now practically a dead letter owing to the adoption by the Spanish authorities of a totalitarian economic policy. In the matter of taxation, also, as explained earlier in this despatch, British subjects do not enjoy the degree of immunity to which they are entitled under treaty rights. There remain the question of immunity from local jurisdiction and the privileges of consular officers.

15. The local Spanish courts and police may perhaps lay claim, in normal times, to a reasonable degree of probity and efficiency. But in the abnormal conditions of the last two or three years, British subjects and protégés in this zone have on several occasions been saved from personal molestation by the police and from summary arrest or expulsion or even a worse fate only through the intervention of this consulate, acting on the basis of its capitulatory rights. It would be rash to assume that in the absence of capitulatory immunity, British subjects would receive impartial justice at the hands of Spanish officials, at least

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as long as the present wave of anti-democratic and anti-British feeling exists. But this, it is to be hoped, is only a passing phase.

16. In the event of the surrender of our extra-territorial privileges, I venture to submit that most of the provisions of the Convention of France of the 29th July, 1937, would be suitable, *mutatis mutandis*, for the Spanish Zone, in normal circumstances. The safeguards provided by that convention would appear to be adequate protection for British interests in this zone. But circumstances are at present abnormal, particularly in the economic field. In any future agreement concerning Spanish Morocco, therefore, it would presumably be necessary to make special provision, if possible, for the protection of British commercial interests in a zone in which all trade is strictly under Government control.

I have, &c.
R. G. MONYPENNY.

[W 9931/162/28] No. 16.

Viscount Halifax to Sir P. Loraine (Rome).

(No. 971.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 4, 1939.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 674 of the 1st May relating to the attitude of the Italian Government to the treaty between the United Kingdom and France, signed on the 18th July, 1938, concerning commercial relations between the United Kingdom and the French and Tangier Zones of Morocco, I have to inform your Excellency that, according to a verbal communication made by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires on the 27th June, the Italian Government have carefully considered my note of the 29th April but feel bound to observe that they could not do otherwise than maintain their point of view as set out in the Italian Embassy's *note verbale* of the 1st February last.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[W 10330/306/28] No. 17.

Mr. Keeling to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 139.)
My Lord, *Tangier, June 30, 1939.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatches No. 71 of the 27th March, 1939, and No. 77 of the 4th April, 1939, relative to dahirs issued in the Spanish Zone of Morocco instituting fresh taxation, which has not hitherto been applied to British subjects and protected persons in the zone by the necessary King's Regulations, and to the dahir of the 29th December, 1938, instituting a consumption tax on coffee substitutes.

2. I transmitted copies of the above despatches to His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan and instructed him to furnish the information called for.

3. Mr. Consul Monypenny has now furnished a full and detailed report in a despatch, No. 73, dated at Tetuan the 23rd June, 1939, copy of which I have the honour to transmit herewith. The report is very comprehensive and I agree with the recommendations made.

4. I am sending a copy of the enclosure to this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at San Sebastian.

I have, &c.
E. KEELING.

Enclosure in No. 17.

Consul Monypenny to Mr. Keeling (Tangier).

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Tetuan, June 23, 1939.*

WITH reference to your despatches Nos. 19 and 22 of the 5th and 11th April respectively, I have the honour to transmit herewith a review(1) of Spanish Zone legislation affecting consumption, gate and other taxes, which has not yet been applied to British subjects by King's Regulations.

2. The review is submitted in two sections. The first (Memorandum I) includes the outstanding legislation of 1934 and subsequent dahirs up to date. To such dahirs as appear unobjectionable the drafts of relevant King's Regulations are attached, and reasons are given as to why the remaining legislation appears to be unsuitable for application to British subjects.

3. The second section (Memorandum II) of the report contains a review of legislation issued in the form of further dahirs and ordinances, the effect of which has been to establish in this zone a system of Government control over all forms of economic life.

4. A study of the ordinances included in Memorandum II, particularly those creating a Central Economic Committee and establishing currency restrictions, will show that the Government has assumed authority to exercise a large measure of control over all imports and exports as well as over foreign exchange. From the text of the dahir dated the 29th October, 1936, it appears that the reason given for the introduction of these measures was to prevent any excessive rise in prices as a result of the war in Spain, and the intention may, at the time, have been as claimed in article 6 of the dahir in question, to respect as far as possible treaty rights in force in this zone. Actually, in practice, the outcome of such legislation is that the Government has now assumed entire and arbitrary control over all trade in this zone, and that foreign treaty rights, in so far as trade is concerned, are completely overruled.

5. Moreover, the control thus assumed by the Government is exercised in many cases with deliberate discrimination, in favour mainly of Spanish commodities. Merchants requiring foreign exchange for their imports must apply to the Central Economic Committee. The committee can grant or refuse the exchange as it thinks fit, and, according to information supplied by local merchants, applications for foreign exchange to finance imports from countries other than Spain are usually refused. Spaniards may not, in any case, possess foreign exchange, but must convert their holdings into pesetas at the fixed Government rate. Foreign merchants are discouraged from engaging in the import trade by the fact that they cannot remit abroad the proceeds of their sales in this zone.

6. Although under its regulations the Central Economic Committee should not act as a merchant except in circumstances of absolute necessity, and dealers are supposed to clear merchandise and pay for it in normal mercantile fashion, in practice the Central Economic Committee often acts as importer and distributes the goods at a fixed price, so that merchants are not concerned with either customs or consumption taxes.

7. The methods of the committee, I would repeat, appear to be entirely arbitrary. Merchants are not free even to deal in the goods of their choice; they must accept whatever commodity the committee may allocate to them, the quantity and price being fixed by the committee. Any attempt to resist these impositions would spell ruin for the merchant concerned, as his applications for the necessary "permits" to do any further business would be refused.

8. As a result of these restrictions, the import of British goods into this zone has practically ceased. The few British merchants (mostly British-protected persons) who carry on a business in the zone have perforce had to comply with the new regulations. As long as the present system of Government control over trade is maintained, all dahirs relating to taxes are for all practical purposes a dead letter, and the question as to whether such dahirs should be covered by King's Regulations would appear to be only mainly of academic interest, for the gradual extension during the last three years of Government control over trade has to-day reached such a point that there is no longer any vestige of free

(1) Not printed.

trade; and with the suppression of free trade the basis of our capitulatory rights, in so far as they relate to commerce, has been destroyed, at least temporarily. It would, in fact, seem difficult to reconcile the retention of capitulatory rights affecting trade in a zone in which totalitarian methods have been imposed.

9. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the policy of His Majesty's Government voluntarily to extend to British subjects such taxes and regulations as are not in themselves directly prejudicial to British interests, it would seem necessary to regularise the position by the issue of King's Regulations covering legislation which can be accepted, and to draw the attention of the present Spanish authorities to the fact that we maintain our objection, in principle, to those dahirs which formed the subject of representations to the Spanish Zone authorities and to the Spanish Government in 1935, and to any other dahirs since issued which are prejudicial to British treaty rights.

I have, &c.
R. G. MONYPENNY.

[W 10568/1730/28] No. 18.

Consul-General Hurst to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 59.)
My Lord, *Rabat, July* 7, 1939.

NOT having had for several months an opportunity of conversation with the Resident-General on the subject of the general situation in the French Zone of Morocco and the reactions upon it of current international events, I arranged for him to receive me yesterday, prior to my departure on leave.

2. After I had conveyed to General Noguès my congratulations on his recent promotion to the rank of Grand-Croix in the Légion d'Honneur, I said that I was well aware of the present very satisfactory state of affairs in the French Zone, which he himself had been mainly instrumental in bringing about; he might, however, be prepared to place me in a position to paint a picture in more detail. I realised, for instance, that his successful efforts must have been accomplished in the teeth of continuous endeavours of the agents of unfriendly Powers to provoke the Moors and undermine their loyalty.

3. General Noguès said that I could assure His Majesty's Government that the attitude of the native population was entirely satisfactory and gave no cause for any alarm or apprehension. Hostile propaganda—particularly from Italian sources—had been dinned into them with such ceaseless iteration that, coupled with its clumsy nature, the Moor had ceased to pay any further attention to it. Moreover, the suppression of Albanian independence had much incensed them. Some thirty of the 1937 rioters who had received a sentence of two years' imprisonment were not due to be released until next October. The four principal ringleaders were in exile, one in Gaboon, the others in South Morocco, and he proposed to keep these—the really dangerous agitators—there. Nine-tenths of the rank and file who had served their sentences and returned to their towns and villages had refrained from displaying any further seditious activities. From time to time a native was caught distributing subversive propaganda from the Spanish Zone and given a sentence of three months, but this represented the sum total of present efforts.

4. Turning to the Spanish Zone, General Noguès said that, now that the civil war in Spain had ended and the time had come to implement the promises which the High Commissioner had made to the Moors, a very difficult situation had arisen for the Administration there, and he foresaw trouble for them within the next few months, unless possibly Colonel Beigbeder were to be replaced by some army officer of commanding character and abilities.

5. I remarked that, in the event of a European war and of a Spain exercising a neutrality benevolent to the enemy, one action she would adopt would surely be to maintain a large armed force in the Spanish Zone in order to immobilise as many French troops as possible in Morocco. General Noguès agreed, and did not endeavour to minimise this danger or the damage which could be caused by such action. He obviously, however, did not consider that such a spurious neutrality could be of long duration.

6. In conclusion, I thanked the Resident-General for the very helpful attitude of the French authorities of the zone as regards Palestine. All endeavours of the Moroccan Moslems to hold meetings or work up sympathy for their co-religionists there have been firmly checked and nearly all mention of the subject has been kept out of the press.

7. The optimism as to the immediate future of the French Zone in all circumstances felt by the Resident-General, and shared by most provided he is maintained in his present post, is further justified by the magnificent harvest all over the country this year. Well away from the starvation line for the first time for several years, the poorer natives, never so promising a material as the town intellectual at the worst of times, will be still less malleable.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris and to His Majesty's Consul-General in Tangier.

I have, &c.
L. H. HURST.

[W 10858/1730/28] No. 19.

Consul-General Cook to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 63 E.)
My Lord, *Rabat, July* 13, 1939.

WITH reference to Rabat despatch No. 107 E. of the 12th December last, I have the honour to report that the Conseil du Gouvernement held it half-yearly session at Rabat on the 28th and 29th June last. As is customary, the meeting proper opened with an address by the Resident-General, describing social and economic developments during the last six months and outlining the policy and the activities of each department of the Administration.

2. This year a budgetary committee of the Conseil was summoned to sit beforehand on the 27th June, and it transpired that it had suddenly become necessary to raise an additional sum of 15 million francs by taxation during the remaining half of the present financial year. This sum represents one-half of the annual cost to France of the Moroccan defence services, an item which the metropolitan Government has for some years past waived in favour of the Moroccan budget, but now no longer feels called upon to do so. Various expedients were submitted to the committee by the official departments concerned, and it was decided to raise the amount needed by two new taxes, to be applied almost immediately. These were an additional tax of 20 centimes per litre on petrol and a stamp-tax of 1 per cent. on the value of customs and revenue receipts. One section of the committee wished to institute a tax on the profits of limited companies, but the proposal was not accepted by the authorities, although it is thought in some quarters that the idea is only temporarily shelved now that it has once been raised.

3. The Resident-General's speech began with a reference to the record harvest of this year. The four principal cereals would yield 80 million quintals, a figure never before reached in Morocco, the population of which would not only be preserved from the famines of recent years, but would be able to accumulate reserve stocks—a useful factor in case of war. Even with the lower prices ruling for soft wheat, the native grower would this year receive a fair reward for his labour; the official Wheat Office had reduced the price of bread and intended to form stocks equivalent to 10 per cent. of the cereals reaching the market. The free export of barley had already been re-established, and the comparative lowness of world prices now ruling would both allow the poorer classes to purchase more easily and encourage native farmers to form the reserves made necessary by the unreliable climate of this country. In spite of preoccupations in France and Algeria caused by the abundant harvests there, the Protectorate Government had managed to retain the same duty-free quotas as in previous years. Satisfactory progress had been made as regards marketing Moroccan wines and vegetable produce. Thanks to an official campaign in the United Kingdom, the latter country had absorbed already this year 100,000 quintals of potatoes and 300,000 cases of tomatoes. The marketing of esparto grass had been successfully stablised, and it was hoped to do the same for another

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important local product—vegetable fibre. Cattle breeding was showing encouraging results, in response to official efforts at improvement, and larger quotas for Moroccan cattle, pigs and mutton had been obtained in Paris. The mining industry continued to make further progress year by year. At Djerada the production of anthracite had reached 11,000 tons per month, and more than 100,000 tons of iron ore had been extracted in the first quarter of 1939. Prospecting was going on for iron, manganese and antimony in several districts, and it was hoped to discover beds of soft coal near the Algerian borders. The yield of mineral oil remained low (about 350 tons per month), but recent discoveries in the Gharb area were encouraging.

4. Turning to the commercial aspect of the last six months, General Noguès stated that less improvement was apparent, but that the present rich harvest would doubtless bring a change for the better before long. The question of quotas for Moroccan produce entering France had developed favourably during the past year. Quotas as a whole had been stabilised, and in some categories even increased; market-gardeners, for instance, should now be able to organise their production, and learn not to depend on the French market, but to explore other outlets abroad. The official departments concerned with economic affairs had been working at arrangements for exporting Moroccan meat and animal products to Great Britain, as also Moroccan wines to Switzerland, and had been studying, in concert with the metropolis, ways and means of stemming the inrush of goods from countries which buy practically nothing from the Protectorate. Unofficial discussions had been going on with a view to the resumption of commercial relations between the French and Spanish Zones, and it was hoped that they would lead to the desired result as soon as possible. Morocco had been represented at the New York and Liège exhibitions, while the local trade-fairs here had enjoyed much success. Imports for the first three months of the year had risen from 483 million francs in 1938 to 522 million in 1939, while exports had risen for the same period from 322 million francs in 1938 to 428 million in 1939. Unemployment among Europeans here of any skill or capability had practically disappeared, and there was now a demand for labour from outside.

5. The Resident-General then went on to describe the material progress which continues to be made in this comparatively new country. Various important new roads were being properly built, including two towards Algeria and Senegal respectively. Railways showed an increase in receipts of over 18 per cent. compared with a year ago, thanks to the system of controlling road transport. The registration of new private motor-cars had risen considerably in the first quarter of 1939, and the proportion of French cars had increased from 38 per cent. in 1936 to 70 per cent. so far this year. Important harbour works were in progress at Casablanca, Saffi and Agadir. At the first-named port an eight-year plan of work had been drawn up, including schemes for two new quays, deepening of basins, a commercial mole and a graving-dock. At Agadir the jetty was being extended year by year, according as the funds received from France allowed. Traffic in Moroccan ports as a whole showed an increase of 20 per cent. for the first four months of 1939 compared with the same period of 1938. The consumption of electricity had similarly risen by 12 per cent. over last year's figures, and helped in itself to justify the important hydraulic schemes now in preparation. Work had already started on some of these, while minor irrigation works had been carried out in all parts of the country, including the oases and semi-desert regions of the south. Organised efforts continued to be made to spread improved agricultural methods among the native farming population, and rural elementary schools were being established in different sectors of the country under expert guidance in practical farming instruction.

6. All these efforts, the Resident-General pointed out, served to provide for a continually increasing Moroccan population. Thanks to modern hygiene, the birth-rate in this country was rising and the death-rate falling. The grave typhus epidemics of recent years had shown no signs of reappearing this last winter, owing to the sanitary measures taken in town and country, including nearly 150,000 inoculations so far this year.

7. Provision for increased primary and secondary education had had to be made, for European and Moroccan pupils alike. The increase in European scholars this year had been nearly 2,000, while the figure was 4,000 in the case of Moroccan pupils. The latter now numbered nearly 26,000, and the Resident-General stressed his desire that their education should be practical, whether in

town or country, and should make them good farmers or good artisans. Schemes were being studied for placing the natives in suitable positions when they left school.

8. After a short dissertation on the strength of the friendly attachment which at present joins Morocco to the French nation, General Noguès passed, in conclusion, to the call for practical expression to these sentiments in the shape of a future annual contribution of 30 million francs for defence purposes, to be raised by new taxation. Certain forms of taxation, such as customs-duties and consumption-duties, had been pushed to the limits of prudence in this country, and were yielding only the bare budgetary estimates, or even less. The two taxes adopted, on petrol and on customs-receipts respectively, involved no change in system or expense of recovery, and could be quickly repealed if so desired later on. A tax on the profits of commercial societies, however, needed too much careful study to be adopted at present, and might drive away much-needed capital from the Protectorate if embarked upon too quickly.

9. The speech ended in an appeal for unity in the face of present dangers. Shortly afterwards the usual sectional and regional discussions began among the members of the Conseil du Gouvernement, which is, of course, an advisory body only, and its debates are of no particular interest in most cases, except to the orators concerned.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris and to His Majesty's Consul-General in Tangier.

I have, &c.
F. A. G. COOK.

[W 11560/373/28]

No. 20.

Mr. Keeling to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received August* 4.)

(No. 157.)

Tangier, July 22, 1939.

My Lord,

MY Italian Colleague came to see me a few days ago on a routine matter and remained on to explain to me the attitude, which he said his Government proposed to take up regarding Tangier in the forthcoming period. It was obvious, M. de Rossi said, that there was going to be a tussle between France and Spain for the predominant position here. The Spaniards had begun, with articles in the local Spanish paper, the *España* (see my despatch No. 131 of the 24th June, 1939), claiming that for historical and geographical reasons Tangier could only belong to Spain. The *Action française* has now replied in an article, which has no doubt been brought to the notice of your Department, that Tangier is for French Morocco what Danzig is for Germany. As between Spain and France, M. de Rossi continued, there could never be any doubt with which country Italian sympathies lay generally, but in the particular case of Tangier the Italian Government were anxious not to take sides in an active way but rather to follow the impartial policy which they understood to be that of His Majesty's Government, with whom they hoped to work with a view to maintaining the balance and preserving the international character of the zone. The Spaniards, he implied, would give plenty of trouble in due course; meanwhile he objected to what he called the French policy of "Tunisification" here. He thought the situation would at once improve if Tangier police could be got out of their hands and placed under an Englishman, if possible; and, if not, under any neutral—a Scandinavian, a Swiss or a Dutchman.

2. After further conversation M. de Rossi left me with the assurance that the Italian Government were most anxious to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in maintaining the statute and the international régime.

3. No one would accuse M. de Rossi of being over-reliable, but he was evidently anxious that I should report the above to your Lordship.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Rome and San Sebastian.

I have, &c.
E. KEELING.

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[W 12681/373/28] No. 21.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, August 28, 1939.*

DURING course of visit which I paid administrator Tangier Zone early this morning, M. le Fur told me confidentially that if war should come and Italy came in with Germany, he would do his best to obtain necessary powers to expel all Italians from zone. Italian colony numbered some 900, and a hostile Italy presence here would constitute grave danger to the administration. They had already proved how troublesome they could be during recent Spanish Civil War. See my immediately following telegram.

[W 12685/373/28] No. 22.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, August 28, 1939.*

MY immediately preceding telegram. Italian Consul-General spoke to me later this morning regarding the situation of Italian colony in Tangier, in the event of hostilities. He explained that while he was not speaking under instructions from Rome he personally considered any action against Italians in zone would constitute a breach of article 3 of the statute.

2. The Dutch Consul-General called later and tells me that Italian colleague had spoken to him on the same sense and had added a warning to the effect that if Holland and Belgium did not protest against any anti-Italian action by the gendarmes, they would, in the opinion of the Italian Government, endanger their own neutrality.

3. Neither the Dutch Consul-General nor I myself expressed any opinion to our Italian colleague on these questions, and that the Dutch Consul-General is referring the matter to The Hague regarding the violation of Dutch-Belgian neutrality in the event of [? hostilities] (see paragraph No. 2 above) seems an exaggeration. We also appreciate the fact that the substantial local Italian community will be a source of preoccupation to the French in case Spain proves benevolently neutral towards Italy.

This matter may of course become a live issue shortly, and I should be glad of your views.

[W 12696/373/28] No. 23.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, August 29, 1939.*

MY telegrams Nos. 51 and 52.

French Consul-General, whom I saw last night, takes strong line. He tells me he feels confident his Government would not countenance presence of Italians in Tangier should Italy take part in hostilities, and he thinks from a legal point of view their expulsion could be arranged, but he has not yet taken advice as to this.

2. Even if Italy remained neutral, M. Avonde is of the opinion that presence of Italians here would be extremely embarrassing. He is telegraphing to his Government in this sense and asking for instructions.

[W 13144/5050/41] No. 24.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, September 4, 1939.*

SPANISH Consul-General, during a visit which he paid to me this morning, stressed Spain's desire to maintain complete neutrality in the conflict.

2. Speaking of the status of Tangier, he further said that his Government would do all in their power to assist in the preservation of existing régime. Spain was particularly interested in Tangier, and she could not suffer any change of the *status quo*.

(Repeated to San Sebastian, No. 11.)

[W 12696/373/28] No. 25.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Gascoigne (Tangier).

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 6, 1939.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 53 and 56 [of 29th and 31st August: Italians in Tangier].

Question of any action in Tangier on the lines referred to needs to be very carefully considered and controlled in view of the international situation and the urgent need of not antagonising Italy or Spain. French Ambassador has been so informed.

2. No step should be taken which infringes Tangier's neutrality (article 3 of statute), and you should therefore resist any proposal to expel Italians merely because Italy is a belligerent—and *a fortiori* if Italy remains neutral. Before resorting to expulsion, procedure for which is laid down in article 29 of statute and article 4 of dahir organising the administration of the zone, reasonable grounds should be advanced, *e.g.*, under article 10 of the statute. In order to ensure maintenance of neutrality, it may be necessary for Administration to consider measures for strict control of communications, including foreign consulate and other wireless installations.

3. Should the situation mentioned in Foreign Office telegram No. 22 [of 31st August] arise, no foreign troops should be allowed into the zone except after consultation with French Government and His Majesty's Government.

4. His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris is being instructed to communicate with French Government on above lines.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 320, *en clair* (by bag).)

[C 13619/13619/28] No. 26.

Mr. Makins to Mr. Gascoigne (Tangier).

(No. 188.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 16, 1939.*

I AM directed by Viscount Halifax to inform you that on the 11th September the French Embassy made a verbal communication in connexion with a telegram which had been received from the French Minister at Tangier proposing the expulsion of German nationals from the Tangier Zone.

2. In this telegram M. Avonde states the legal position is as follows:—

> " Ces derniers (les Allemands) sont en dehors du statut et après examen avec le Mendoub il apparaît que la publication d'un dahir ou l'abrogation de la loi tangeroise de juin 1933 les concernant ne sont pas nécessaires pour permettre leur expulsion de la zone de Tanger. Leur entrée dans la zone est subordonnée à une autorisation des autorités métropolitaines ou consulaires françaises et leur résidence ici au maintien de l'autorisation de séjour donnée ou prolongation par le Mendoub. Si donc ce dernier la retire ils se trouvent en situation irrégulière et doivent quitter Tanger."

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3. M. Avonde stated that he had sounded his Spanish and Portuguese colleagues, who did not oppose his views; and the Spanish Minister also is said to have declared himself willing to facilitate the departure of Germans from Tangier to the Spanish Zone. M. Avonde stated further that he would not propose to expel Jewish refugees from Germany.

4. The French Government were anxious to learn the views of His Majesty's Government as soon as possible, and in the meantime proposed to take no action in the matter.

5. The position was accordingly carefully examined, and in a letter to the French Embassy, copy of which is enclosed herewith, it was stated that His Majesty's Government saw no objection to the proposal that steps should be taken to expel all Germans, except Jewish refugees, from the Tangier Zone, but that as Anglo-French interests would probably suffer more than they gained if the expulsion of Germans led to a conflict with Spain, it was desirable, before any steps were taken in the matter, that the French Government should assure themselves that the Spanish Government will, in fact, raise no serious objection.

6. Copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I am, &c.
R. MAKINS.

Enclosure in No. 26.

Mr. Kirkpatrick to M. Roché.

My dear Roché, *Foreign Office, September* 13, 1939.

I HAVE looked into the question of the position of Germans in the Tangier Zone, about which you spoke to me on Monday.

We agree with the statement of the legal position you showed me, and we see no objection to the proposal of the French Minister at Tangier that steps should be taken forthwith to expel all Germans except Jewish refugees from the Tangier Zone.

It appears clear from the report of the French Minister that the Spanish Government are unlikely to raise any objection. Anglo-French interests would probably suffer more than they gained if the expulsion of Germans led to a conflict with Spain, and we assume, therefore, that the French Government will, before proceeding to the expulsion of Germans, assure themselves that the Spanish Government will, in fact, raise no serious objection.

Yours ever,
I. KIRKPATRICK.

[C 14256/13619/28] No. 27.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received September* 20.)

(No. 188.)
My Lord, *Tangier, September* 3, 1939.

IN view of the outbreak of war, I have the honour to submit to your Lordship a brief report on the political situation in Tangier, with particular reference to the attitude of Italy and Spain. During the past week, I have had the opportunity afforded by my first arrival here of visiting my foreign colleagues, as well as the Administrator of the Tangier Zone, and other zone officials. As a result of my conversations with these gentlemen, I have formed the following impressions regarding the situation which seems likely to obtain here for the present:—

2. As your Lordship is aware, the position of the International Zone as an "enclave" in Spanish Morocco is a particularly delicate one. Given a Spain actively hostile to France and England, the neutral status of Tangier would be

in considerable danger. If Spain doubted that the democratic forces held the command of the Mediterranean, she might attempt to seize Tangier by force, a *coup* which would presumably be countered by the French. This would bring to the International Zone innumerable dangers and complications. But the general opinion of my colleagues and of other well-informed persons is that the indications available here at present show that Spain has decided to remain neutral. What particular brand of neutrality she proposes to display, is not yet clear, but the danger of a Spanish attack on the zone does not seem to be an actual one at present. If, however, Spain should use her neutral status to assist Germany, the large Spanish colony here, which now number some 8,000 persons, might prove to be a considerable burden to the Administration. But, here again there are signs of which way the wind is blowing. The Spanish newspaper *España* of Tangier, a daily morning newspaper, which up till quite recently was loud in its abuse of the democracies, changed its tone after the conclusion of the Germano-Soviet agreement, and I have noted since my arrival its impartial attitude. Moreover, the French Minister tells me that his Spanish colleague has been at pains to impress upon him Spain's desire to maintain the strictest neutrality, an event which Señor Peche also prophesied to me, some days ago. My French colleague will shortly pay a visit to the new Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan, and as soon as I can absent myself from here, I shall do likewise.

3. In my telegrams Nos. 51, 52, 53 and 56 of the 28th, 29th and 30th August, respectively, I had the honour to invite your Lordship's attention to the attitude of the Administrator of the Tangier Zone and to that of my French colleague, towards the Italian colony here. Since these telegrams were sent, the situation has to some extent been clarified, in that Italy appears reluctant to enter the conflict against us. But, here again, we may meet with considerable trouble should the Italian colony, perhaps in collusion with the Spaniards, decide to use their neutrality to favour the German cause. Whilst referring to the case of the Italians, it is of interest to note that in spite of the reports current during last week that the members of the Italian colony had received instructions from their Minister to cross into the Spanish Zone in the event of war, the impression derived by persons in contact with this community was that they showed no anxiety in regard to such an event. This is a directly opposite attitude to that adopted by the Italians during the last international crises.

4. As regards the native population of the zone, which numbers some 45,000, I am told by my French colleague that "he has them absolutely in hand." M. Avonde stated to me only to-day that the attitude of the Moors residing in Tangier was extremely satisfactory from our point of view, and that he anticipated no trouble whatsoever.

5. The Administrator, M. Le Fur, has, during the past few days, in collaboration with members of the Legislative Assembly, drafted same special regulations to be enforced during the period of the war. These include (*a*) the control of prices, and (*b*) the prohibition of the re-export of food-stuffs from the zone. As regards (*b*), however, the draft regulation contains a saving clause whereby it will be possible for Gibraltar to continue to obtain from Tangier an amount of food-stuffs equal to, but not exceeding that which she has been taking up to now. Individuals residing in the Spanish Zone, many of whom are in the habit of purchasing their own supplies of food in Tangier, will also be permitted to continue this practice; whilst, as regards the general requirements of the Spanish Zone, I understand that a Spanish delegation is now at Rabat with the object of arranging for a direct source of supply from French Morocco. In so far as the supply of food for the Tangier Zone is concerned, M. Le Fur tells me that he is optimistic that the arrangements which he has made with the authorities in French Morocco, whence Tangier receives the greater part of her supplies, will suffice.

6. In conclusion, I have the honour to state that in my opinion, and in that of His Majesty's Consul, who has had considerable experience in Tangier, and whose assistance is proving invaluable to me, the situation here, although doubtless it will become extremely delicate at times, should not prove to be one of insuperable difficulty. I am aware of your Lordship's views regarding the necessity of adhering closely to the provisions of the Statute and thus of maintaining the complete neutrality of the Tangier Zone. In the carrying out of this policy, I feel, as a result of the first contacts which I have made with him,

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that I can rely upon the support and assistance of my French colleague; and it is my intention to endeavour to cultivate the most intimate relations with M. Avonde throughout the difficult days which lie ahead.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar, His Majesty's Ambassadors at San Sebastian, Paris and Rome, His Majesty's Consul-General at Rabat and His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 15367/13619/28] No. 28.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received October* 2.)

(No. 202.)
My Lord, *Tangier, September* 19, 1939.

ON the declaration of war my French colleague immediately consulted his Government regarding the desirability for the expulsion of such German subjects as were resident in the Tangier Zone.

2. I should explain that despite the fact that German subjects have no treaty rights in Tangier (Treaty of Versailles, article 141, *et seq.*), permission has been granted to a certain number of German merchants and others to reside in the zone. The German colony here on the 3rd September amounted, I am informed, to some seventy persons, which included German and Austrian Jewish refugees.

3. My French colleague has now informed me that his Government have agreed that the Mendoub should expel such German subjects whose presence in the zone is considered undesirable under the present circumstances. Exception, however, is being made of Jewish refugees and certain others who are well known to be harmless.

4. M. Avonde has shown me the correspondence which he exchanged with the Quai d'Orsay regarding this matter, from which it appears that the French Government did not fail to consult your Lordship. I have not, therefore, considered it necessary to weary you with this question, and I only report it now for purposes of record.

5. I should add that M. Avonde informs me that amongst the German subjects who will be expelled—some thirty in number—there are many propagandists and *agents provocateurs*, who have been endeavouring, no doubt under instructions from their Government, to sow dissension amongst the Moorish population.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 16463/13342/28] No. 29.

Mr. Hunt to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received October* 13.)

(No. 98.)
My Lord, *Rabat, October* 3, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to report that the assurances as to the satisfactory attitude of the native population of the French Zone of Morocco and its continuance given to me by the Resident-General last July, as reported in my despatch No. 59 of the 7th of that month, have been fully justified by events.

2. The introduction of a war-time régime and the commencement of hostilities against the Reich have nowhere in this zone called forth a discordant note. A message from His Majesty the Sultan dated the 3rd September recalled that, after victory had in the last war crowned the standards of France and her Allies, amongst whom Morocco was proud to be included, the Government of the Republic had spared no efforts to bring about a lasting peace. These endeavours had unfortunately been wasted on their common enemies. His Majesty then drew a brief comparison between conditions in Morocco before the Protectorate Treaty and now. It was the duty of all Moroccans to show their lively gratitude for the inestimable benefits bestowed on them by France and to help her unreservedly,

sparing no resources and no sacrifices. This message was read in all mosques in Morocco. His Shereefian Majesty also addressed a telegram to the President of the French Republic assuring him of the unwavering sentiments towards France of himself, his entourage and all his subjects, and assuring the President that they would be whole-heartedly at his side and give the utmost help their resources permitted without stint or restrictions. His Majesty took a further opportunity of expressing the unshakable attachment to France of himself and his people in a declaration which he made at Moulai Idris before entering the sanctuary there of the founder of Islam in Morocco. The occasion was that of the annual gathering there which brings together many thousands of Moslems from Northern Morocco, and at which General Noguès (whose duties as General Commanding the French forces in North Africa now entail his absence from the French Zone, the administration of which is left to the délégué, M. Morize) was also present.

3. His Majesty's Consul at Marrakesh reported early last month that the native reservists were crowding in many times as fast as had been expected and that the spirit in his district appeared to be excellent This may be taken as representative of the whole zone.

4. Besides many messages of sympathy and support from local bodies, practical action has been taken by a group of twelve Moslem notables of Fez, who have initiated a collection of funds in view of purchasing and presenting a warplane to France.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris and to His Majesty's Consul-General in Tangier.

I have, &c.
S. H. HUNT.

[C 17008/13619/28] No. 30.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 216.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 3, 1939.

IN my despatch No. 188 of the 3rd September last I had the honour to furnish your Lordship with a brief report on the political situation at this post. One month has now elapsed since the outbreak of war, and, although the political alignment of many of the European Powers still remains uncertain, the attitude of Italy and Spain, two of the countries which show particular interest in this zone, has become less fluid.

2. Thus, in so far as can be foreseen at present, Italy is not so open in adherence to the Axis policy, and Spain appears to have decided to remain neutral. The effect on Tangier of this is a beneficial one, for, with a quiescent Italy and a quasi-neutral Spain, the chances of an armed *coup* against this zone must disappear. Furthermore, the Italian and Spanish communities in Tangier have, up to now, behaved tolerably well, and the two consuls-general concerned are, for the time being at least, co-operating with the Administrator of the Zone in keeping their nationals in leash.

3. But if the political picture here is clearer than it was a month ago, the financial and economic conditions obtaining are, owing to war conditions, deteriorating rapidly. I have had the honour to inform your Lordship in my telegrams Nos. 73 and 74 of the 19th September that currency control, which is now in force in French Morocco, will be likely to be extended to Tangier in due course. This question has been under discussion here for some weeks, but the actual methods to be employed in the application of such a control have not yet taken shape. It is necessary, I submit, that any measures of control which are instituted here should be applied in such a manner as to impair in as small a degree as possible the neutral status of Tangier; and it is to this end that we are unofficially working in our search for a formula which would at once be effective in preventing speculation against the franc, and at the same time would conform with the régime of economic equality laid down in the Act of Algeciras, and confirmed in article 7 of the Tangier Statute.

4. Since the last days of August the international trade of Tangier has been almost completely paralysed. The two main reasons for this are: (*a*) the difficulty of commmunication—no ships other than the tri-weekly ferry steamer

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to and from Gibraltar and a very occasional French "*paquet*" ship from Marseilles have put into this port, the harbour of which, as your Lordship is aware, is greatly exposed; and (*b*) the difficulty which is experienced, even in the absence of currency control in this zone, of obtaining foreign exchange. I shall furnish your Lordship with a detailed report on the financial and economic conditions here as soon as the situation is more settled. No doubt the difficulty of sea transit will grow less as our convoy system is organised, and it is also hoped that, under a modified currency control, traders in Tangier will be assured of a supply of foreign exchange for use in all genuine commercial transactions.

5. The supplies of essential food-stuffs for this zone have up to now been made available by the French authorities in Rabat, and M. le Fur, the Administrator of the Zone, who is himself a French colonial official of the Morocco service, is to be congratulated upon his successful arrangements. There is at present some shortage in such essentials as butter, sugar and paraffin, but, taken as a whole, the situation remains satisfactory—not the least important factor being that M. le Fur is on friendly personal terms with the authorities in the French Zone and can, therefore, influence them in a manner beneficial to his administration.

6. The Committee of Control have not, since the outbreak of war, had to deal with questions of first importance, and the atmosphere prevailing between the members is at present fairly satisfactory. Albeit the Italian and Spanish Consuls-General are ever searching for sticks with which to beat the administrator and discredit his administration. International politics, rather than questions of parochial importance, must, moreover, tend to influence the members of this international body at the present time, and the existing harmony may be difficult to preserve when complicated and contentious matters, such as that of currency control, come up for examination.

7. The above is more of a negative than a positive nature. I have, however, thought it well to send a general report to your Lordship to show that the situation here is as satisfactory as can be expected under war conditions. The aim for which I am glad to say that all my colleagues seem to be working at present is to preserve intact the neutral status of Tangier. This was achieved in face of considerable difficulty during the Spanish civil war, and if we can continue to preserve it now, the special régime in force here should emerge from the present period of conflict in Europe with a greatly enhanced reputation and stability for the future.

8. I am sending copy of this despatch to his Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar, His Majesty's Ambassadors at Madrid, Paris and Rome, His Majesty's Consul-General at Rabat, and His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan.

I have, &c.

A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 19792/14253/28] No. 31.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 4.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, December* 4, 1939.

SITUATION in Spanish Zone of Morocco.

His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan reports rumoured unrest in Spain appears reflected at Ceuta, where authorities are said to be carrying out arrests for no ostensible reason. With exception, however, of above and of a minor incident in Laraiche recently, consisting of a clash between rival Nationalist Moors, situation in Spanish Zone remains outwardly calm. Nevertheless, Monypenny reports that Moorish population is displeased with new High Commissioner's régime, which, from Moorish point of view, compares ill with more elastic policy of General Beigbeder.

2. As a result of enquiries made here, I see no reason at present to fear imminent trouble of a serious nature.

Despatch follows.

(Repeated to Madrid and Gibraltar.)

[C 20384/13619/28] No. 32.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, December* 14, 1939.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 193 of 30th September and my letter to Mr. Makins of 4th December: Question of appointment Spanish Administrator in Tangier.

2. I learn from a reliable source that the Spanish Government have now decided to liquidate their debt to Tangier Administration for the upkeep of the gendarmerie (your telegram No. 40 of 3rd November) and to use this as a lever to force their claim to administrator's post, basing this on Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1935 (see p. 8 Tangier annual report 1935). Señor Figueros (Secretary-General of High Commission, Tetuan) and Dr. Amieva (General Franco's agent at Tangier during Spanish civil war) are mentioned as candidates and a move will be made shortly.

3. I have discussed this matter with my Portuguese, Dutch and Belgian colleagues and we are all in agreement that at present time such an appointment would be most undesirable. My French colleague feels personally as we do, but he is embarrassed by 1935 agreement and his hands are tied. The Italian Consul-General may be expected to stand by Spain.

4. If French give in, the appointment will pass the Legislative Assembly, as with [? Jewish] and Moorish vote Spain will have a majority.

5. In accordance with their [group omitted: ? promise] French Government are possibly already consulting you in this matter. Would it not, in the special circumstances, be possible to suggest to them that, if official Spanish request is made, they should parry it by arguing that, owing to abnormal war conditions here, it would be imprudent to make any change at present? At the same time, the French Government might sweeten the traditional pill expressly stating that, as far as they were concerned, Spanish claim would be favourably considered at the end of hostilities.

6. Alternatively, could a word be said by us either in London or Madrid with a view to persuading the Spanish Government that this is not a propitious moment to put forward their claim? This course has, however, two drawbacks: (*a*) such an action might commit us to Spanish claim after the war, and (*b*) it might be misinterpreted as a French manœuvre.

[C 20559/13619/28] No. 33.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 16.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, December* 15, 1939.

MY telegram No. 90 of 14th December.

2. In the course of a conversation this morning with the Administrator of the Tangier Zone, I learned that both authorities of Rabat and those of "Deuxième Bureau" in Paris are now exerting strong pressure on the Quai d'Orsay not to give in to the Spanish request for immediate replacement of M. Le Fur by Spanish incumbent. The authorities of Rabat fear, if change is made now, disintegration of the present régime in Tangier will ensue, and this they would view with dismay. Second Bureau have been primed by the French Military Attaché here (who corresponds direct with this office) to the effect that the advent of the Spanish Administrator would have immediate repercussions upon the efficiency of Tangier police force, which would possibly result in local disturbances and thus provide an excuse for Spaniards to send in troops.

3. The above information, accuracy of which I do not question, seems to show the desirability for the Statute Powers to impress on the French Government that they also realise the importance of the retention at present of the French Administrator, and my Dutch, Portuguese and Belgian colleagues are

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communicating with their Governments generally in the sense of my telegram No. 90 of yesterday.

4. As the Spanish claim now seems likely to be resisted in so far as immediate future is concerned, it might not be opportune for us to make any mention of the matter to the Spanish Government. (Paragraph 6 of my immediately preceding telegram.)

[C 21101/13342/28] No. 34.

Consul-General Hurst to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 31.)

(No. 113.)

My Lord, *Rabat, December* 19, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch, No. 58 of the 16th instant, from His Majesty's Consul at Fez, in which Mr. Blanch conveys the impressions he has gained as to local Moorish reactions to the war of the Allies against the Reich.

2. Fez is the intellectual centre of Morocco and the stronghold of a Nationalist movement which, in so far as it had spread to them at all, has, in other parts of the French Zone and during the past few months, faded even further into the background than has been the case in Fez. In estimating the causes generally of this regression, I would stress the important part played by an improvement in the material well-being of the rural population. This improvement is due in the main (and as such only temporary) to the benefits arising from the largest harvest on record, but permanent reforms progressively introduced by the French since the appointment as Resident-General of General Noguès have also played a contributory part. Such a betterment of their lot naturally makes the country people less promising material for Nationalist intrigues.

3. Finally, I would add that if, in the simile with which Mr. Blanch closes his despatch, the son is to be taken as personifying the militant wing of the Nationalists which created serious trouble under Si Allal-el-Fassi in the autumn of 1937 (and any other comparison would be forced, since punishment was meted out to these alone) the beating was deserved.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, and to His Majesty's Consul-General in Tangier.

I have, &c.

L. H. HURST.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Consul Blanch to Consul-General Hurst.

(No. 58.)

Sir, *Fez, December* 16, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to submit to you hereunder my impressions of the reactions of Moorish opinion in Fez to the war with Nazi Germany, obtained in the course of conversations with my Moorish acquaintances since my return to Fez at the beginning of November.

2. The first and most significant fact I have observed is the apparent eclipse of the Nationalist movement as a subject of interest. I attribute this partly to the great reduction in the numbers of political prisoners still under detention, now that those serving a two years' sentence as a result of the 1937 troubles have been released; partly to the fact that such among these as might at other times be tempted to renew political agitation realise that indulgence in their fancy under present conditions would expose them to the risk of far heavier penalties than they have just undergone; and partly, also, that a more than usually good harvest affords an unpromising background upon which to work. Not to be overlooked in this connexion is the excellent work accomplished by Commandant Salanié of the Regional Bureau for Native Affairs during the two years he has been in charge of that office, and who is as universally praised by the inhabitants of Fez-Medina as is the memory of his immediate predecessor execrated.

3. Loss of ardour for the Nationalist movement may also be attributed to a certain disillusionment as regards those of its leaders who took refuge in the

Spanish Zone on account of their readiness to intrigue against each other and to accept Spanish money while doing nothing positive to further the cause of Moroccan freedom. One young Nationalist at Fez, who previously had been inclined to draw comparisons between the French and Spanish administration in Morocco greatly in favour of the latter, confessed to me that a visit to the Spanish Zone had stripped him of all his illusions.

4. As regards the war itself, I think opinions may be divided into three main categories. In the first place, among the most educated elements, a feeling of general sympathy with the Allies, coupled with the underlying hope that as a result of the war France may be obliged to concede a larger measure of political independence, and also the fear that an early and crushing victory over Germany would have the opposite effect. In the second category, mostly composed of the artisan and shop-keeper classes in the Old Town, I am told that inability to draw distinction between the fundamental differences separating the character and ideals of the democracies and Nazi Germany, and hostility to France, as being the country responsible for Morocco's loss of independence, have led many among them to see in Hitler the "liberator" of the German people, a man of simple tastes who wears only the uniform of a common soldier, and who, with lofty generosity, and unlike all other leaders, scorns to accept any salary from the State he serves so well, contenting himself with the revenues he draws from his writings. The inference being, presumably, that if he defeats Britain and France there is a chance that the Moors, too, may benefit from his liberating activities.

5. The third category consists of a group of extremists who, while sufficiently informed to realise that no good is likely to come to them from Germany, nevertheless have acquired such a feeling of resentment against France that they profess to welcome any change, however deleterious to their own condition, so that they may witness the spectacle of France licking the dust.

6. It is impossible to credit so fantastic an attitude with a large following, but it is a theme which I have heard repeated several times and by Moors of different stations in life, though by none of these, be it added, put forward as a personal profession of faith. It may reasonably be argued that such a view denotes an inherent belief in the invincibility of France upon the part of such as hold it, and I am inclined to regard it as the deformed offspring of the tendency, mentioned in the second sentence of paragraph 4 above, to look upon France's enemies as possible aids to the realisation of their aspirations.

7. This last is a natural enough attitude, and must be expected to continue until France has succeeded in convincing the more educated elements of her good faith. The better-informed Fassi looks towards Algeria and shudders. He hates Italy, yet sees in Italy the principal factor for the preservation of Tunisia's continued existence as a protectorate rather than as a province of France. Until recently he felt that such preservation might come to Morocco through the British, but the past two years have seen the disappearance of the last vestiges of such a hope, and left him with no other defence than France's integrity, in which he is not prepared, as yet, to put much trust.

8. Perhaps the attitude which most widely prevails is best illustrated by the following simile given me by one of the more intelligent and level-headed of the younger generation in Fez. He said: "the feelings of the majority towards France may be likened to those of a son towards a heavy-handed father. Just after receiving a beating the son may think he wants to find someone willing and capable of inflicting like punishment on his father, but when it comes to the point he will go to his father's side to help him beat off his assailant."

I have, &c.

J. W. BLANCH.

[C 1535/14/28] No. 35.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received January* 3.)

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *Tangier, January* 1, 1940.

IN my despatch No. 216 of the 3rd October last I had the honour to report to your Lordship that the general political situation obtaining in the Tangier Zone remained stable, and that in view of the non-belligerent, if not altogether

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neutral, attitude of Italy and Spain towards the present conflict, I saw no reason to anticipate serious internal tension such as, for instance, had prevailed in Tangier during a great part of the Spanish civil war. I am pleased to be able to inform you, at the turn of the year, that no untoward incidents have occurred in this zone since that date, and that there seems to be no reason why this happy state of things should not continue, given, of course, that the present conflict does not extend to the Mediterranean.

2. If the political part of the picture which I painted in my communication above referred to was a favourable one, the economic and financial portions were not so satisfactory. Since that despatch was written at the beginning of October, we have passed through a period of economic difficulty which might have had serious internal repercussions; this was, moreover, attended by a minor financial crisis. As regards the economic side, we were faced, after the outbreak of the war, as your Lordship is aware, with an almost complete dislocation of Tangier's foreign trade, and the zone found itself obliged to rely practically entirely upon the French Protectorate for the supplies of essential food-stuffs. At the same time, owing chiefly to the absence of customs revenue (due to the cessation of the foreign import trade), the funds in the Administration's exchequer sank to a low ebb, and we found ourselves drawing upon the reserve fund (a sum of 1 million francs), which at one moment became dangerously near to being exhausted. At the same time the French authorities at Rabat were said to be anxious that a currency control should be imposed upon this zone. This would have interfered with future commercial transactions, and it would have been difficult to implement. Moreover, such action would be contrary to the letter of the Act of Algeciras (article 7 of the Tangier Convention of the 16th December, 1923).

3. The 1st January, 1940, finds Tangier in a more satisfactory condition, both economically and financially. Certain legislation was passed with some difficulty in October regulating the supply of food-stuffs from the protectorate. The finances for 1939 will, I am informed, be closed with only a small deficit; and the budget estimates for 1940 have been passed by the Legislative Assembly and the Committee of Control. The British Director of Finance, Mr. Goligher, tells me, moreover, that he is hopeful that, with a partial resumption of the import trade, customs receipts will increase and he seems not unhopeful that the Tangier exchequer may once more regain its pre-war equilibrium. It is, indeed, true that some overseas trade is again being attracted to Tangier. The United States of America and Portugal are now sending commodities to this zone, and it may be that in a short time we shall find ourselves less dependent upon the French Protectorate for our necessaries of life. But, given the uncertainty of the international situation in Europe, it would be unwise to make any definite forecast. I trust in this connexion that our own modest import trade to Tangier will also be resumed (either in transit Gibraltar or even direct) and this has formed the subject of separate communications which I have addressed to the Department of Overseas Trade.

4. Although the Committee of Control has had some important and contentious legislation to deal with, the harmony of the meetings of that international body has not been disturbed to any marked extent. This is in great measure due to the tactful and efficient manner in which the President, my Belgian colleague, has conducted the business. I can only hope that the new Spanish Consul-General, Señor Amlàva, a local surgeon of some repute who acted as General Franco's "agent" in Tangier during the Spanish civil war, but who has never had any regular diplomatic experience, will be able to carry on in like manner when he takes over his duties as President from M. Polain this month.

5. If the above can be termed an optimistic picture, it must be admitted, I think, that this satisfactory state of things could not have been brought about if it had not been for the masterly and fearless manner in which M. le Fur, the French administrator of the zone, has handled a difficult situation. I was for this reason considerably concerned when I heard on good authority in December that the Spanish Government meant to approach the French Government with the request that the promise made by the latter in 1935 (that there should be a Spanish administrator) should be implemented forthwith. I therefore addressed to your Lordship my telegrams Nos. 90 and 91 of the 14th and 15th December, respectively, and my neutral colleagues likewise approached their Governments

in the hope that the serious results which might attend any change in the head of the Administration at this critical juncture should be represented to the French Government, and that the said Government might be induced to resist the Spanish claim until the end of the present European conflict. Since that time there has come to us here a feeling of *détente* so far as this matter is concerned; and although we have no concrete information on the subject, my colleagues appear to be under the impression that the Government of the Republic have succeeded in persuading General Franco's Administration to put the matter in cold storage for the present, but I have no confirmation of this from my French colleague.

6. This despatch contains no subject of salient interest, but I have thought it well to inform your Lordship that the general situation here is, in my opinion, and in the opinion of my foreign colleagues, as satisfactory as can be expected in these troublesome days. During the present conflict the chief aim of those responsible for the administration of Tangier should be the maintenance of the existing régime by the exercise of a strict adherence to the Statute. With the possible exception of the Spaniards, whose policy here is by no means clearly cut, but whose aims seem to lie in the discrediting of the Administration, thus creating an excuse to strengthen their claims in the International Zone, my colleagues are intent upon this course. While hostilities are taking place on a grand scale in Europe, it is only possible to mark time in Tangier. But with the advent of a just peace there should be a possibility of developing some of the resources of this zone, which since 1936 has lain continuously under the shadow of war.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Madrid and Rome, His Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar and His Majesty's consular officers at Rabat and Tetuan.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 320/85/28] No. 36.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received January* 8, 1940.)

(No. 271. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Tangier, December* 21, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the annual report on the heads of foreign missions at Tangier.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Tangier.

(Passages marked with an asterisk are taken from previous reports.)

Belgium.

*M. Francis Janssens, consul-general since the 30th July, 1937, with personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

His last post was minister at Addis Ababa.

M. Janssens is not very intelligent, but he is a perfect gentleman and a pleasant and friendly colleague.

His wife is of Dutch origin, a widow much younger than he, with a daughter. She dresses quite well and dabbles in spiritualism. They have taken an old house, done it up with good taste, and entertain agreeably. (Written in 1938.)

M. Janssens was succeeded on the 19th June, 1939, by M. Marcel Polain, consul-general, with the personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

M. Polain's last post was that of first Belgian representative to General Franco's Government. Previously he served for many years in Japan and Siam. He has succeeded M. Janssens as president of the Committee of Control. M. Polain seems to be sincerely Anglophile, and he is an intelligent and friendly colleague. Both he and his wife speak excellent English and Mme. Polain, a native of Ypres, was partly educated in England.

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France.

*M. Charles Avonde Froment, consul-general since the 28th December, 1936, with the personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

M. Avonde's whole career has been either in or connected with Morocco. Some ten years ago he was transferred to Paris, took part in the 1928 negotiations and subsequently was assistant in the African Section at the Quai d'Orsay until his present appointment. It was generally supposed that he came here with the idea of putting in two years abroad and, having made a name for himself, of succeeding M. de Saint-Quentin. (Written in 1938.)

I find M. Avonde a most helpful and loyal colleague. While he is conceited and egotistical, it must be admitted that he has immense knowledge regarding the French and Spanish Protectorates of Morocco, and, what is even more useful to me, he thoroughly understands the intricacies of the international administration of this port. I came to Tangier determined to do all I could to work with M. Avonde. I was, however, a little uncertain of my ground, as my predecessor had had serious differences with him in the past. I am glad to say that, up to the present, I have had no cause for complaint.

Mme. Avonde, who is his second wife, is the daughter of a "Front populaire" politician, and was a typist in a French Government office. She belongs to the middle strata of French society, and is much imbued with her own importance. Albeit, she is extremely active in looking after her large colony, and has been most friendly to my wife and myself.

The Avondes entertain largely, but almost exclusively their own colony.

Italy.

*M. Pierfilippo de Rossi del Lion Nero, consul-general since September 1935, with personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

He was Italian Minister at Athens before he came here, and it is generally supposed that he was moved on account of having been involved in the Veniselos revolt. He dislikes Tangier and everything connected with it, and for the last two years has been continually hoping for a move. Recently he was talked of for the embassy at Santiago. For a man so clever and active, it is rather surprising that he has not got on quicker in a service where promotion is generally not slow, but he has had powerful enemies at the Palazzo Chigi, including Signor Bastianini, and perhaps even Fascists were sometimes bored with M. de Rossi's dynamism. From what I heard when I was last in Rome and recently here, I should be inclined to say that he has survived his bad moment, and, having, it appears, succeeded in interesting Count Ciano in the question of Tangier, he may perhaps finish with something more in the limelight than Chile. (Written in 1938.)

I regret to report that M. de Rossi has not proved friendly to me. In consequence, however, of the difficult position which he has to take up here on account of the particular brand of neutrality adopted by his Government, I have affected not to notice his attitude, which is sometimes somewhat provocative.

He started soon after I had assumed my duties here by requesting me to assist him in a transaction which involved the transmission by our diplomatic bag of a considerable sum of money (his personal savings) to Switzerland. I was, of course, unable to satisfy his requirements, and it is possibly because of this that he has taken up a position against me personally which is unpleasant.

Mme. de Rossi is from Marseilles. Although French by birth, she is a tenacious Fascist, and is said to be anti-French in outlook. She is disliked by the French colony. The de Rossis, who used to entertain largely and lavishly, have lately given it up almost completely.

Netherlands.

*M. F. Gerth van Wijk, consul-general since January 1925, with personal rank of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

M. van Wijk was previously consul at Moscow, Petrograd and Zürich.

I agree with the view expressed in previous reports that he is a sound and friendly colleague, who, though never assuming a prominent part in discussions, can be relied upon to take a reasonable and unprejudiced view of matters dealt with by the Committee of Control. During 1937, when he was president, his good sense and calm did a lot to make things go smoothly in the Tangier Zone in spite of

the Spanish civil war. I should say that he has more of a solid Dutch wariness than real intelligence, and being fortunate enough to have no colony, his only interest is to have a peaceful life himself and he has often expressed to me the hope never to leave Tangier. Until recently his sentiments have been strongly pro-German as opposed to anything French. He represents German interests here, and as such has to do a good deal of entertaining in connexion with the visits of German warships. I should imagine he is very stingy, for his entertainments are surprisingly badly done, and his house smelly, squalid, dirty and altogether most un-Dutch. (Written in 1938.)

I agree with the sentiments expressed above by my predecessor. Although undoubtedly Germanophile, M. van Wijk has been extremely friendly to me, and I consider that he is an astute and reliable colleague. His only daughter was married to Lord Bute's youngest son in July of this year.

Portugal.

*M. Gastão Barjona de Freitas, consul-general since 1930, with personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

M. Barjona came here as consul-general in 1928. He was transferred to Paris at the end of 1929, but returned to Tangier at his own request at the end of the following year.

As his name implies (the son of Jonah) he is of Jewish descent. His secretaries and staff are all Jews, and the most important members of his colony are the numerous Portuguese Jewish bankers and business men here. (Written in 1938.)

M. Barjona suffers from angina pectoris and is extremely infirm. He is, I think, sincerely Anglophile, and he has an excellent knowledge and long experience of Tangier. He has been most friendly and helpful to me, and his advice is always at my disposal. As it is invariably good advice, I am in the habit of discussing local affairs freely with him.

Mme. Barjona is a United States citizen and hails from Chicago. She is handsome, albeit of a slightly flashy type. Life must be very difficult for her at present on account of her sick husband, to whom she devotes her whole time.

Owing to M. Barjona's illness, the Barjonas do no entertaining at all, and are hardly ever seen in Tangier society.

Spain.

*M. Prieto del Rio, consul-general since the 27th June, 1936, with personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

M. Prieto was formerly consul-general at Paris, and was appointed to Tangier just before the outbreak of the Spanish civil war to replace Señor Rojas y Moreno, whose recall had been asked for by the representatives of the foreign Powers at Tangier on account of his association with Communist elements at the time of the labour troubles in the spring and early summer of 1936.

M. Prieto and his wife never entertain, nor accept any but purely official invitations. (Written in 1938.)

M. Prieto was succeeded in March 1939 by M. Juan Peche y Cabeza de Vaca, consul-general, with personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

M. Peche started his career as secretary at the Spanish Legation in Lisbon, and served afterwards at Paris and Warsaw, whence he was transferred as consul to Fez (French Morocco). At the beginning of the Spanish civil war he was appointed to Alcazar Kebir (Spanish Morocco) by General Franco's Government. He was subsequently transferred to Tetuan, where he served on the staff of the High Commissioner, Colonel Beigbeder, until the end of the war in February of this year. In March 1939 he was appointed the first representative in Tangier of General Franco's régime.

My relations with M. Peche have been friendly.

He is married to a daughter of the late General Primo de Rivera, and it is said that it is chiefly owing to his marriage that he has been given the consulate-general here.

M. Peche has the reputation of being somewhat stupid, and his treatment of the large Spanish colony here, who are mostly composed of the partisans of the former Republican Government, has undoubtedly been tactless.

Mme. Juan Peche suffers from delicate health, owing partly, I suspect, to a long term of imprisonment which she served at Malaga during the civil war.

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United States of America.

*Hon. Maxwell Blake, diplomatic agent and consul-general.

Mr. Blake has been here since 1915, with the exception of the period between 1922 and 1925, which he spent in Albania and Australia. Owing to the fact that the United States have not adhered to the Tangier Statute, Mr. Blake holds himself aloof from the majority of affairs which interest his colleagues.

He is a sympathetic cultivated American gentleman, whose life has been embittered, if not ruined, by his family. Some fifteen years ago he and his first wife, an intelligent and charming compatriot who still lives here, were divorced and he married the present Mrs. Blake, a typically pretty Spanish girl from Gibraltar (real Spaniards refer to them as "cockroaches"). She was as uneducated as the rest of her class, but the tragedy for Mr. Blake, a man for whom the company of an intelligent woman was essential, has been that, in spite of all his efforts to educate her, she has remained after fifteen years with the mentality of a foolish child, and her girlish freshness gone, whereas the rest of her family, who arrived with her and settled down in Mr. Blake's house, have at least been much cleverer and have educated themselves, and generally improved their material and social position.

He is a brilliant talker, an expert connoisseur of pictures and works of art generally, and a very good friend. The United States Legation is the only one remaining in the old part of the town, and he has put all his treasures and his artistic skill into kneading together the various old Moorish houses which together now form the official residence, which also has for him a further sentimental interest, as being the first house acquired by the United States Government for the accommodation of the representatives abroad. It is, however, always doubtful whether his successor, who may prefer to live in one of the modern quarters, will appreciate the money which has been spent upon the reconstruction of the present house.

Mr. Blake entertains profusely and well on the basis of a large consumption of champagne and other liquors. (Written in 1938.)

I agree entirely with the foregoing. Mr. Blake is proving a very obliging colleague, and he is always ready to give his advice when I have occasion to ask for it. He enjoys the unique position here of being the only "diplomatic" representative. As he takes no part in the Committee of Control, he is relieved of the chief burden of this post, and he seems to spend most of his time in redecorating a new house, also in the old part of the town, on which he is spending large sums of money.

[C 443/97/28] No. 37.

Consul-General Hurst to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 1 E.)

My Lord, *Rabat, January 1, 1940.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 107 E. and 63 E. of the 12th December, 1938, and the 13th July, 1939, respectively, I have the honour to report that the Conseil du Gouvernement met on the 27th and 28th December for consideration of the 1940 budget of the protectorate.

2. The figures, which may undergo one or two small modifications before final approval in Paris, foresee a total revenue of 1,170,832,500 fr. and expenditure of 1,170,691,390 fr., being thus some 14 million francs below the respective totals for the preceding year. Apart from special war-time taxation already introduced, and which is for the most part on similar lines to that established in France, and to increases in the postal rates, export dues on minerals and the duty on the higher classes of tobacco, no fresh taxation is imposed.

3. The Resident-General, in his opening address, dealt in far less detail than usual with the composition of the budget, and devoted most of his speech to consideration of the special circumstances arising from the war.

4. General Noguès said that, until victory be attained, national defence must have priority over all else. This did not mean stopping a development which was still far from complete in view of the vast potentialities of Morocco. On the contrary, they must extend their means of production to the maximum,

both to meet the requirements of France in food and armaments and to obtain for her foreign exchange by their exports.

5. Inspired by the Sultan, Morocco had answered the call nobly in the hour of need. In spite of a shameless enemy propaganda, mobilisation had been effected calmly and smoothly, French and Moroccan were united in sympathy and mutual help and a state of more complete security had never existed in the country. Those Moroccans who had formerly shown impatience at an evolution which must needs be slow were now amongst the first to offer assistance. The French army would contain a vastly larger number of French from Morocco and of Moors than in 1914. The latter were volunteering with a touching eagerness. Furthermore, Morocco would send to metropolitan France native workmen who were needed for agriculture and industry.

6. The country had been favoured last year with a magnificent harvest and was freed from cares as to its own needs. But all obtainable surpluses were precious both for the needs of France and her Allies and for commercial exchange. Early rains had necessitated an early preparation for the ensuing harvest. The arrangements made allowed them, given satisfactory weather conditions, to reckon on a good harvest this year also; the areas sown with cereals by Europeans were not less than those for the preceding year and the natives had ploughed more land than previously. In agreement with the French Government, a plan of agricultural production had been drawn up which provided especially for an appreciable development of the cultivation of oleaginous plants and of cotton.

7. As regards minerals, they could materially help France and her Allies by developing the Djerada coalfields and by supplying manganese, lead, iron and zinc, as well as rare ores such as cobalt and molybdenum. The Phosphates Office could meet all calls and obtain important supplies of foreign currency by sales in markets abroad. Oil prospecting was being actively continued, and petrol produced in Morocco had been put on sale for the first time.

8. In the field of industry, a vast programme of construction of flying-training schools and factories was very soon to be carried out, and would need a sustained effort on the part of the contractors to be completed within the period contemplated. So it was with the extension of the ports of Casablanca and Agadir.

9. The population must accept willingly and in a spirit of sacrifice all war-time measures imposed. They were few and light compared with those in force in France. He had, the Resident-General continued, done his best to make the regulations governing foreign trade as simple as possible, and had, by securing the allotment of three more ships, obtained additional carrying-space for Moroccan exports. Apart from some slight shortage of vegetable oils, Morocco had really been deprived of nothing since the outbreak of hostilities. Petrol and other petroleum derivatives, so important in war, had been rationed. Morocco, like France, must abstain from all unnecessary purchases in foreign markets. It had been impossible to prevent a certain rise in prices; Morocco was more dependent on imports from abroad than France.

10. Turning to consideration of the budget, General Noguès said that, thanks to the stability of such receipts as the "tertib" tax on agricultural produce and livestock, the contribution of the Phosphates Office, and the sale of tobacco, coupled with the previous year's conversion of the loan for railway construction, there were no new taxes, apart from the special war measures. One of these latter imposed a special tax on those who, in spite of being of military age, retained their civil employment or whose income remained the same or even rose. At present only French were liable, but the extension to foreigners was under consideration. Next, a deduction from salaries had been brought into force, but on a more reduced scale than in France. On the other hand, an increase in the "patente" tax on trades and professions had been essential, in view of the advantages enjoyed by those whose age or nationality exempted them from mobilisation over those whose professional activities had suffered by their call to the colours. Finally, the application to Morocco of the measures regarding the limitation of war profits had been indispensable.

11. As regards expenditure, none of the essential proposals had been given up. Thus, the 15 million francs for irrigation was still included.

12. Too many firms were insisting on cash sales. If understandable in respect of international transactions, this appeared unnecessary in respect of

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operations within Morocco. Credit establishments were discounting paper, as usual, and so the normal credits of peace time should prevail.

13. The exceptional effort imposed on Morocco by the war would in the end be profitable to her. Let them then look to the future in view of the adaptation thereto of their present labours for national defence. If the protectorate developed and organised well during the war her agricultural, industrial and mineral production, she would possess, in the difficult time which followed, an equipment, a range of products and prices which would enable her to furnish France with a portion of her needs and to struggle effectively against international competition.

14. The native section of the Conseil du Gouvernement, which always sits separately from the European section, met on the 30th December. After paying a tribute to the loyalty of the Sultan and his subjects, the Resident-General, in his address to it, was at pains to point out that the existence of war did not imply any halt in the progress of reforms and improvements. He also stressed the measures taken to avoid the inevitable rise in prices, and new or increased taxation from bearing too heavily on the poorer native classes.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, and His Majesty's Consul in Tangier.

I have, &c.
L. H. HURST.

[C 381/14/28] No. 38.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received January* 9.)

(No. 2.)
My Lord, *Madrid, January* 2, 1940.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your despatch No. 933 of the 21st December last, and to inform your Lordship that the Spanish Government are likely, in my opinion, to attach considerable importance to the question of their claim to the post of Administrator of the Tangier Zone.

2. It must be remembered that the Caudillo himself, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the recently-appointed Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs are all personally interested in Moroccan affairs in view of their previous connexions with that country. Furthermore, the Spanish Government are at present particularly concerned with the question of Spanish prestige, and are not in a mood to agree to any line of action which might be prejudicial to it.

3. It would seem difficult to resist the Spanish request in view of the terms of the Franco-Spanish exchange of notes of 1935, and any such attempt would, it appears, require to be based on the ground that a change in the administration of the zone in war conditions would be undesirable for all the interested parties. It is most unlikely that this contention will be received sympathetically by the Spanish Government.

4. As an example of the interest taken in Morocco by the present régime in Spain, I may mention that the Minister for Foreign Affairs' New Year card to me has taken the form of a pamphlet on *The British Dominion in Tangier in the 17th Century*. This pamphlet is published by the "General Franco Institute for the Study of Spanish-Arabian Questions" in Tangier.

I have, &c.
MAURICE PETERSON.

[C 1388/14/28] No. 39.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received January* 26.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, January* 26, 1940.

MY telegram No. 91, paragraph 1, 16th December, and Madrid despatch No. 2: Appointment of Spanish Administrator to Tangier.

French Administrator, who has just returned from Rabat, where he saw General Noguès, has sent me message to say that the latter, who is now in Paris, is much disturbed because he considers the Quai d'Orsay, and in particular the French Under-Secretary of State, do not realise the local importance to the French (and Allied) prestige of resisting Spanish claim at present.

2. General Noguès intends to take up the question personally with Minister for Foreign Affairs. He understands that the Spaniards mean to continue to press for Administrator's post and he will do all he can to persuade the French authorities to insist on matters being "side-tracked" on the understanding that it will come up for discussion immediately after the war.

3. Very confidentially I hear from my Belgian colleague (who has received information from his embassy in Madrid) that Marshal Pétain, in his anxiety to please Spain, is urging his Government to give way.

(Repeated to Madrid and Paris, Saving.)

[C 1623/16/28] No. 40.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Representatives at Tangier (*No.* 1) *and Rabat* (*No.* 2).

Foreign Office, February 4, 1940.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid reports that in Government circles trouble is expected in Morocco, where the Germans have been even more active than in Spain, and that the trouble they have been fomenting is expected to occur in French Morocco also.

2. Please report if you can confirm.

(Addressed to Tangier, No. 1, and Rabat, No. 2.)

[C 1925/16/28] No. 41.

Consul-General Hurst to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received February* 5.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rabat, February* 5, 1940.

YOUR telegram No. 2.

I have never known French Zone quieter and foresee no likelihood of trouble. Rising cost of living might in future provide promising material for enemy agents if coupled with poor harvest, specially if present Resident-General and his team had been changed, but all this is hypothetical.

(Repeated to Tangier.)

[C 1909/16/28] No. 42.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received February* 5.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, February* 5, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 1 of 4th February.

I can supply no confirmation of opinion expressed in Madrid Government circles.

2. *Tangier Zone.*—All undesirable "Reich" Germans were expelled soon after the beginning of the war (see my despatch No. 202 of 19th September, 1939), and French secret police have German "contacts" in this zone well in hand.

3. *Spanish Zone.*—Germans are admittedly doing what they can to enlist the sympathy of the Moors against the Allies. They are also endeavouring, but ineffectively, to preserve German import trade. There are no signs at present, however, that trouble, *i.e.*, armed rising, will take place.

4. Unsatisfactory situation in Spain is to some extent reflected in Spanish Zone (see my telegram No. 85 of 4th December, 1939), where, owing to the present High Commissioner's unpopularity with the Moors, the soil is rendered more fertile for German propaganda. But the situation remains outwardly absolutely calm, and there have been no incidents this year.

5. His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan agrees with the above, and he will watch the situation most carefully.

(Repeated to Madrid and Rabat.)

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[C 2658/16/28] No. 43.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, February* 19, 1940.

MY telegram No. 2: Situation in Spanish Zone of Morocco.

I learn from official French source that Germans have of late been particularly active in denouncing to Spanish authorities any individuals suspected of being out of sympathy with present régime. This has caused uneasiness among Spanish residents in zone. Object of Germans seems to be to endeavour to bolster up present Spanish régime by persuading authorities to arrest all likely sympathisers with late Red Government.

2. His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan reports that within last few days Spanish military authorities have started fresh recruiting drive for army among Moors. No official explanation has been given.

3. Apart from above, His Majesty's Consul reports situation in zone remains outwardly calm.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[C 2767/16/28] No. 44.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, February* 21, 1940.

MY telegram No. 3, paragraph 2.

His Majesty's Consul, Tetuan, reports Spanish military authorities intend to form eight additional Moorish battalions against any emergency which may arise. Hence Spanish Government is anxious about the situation in the peninsula, and wish to have reserves ready in Spanish Zone to deal with any trouble which may take place in Spain.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[C 3106/16/28] No. 45.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received February* 28.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, February* 27, 1940.

MY telegram No. 8 of 21st February: Situation in Spanish Zone.

I learn from French Military Attaché that four battalions of regular Moorish troops are now concentrated around Ceuta, presumably for despatch to the peninsula if required. Contrary to local rumour, I cannot confirm that any troops have crossed to Spain excepting small routine details.

Undeniably Spanish Zone remains outwardly absolutely calm, but the authorities are restricting freedom of movement of individuals and arrests are being made (see my telegram No. 3 of 19th February).

(Repeated to Madrid and Gibraltar.)

[C 5536/14/28] No. 46.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received April* 15.)

(No. 76.)
My Lord, *Tangier, March* 27, 1940.

IN my Savingram No. 1 of the 20th ultimo relative to the question of certain payments due by the Spanish Government to the Tangier Administration I had the honour to inform your Lordship of the efforts which I and my colleagues were making locally to come to an arrangement with the Spanish Consul-General over this troublesome question. I further stated in paragraph 4 of my Savingram above referred to that my Spanish colleague was threatening to take reprisals against Tangier unless the sum of some 2 million francs owed to Spain by the

Tangier Zone on account of Interzonal Customs compensation was paid immediately.

2. I need not weary your Lordship with a narrative of the trend of events which have taken place in connexion with this matter since that date; suffice it to say that, largely owing to the conciliatory attitude displayed by Dr. Amieva, and also, I should add, by General Asensio, the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan, we arrived at an agreement on this question during a meeting of the Committee of Control this morning.

3. I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum drawn up by my Spanish colleague setting forth the offer which Spain has now made for the final liquidation of her debt. Although your Lordship will observe that the Spanish Government has not found it possible fully to liquidate her voluntary payments, we all felt that the terms were as good as we could hope for, and they were accepted unanimously by the committee.

4. After this money has been received from Spain the Administrator will immediately pay the money which his services owe to Spain in the matter of the customs compensation.

5. As regards the future, I asked Dr. Amieva this morning whether we could rest assured that Spain would, during 1940, make all the payments to Tangier which were due from her, both those of a statutory and a voluntary nature. While Dr. Amieva gave me verbally a positive assurance that Tangier would receive the statutory payments, he explained that he could make no promise that the voluntary payments would be made, although he considered that Spain would do her best to furnish them.

6. I am inclined to think that we can feel easier as regards Spain's future participation in the financing of this administration, and I believe that the main reason which finally induced the Spanish Government partly to liquidate their debt was the fear that, if they did not do so, France would step into the breach and take over the payments. The resulting loss by Spain of prestige and influence in Tangier was more than she could bear.

7. It remains to be seen, however, whether in return for this settlement, which there seems no doubt that the Spanish authorities look upon in the light of a "concession" to Tangier, Spain will seek a "contre-partie," such as the appointment of a Spanish Administrator (my telegram No. 1 of the 26th January, 1940), the creation of mixed Franco-Spanish customs posts or the dismissal from the Tangier Administration of certain Spanish officials (my despatch No. 18, paragraph 4, of the 19th January, 1940). At present I have no reason to believe that she intends to do so, but, given the predatory mentality of the Spaniards and the paramount importance which they place upon increasing Spain's influence in this zone, it is not unlikely that they have some such move in mind.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Mémorandum.

LE Gouvernement espagnol maintient son point de vue sur les deux questions suivantes :

(*a*) Il se fait responsable des engagements contractés envers l'Administration de la Zone de Tanger par l'État espagnol et l'Administration de la Zone espagnole du Maroc, à condition que la date soit antérieure au 17 juillet 1936.

(*b*) Séparation absolue entre les obligations du budget national et celles de la Zone espagnole.

Malgré ladite décision, le règlement des arriérés, qui correspond aux engagements mentionnés, sera effectué par l'Espagne comme suit :

(19) 1,683,333·35 fr. pour les frais de l'entretien de la gendarmerie correspondant à 1936 et 1937(') et aux mois de janvier et février de 1939.

(') This should read "1937 et 1938."

(22) L'État espagnol offre une somme de 500,000 fr. comme paiement symbolique de l'apportation volontaire et " collaborations " qu'on a laissées sans payer jusqu'au 1er janvier 1940.

(32) Avec le versement des deux sommes susmentionnées, tous les arriérés de l'État espagnol et de l'Administration espagnole du Maroc avec la Zone de Tanger seront *considérés comme* totalement réglés jusqu'à la *date du 1er janvier* 1940 et, à partir de celle-ci, il y aura une totale indépendance entre les comptes du budget de l'État espagnol et ceux de la Zone du Protectorat espagnol du Maroc.

Je prie notre honorable Comité de se prononcer sur cette proposition et, si elle est approuvée, les deux sommes seraient versées incessamment.

[C 6900/5847/28] No. 47.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 29.)

(No. 123.)

My Lord, *Tangier, May* 20, 1940.

IN my telegram No. 26 of this morning I had the honour to inform your Lordship that Radio-Rome had broadcast at 8 P.M. last night that:—

(*a*) Two British war vessels had entered Tangier territorial waters.
(*b*) Residents were fleeing from Tangier to the Spanish Zone.

I had, further, the honour to inform you that these assertions were entirely untrue.

2. In themselves such mendacious statements are of little importance. They bear, however, an unpleasant similarity to the technique which has been used by the leaders of the totalitarian States prior to an attack upon one of their intended victims. I have no evidence to show that Italy means to endeavour to attack Tangier, either from the sea or by a *coup* executed from the inside, perhaps in liaison with the Spanish colony or forces from the Spanish Zone. But should Italy enter the war against us, which seems now to be not improbable, if she decided to try and attack Tangier, she might give as her excuse the alleged infringement of the neutrality of the port by Great Britain. The incident, therefore, may have a certain importance in the future.

3. As your Lordship is aware, we have been careful since the 1st September, 1939, not to infringe the neutrality of this zone. No British warships have visited Tangier, nor, to my knowledge, have any come within the 3-mile limit. Furthermore, as far as I am aware, this applies also to our service aircraft from Gibraltar, which are entrusted with the constant patrolling of the Straits.

4. But if we have not broken the Tangier Statute, Italy herself has done so, and is continuing to do so. I venture to state, for purposes of record, that she is infringing upon the neutrality of this zone in the following ways:—

5.—(*a*) The Italian Consulate-General maintains a powerful wireless transmitting station in its grounds. This is not only used for official purposes, but it has been thrown open to the public by advertisement, and it deals with much of the traffic between this zone and Eastern Europe. This is directly contrary to article 14 of the statute.

(*b*) The Italian Consulate-General has in its possession a store of arms. The French military attaché has informed me that this amounts to some four machine-guns, fifty rifles and a few cases of bombs. (This is contrary to article 3 of the statute.)

(*c*) It has been the practice for several years for the Italian Consul-General to maintain a guard of armed naval ratings at his official residence. These men, who number about twelve, are constantly to be seen walking in the town in uniform. This, also, is contrary to article 3 of the statute. In contrast to this, leave parties from the army and navy stationed at Gibraltar visit Tangier for some four days at a time. But, since the war, they have always been dressed in plain clothes.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to his Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar and to His Majesty's Consul-General at Rabat.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 5892/14/28] No. 48.

Sir R. Campbell to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 1.)

(No. 423. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, May* 31, 1940.

FRENCH Government have informed the Spanish Government that they are now prepared to agree to the appointment of a Spaniard to the post of Administrator at Tangier. French Ambassador in London is being instructed so to inform your Lordship.

2. French Government have for some time past been receiving two notes a week from the Spanish Government on this subject. They finally decided to accede to the Spanish request, which was justified on legal grounds, at the pressing request of Marshal Pétain. I gather, however, that for administrative reasons the change over is unlikely to take effect for three or four months.

[C 7221/14/28] No. 49.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 12.)

(No. 135.)

My Lord, *Tangier, May* 31, 1940.

ON the 1st January, 1940, I had the honour to address a despatch to your Lordship (No. 6) in which I endeavoured to set forth a brief picture of the general political and economic situation in Tangier. Since that time I have not forwarded a communication of this nature because such incidents as have occurred have been of purely local importance, and I did not consider it opportune to lay these before you in time of war, when your Lordship's Department must be overburdened with work of vastly greater importance.

2. I think, however, that the time has now come to submit an appreciation of the situation as it has developed since the beginning, on the 9th–10th April, of active warfare in Europe. Local opinion has, of course, followed with the keenest interest the various phases of the conflict. On the opening of the Norwegian campaign, when the Royal Navy scored such signal successes, and it looked as if our effort to frustrate the German attempt to seize that country would be successful, Italian and Spanish opinion veered towards Great Britain. Since, however, our failure to take Trondheim, the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Southern and Central Norway, and the set-backs suffered in the Low Countries, Flanders and Northern France, Italian and Spanish opinion, both vocal and as expressed in the press, has rapidly turned again to the side of Germany. I notice this in so far as my relationships with Italian and Spanish acquaintances are concerned, but it is more apparent in the public meeting places of the port, where some slight incidents have occurred between British and French subjects on the one hand and Italians and Spaniards on the other.

3. I have no doubt that, from the observations which I have been able to make here, the local Italian and Spanish colonies are, with few exceptions, hostile to the Allies, and in particular to Great Britain. The Italians do not forget England's action regarding the Abyssinian sanctions, and the Spaniards are continually harping upon the policy which we implemented during the civil war.

4. After the treacherous act of King Leopold on the 27th May, the Italians and Spaniards looked upon the war as having been practically won by Germany. But the heroic resistance of our forces in Calais and around Dunkirk has undoubtedly caused some at least to " think again." Moreover, the calm and resolute manner in which the people of Great Britain have taken this serious defection has impressed public opinion. Nevertheless, at the moment of writing, many of the Italians and Spaniards in Tangier are inclined to the view that Hitler's victory will be complete by the autumn. In this connexion it is interesting to note that only this afternoon the Spanish radio broadcast an address to the effect that your Lordship should take notice that Spain did not want money, but Gibraltar. Moreover, the *España* has reproduced in full this

morning an article from the *Arriba* of Madrid, entitled: "Gibraltar: Honour and Duty of Spaniards," which will have already been brought to your attention.

5. As regards the position of Tangier itself, we have lived for the past two months through a period of alarms and excursions. It is true that Spain could occupy this zone in an hour. Her forces gathered on the frontier amount to some 2,500 men, and we have no means of resistance worth mentioning. But even the most chauvinistic Spaniard must realise that such an act would constitute a *casus belli*, and that Great Britain and France would be likely to take immediate reprisals. Unless, therefore, the Allies were to suffer a "paramount" defeat in the field such as might paralyse their activities for a considerable time, I do not feel particularly apprehensive regarding a Spanish *coup* here. There is, however, always the chance that the Spanish authorities may be pushed into it by the extreme "Falangist" elements working in co-operation with the Germans and Italians.

6. At this moment we may be on the brink of war with Italy. If Signor Mussolini does throw his country's armed forces into the scales against us, the position of Tangier need not, I suggest, necessarily be greatly affected. It is only, I think, if Italy induces Spain to come in with her that we should be likely to have serious trouble. The question of the position in which the Italian Consulate-General and the Italian colony would find themselves in the event of Italy entering the war has been brought to your Lordship's notice in a separate communication. My latest information is that a great part of the Italian colony would probably leave this zone at once, but that my Italian colleague and his staff would try to remain, together with the Italian members of the Tangier Administration.

7. The British colony, which numbers some 1,065 persons, is, quite naturally, uneasy at the prospects of possible future trouble. There has been talk of evacuation, but I have not seen fit to advise this up to the present, as there is no concrete evidence of any sort to suggest that a *coup* is to be expected. His Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar has, however, been so good as to consider the possibility of sending over a small force to Tangier in the event of a *coup* coming from the inside and organised by the Italians without the co-operation of Spain.

8. As regards the legislation passed since the 1st January, the only law of general political importance is that designed to prohibit the entry into Tangier of Jewish refugees from Europe. We have, as your Lordship is aware, a certain number of these unfortunate people on our hands, as they were not expelled from the Tangier Zone at the beginning of the war (my despatch No. 202 of the 19th September, 1939). A further influx of some 112 Polish refugees arrived via Italy on the 24th May. I felt strongly that, in view of all the circumstances, these potential Fifth Columnists should be refused entry in the future, and, after consultation with my French colleague and the Administrator, legislation was drawn up and has been passed by the Legislative Assembly (as an exceptional measure and for the duration of the war) to prevent further shipments. The wording of the law in question, however, copy of which will be sent to your Lordship in due course, has been so framed as not to point to the exclusion of Jews as such. Another cogent reason for refusing to accept numbers of Jewish refugees is the intensification of Moslem feeling against the Jews, which is already high in Tangier.

9. The economic situation of the port has of late months become easier. This is due to the increase of imports from foreign countries. The British Director of Finance, Mr. Goligher, has recently informed me that the import tariffs, upon which Tangier must now chiefly depend in the absence of all tourist traffic, are steadily increasing, and this is satisfactory, given the financial stringency in which the zone found itself, as your Lordship will remember, during November last. Of course, if the Mediterranean should become a theatre of war by reason of Italy's entry into the conflict, the economic situation here must again deteriorate owing to the resulting lack of imports, and we shall be likely once more to become almost wholly dependent for our essential commodities upon the French Protectorate.

10. It is only fair to say that up to the present time Tangier has been specially favoured. The cost of living has, it is true, risen, generally speaking, to over 100 per cent. of that existing in August 1938, and there is, therefore, a substantial amount of distress amongst the poorest classes. But the general

situation of the majority of the inhabitants of the zone must, I think, compare favourably with that of the nationals of almost any European country. This state of affairs may well continue, and, even if Italy decides fully to honour her pledges to her Axis partner by a resort to arms, I see no reason to fear that Tangier will necessarily experience serious disturbances or economic distress. The future attitude of Spain is to us here the all-important question, and, judging by the recent declaration made to your Lordship by the Spanish Ambassador in London (Foreign Office despatch to Madrid No. 211 of the 10th May, 1940), together with such indications of Spain's future policy as I have been able to glean locally, it would not appear likely that we shall be faced, in the immediate future, with the difficulties which active hostility on the part of that country would inevitably carry in its train.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the Governor, Gibraltar, and to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Rome and Madrid, to His Majesty's Consul-General at Rabat and to His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 6203/14/28]

No. 50.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 12.)

(No. 318.)
(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, June 11, 1940.

In conversation this morning with Minister for Foreign Affairs, I asked him whether he contemplated any trouble in future [group undecypherable] in Tangier. His answer was a long speech upon the position in Morocco and Tangier, based upon the assumption that there was no immediate cause for alarm, and that existing police in the International Zone ought to be able to deal with the situation. This view differed somewhat from the account that the French Ambassador had given to me earlier in the morning, namely, that the Spanish Government would welcome the reinforcement of the international police by a Spanish contingent. Señor Beigbeder seemed to me to wish to leave things as they were, but made it clear that if they became worse any reinforcement should be a Spanish reinforcement. Once or twice he emphasised the fact that he had not raised the question at all, but that it had been raised by the French authorities in Tangier and the French Government in Paris.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 8, and Tangier, No. 1.)

[C 5847/5847/28]

No. 51.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 14.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Tangier, June 14, 1940.

FOLLOWING is sequence of events regarding the occupation of Tangier:—

2. Very early to-day Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan forwarded a note to French Consul-General there stating that, in agreement with French Government, Spanish Government intended to occupy Tangier at once. Occupation was only for purpose of maintaining order, and zone would continue to be administered by international administration.

3. All is quiet in town and I am advising members of colony to go about their business as usual.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 17, and Governor, Gibraltar.)

413/87
RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[C 5847/5847/28] No. 52.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, June 14, 1940.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is translation of note which I have just received from my Spanish colleague :—

"The military occupation of Tangier and its zone has been carried out by troops of the Shereefian Mahalla in the name of Sultan of Morocco and with the exclusive object of securing the strict neutrality of Tangier and its zone in the present circumstances.

"I am pleased, in the name of my Government, to bring to your notice that this occupation has a provisional character and that all the rights of interested Powers and established services will be respected."

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 18, and Governor, Gibraltar.)

[C 7262/5847/28] No. 53.

Viscount Halifax to Sir W. Selby (Lisbon).

(No. 212.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 14, 1940.*

DURING the course of my conversation with the Portuguese Ambassador this afternoon his Excellency asked me whether the Spanish troops had occupied Tangier as a result of an agreement between the Spanish Government and His Majesty's Government.

2. I told Senhor Monteiro that we had recently discussed the question of Tangier with the French Government, and it had been agreed that in the case of unrest we should invite the Spanish Government to send their troops to occupy the zone. I understood that the French representative at Tangier had agreed to the entry of the Spanish troops this morning, and I thought that this was probably the best solution in present circumstances. His Excellency said that his Government were interested in this question because of the presence of a very considerable Portuguese colony in Tangier.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[C 7262/5847/28] No. 54.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 334.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, June 14, 1940.*

TANGIER telegram, unnumbered, of 14th June addressed to you.

I have received a note from Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that French Minister in Tangier, through his military attaché, proposed to Spanish Minister the formation of a mixed Franco-Spanish force to reinforce the police in the International Zone in case of possible incidents which might affect the neutrality of Tangier.

The Spanish Government informed French Government in Paris of their reserves and of their opinion that such a police operation should be carried out by Spanish forces, in view of the attitude of non-intervention of Spain, being the best guarantee of neutrality and of the statute.

The agreement of France having been obtained, High Commissioner of M.I.D. has been authorised to arrange that Jalifian troops in name of the Sultan should enter Tangier this morning.

In agreement with French Ambassador, the occupation is to be provisional respecting statute and in conformity with it, guaranteeing neutrality of territorial waters and normal functioning of all services.

(Repeated to Gibraltar, No. 49.)

[C 7262/5847/28] No. 55.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 338.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, June 14, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 334.

Official announcement issued to press and wireless by the Spanish Press and Propaganda Department omits any mention of the fact that the step was taken in full agreement with the French Government. Impression is given that Spain has taken the matter into her own hands, with result that demonstrations have taken place in the streets of Madrid and in front of, and even within the precincts, of German Embassy.

French Ambassador and I are seeing Minister for Foreign Affairs at 8 P.M. this evening, and will press for correct version of the narrative.

In the meantime, I trust it will immediately be made clear by broadcast that the step was taken by prior agreement with the French Government, and solely in order to safeguard the international character of the settlement.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 2, and Gibraltar, No. 50.)

[C 7287/5847/28] No. 56.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 339.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, June 14, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 338.

French Ambassador and I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening. We protested against the organised demonstration within precincts of the German Embassy, and, secondly, against the absence from the official communiqué of any reference to the prior agreement with French Government over the reinforcement of Tangier by Moorish troops.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs was apologetic about the demonstration. As to the communiqué, he showed us his own telegram to the Spanish authorities in Tangier, in which the position was fully and accurately revealed. He promised to rectify omission to-morrow, and at the same time disclosed to us that the threatening reports of Italian submarine and many German tourists in the neighbourhood of Tangier had forced his hand and that the Germans and Italians were furious with him for being forestalled.

3. Throughout the interview he was frank and friendly.

(Repeated to Gibraltar, No. 51, and Tangier, No. 2.)

[C 7262/5847/28] No. 57.

Sir R. Campbell to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 401.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tours, June 13, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 347 to Madrid and Madrid telegram No. 318.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs inform me that the question of Tangier was, in fact, raised by the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, who called on the Secretary-General on 9th June. His Excellency declared that Spain was ready to assure the neutrality requested. It was right that she should, as she was the only neutral statutory Power. She was ready to give an assurance that the statute would be observed and would be unimpaired at the end of the war. If security zone were menaced, the Spanish Government were prepared to send troops in to maintain order, but no troops belonging to the belligerents should be sent.

2. Ministry for Foreign Affairs have asked me to ascertain your views. They think that the choice lies between either saying nothing to the Spaniards or expressing agreement with them. They see some advantage in the latter arrangement, as you could definitely guarantee the neutrality of Tangier. In view of the Spanish attitude, they do not think it likely that Italy will do anything to disturb the peace at Tangier.

RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[C 7287/5847/28] No. 58.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 16.)

(No. 348.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, June* 16, 1940.

REFERENCE to my telegram No. 339.

My telegram No. 51 to Gibraltar and my telegram No. 3 to Tangier.

The Government is obviously making it appear that they have had great success in the occupation of Tangier.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has not carried out promise to issue communiqué stating that action was taken in accord with the French. When I charged him last night with his failure to carry out the undertaking given to the French Ambassador and me, he said that public opinion would not stand in the present atmosphere such a reference to the French, but that he would have the position explained in an article to be published to-day or to-morrow. I do not think that he will even do this.

(Repeated to Gibraltar, No. 42, and Tangier, No. 4.)

[C 7287/5847/28] No. 59.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 17.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, June* 17, 1940.

MY telegram No. 59, paragraph 3.

My Spanish colleague brought Officer Commanding Spanish Forces of Occupation to see me this morning.

2. I took opportunity to make following friendly observations to Dr. Amieva and Colonel Yuste :—

(*a*) I was surprised that my Spanish colleague had not advised me beforehand that occupation would take place.

(*b*) I did not understand why a force of such strength should be needed to "police" a zone which was perfectly quiet at the time of occupation.

(*c*) I reserved our treaty right (article No. 4 of Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 9th December, 1856) that British subjects should circulate freely in all parts of this zone, and I cited interference which had taken place on two occasions with British subjects on 15th June.

3. Replies which I received were : (*a*) my Spanish colleague regretted that, owing to his "complete ignorance" of plans for occupation, he had not been able to inform me beforehand; (*b*) no excuse was given; (*c*) sincere regret was expressed that interference had taken place.

4. Interview was most friendly and my Spanish colleague and Colonel Yuste gave me positive, and I think sincere, assurances that in future neutral status of zone would be preserved and rights of interested Powers respected.

5. Colonel Yuste made a good impression upon me, and I see no reason at present why we should not be able to work with him. At the same time, my Spanish colleague rather significantly made the point that, while he sought only "peace and neutrality" in Tangier, he "did not know what his Government's plans were."

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 31, and Gibraltar.)

[C 7262/5847/28] No. 60.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 256.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Madrid telegram No. 334 of the 14th June, 1940, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a translation of *note verbale* from Ministry for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Embassy, dated the 14th June, 1940, respecting the occupation of Tangier by Jalifian troops.

Madrid, June 14, 1940.

Enclosure in No. 60.

Translation of note verbale *from Ministry for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Embassy, dated June* 14, 1940.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

THE French Minister in Tangier sent Captain Luiset, military attaché, to see the Spanish Minister in Tangier, and to inform the latter that the French Government had proposed that a mixed Franco-Spanish force should be prepared for the purpose of reinforcing the police and security forces in the international zone in case of possible incidents which might affect the neutrality of Tangier.

The Spanish Government informed the French Government through their ambassador in Paris of their reserves in this connexion and of their opinion that such a police operation should be carried out by Spanish forces, as Spain's attitude of non-intervention was the best guarantee of neutrality and of the statute.

The agreement of France having been obtained and communicated by the French Ambassador to the Spanish Minister at 7·15 P.M. on the 13th June, the High Commissioner of Tetuan has been authorised to arrange that Jalifian troops should, in the name of the Sultan, enter Tangier for that purpose. The forces in question have received orders to enter Tangier zone this morning.

In agreement with the French Ambassador, the occupation is to be of a provisional nature, and will respect the statute and be in conformity with it. The neutrality of the territorial waters and the normal functioning of all services will also be guaranteed.

I avail, &c.
J. BEIGBEDER.

June 14, 1940.

[C 7277/7277/28] No. 61.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, June* 18, 1941.

MY telegram No. 56.

His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan states that rumours persist in Spanish Zone that Spanish troops are on point of crossing frontier into French protectorate at two particular points, viz., (*a*) Ouezzane, (*b*) Oujda. Military activities continue and Moors are now being called up from Tetuan area in increasing numbers.

2. My French colleague has no confirmation of intended attack.

3. A hostile demonstration of Moors took place outside British Consulate at Tetuan yesterday evening, after which crowd proceeded to German Consulate where they burnt French flag.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 33, Rabat and Gibraltar.)

[C 7277/7277/28] No. 62.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 20.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, June* 20, 1941.

MY telegram No. 67 of 18th June.

Situation in Tangier remains quiet.

2. His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan reports military preparations are continuing in the south for a future attack against French Zone. All information available in Tangier confirms this.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 36, Gibraltar, Rabat and Military Mission, Algiers.)

[C 7398/5847/28] No. 63.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 28.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, June* 27, 1940.

FOLLOWING is text of note, dated 25th June, which Spanish Officer Commanding Forces of Occupation, Tangier, has addressed to President of Committee of Control :—

" Il est admis en droit international public comme règle objective de droit, transformée en principe de droit positif par son application constante, que les lois pénales ayant caractère militaire ont toujours une application extra-territoriale, et suivent et protègent l'armée partout et là où elle se trouvera. Il est également admis en droit international public que la juridiction de l'armée d'occupation s'applique de plein droit à tous individus responsables de crimes portant atteinte à la sûreté ou au prestige des forces d'occupation, étant donné que ces forces doivent pourvoir à leur sûreté et à celle de toutes les personnes qui en dépendent, et ceci par leurs propres moyens, qui ne peuvent être autres que les lois pénales militaires du pays au nom duquel l'occupation a lieu.

" 2. J'ai donc l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre haute autorité que les forces d'occupation de la Zone internationale de Tanger, par ses organes juridictionnelles, conseil de guerre et autorité judiciaire militaire, connaîtront et jugeront, en conformité des règles et dispositions du code de justice militaire espagnol et des lois supplétoires ayant un caractère permanent, de toutes sortes de délits spécifiquement militaires, quelle que soit la personne responsable, dès qu'ils auront été commis dans le territoire d'action des forces d'occupation de Tanger, ou portant atteinte à la sûreté, au prestige ou à l'autorité de ceux qui les composent, sans que cette compétence juridictionnelle puisse affecter, toutefois, les juridictions administratives ou judiciaires criminelles de la Zone de Tanger, lesquelles sont maintenues et respectées entièrement."

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 47.)

[C 7398/5847/28] No. 64.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 27.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, June* 27, 1940.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

My comments are as follows :—

(*a*) When the note in question was circulated to me this morning my only remark was to write " vu " on the paper.

(*b*) The note represents a *fait accompli*.

(*c*) The second paragraph of the note is obscure in so far as concerns the precise nature of the accords, which will be dealt with by the military court.

(*d*) This established military jurisdiction, which overrides in certain cases the competence of the three " statutory " courts (articles 13, 27, 29 and 48, 1924 convention), marks the beginning of the inevitable whittling away of the present international régime by the Spanish authorities. It furthermore gives the latter a loophole to exercise jurisdiction over anybody in the Tangier Zone against whom they have a grudge, *i.e.*, British subjects who are *brulé vis-à-vis* Madrid.

(*e*) I submit it seems difficult to resist in default of means to enforce our protest, but I suggest that a precedent may exist; and, if so, I should be grateful of particulars.

(*f*) When the matter comes up before the Committee of Control next week, I intend (if I have not by that time received your instructions) to ask for a clearer definition of the writs which it is intended should be dealt with by the military court, and at the same time to [? enter] [two groups undecypherable] on behalf of my Government, as His Majesty's Government may consider, that this constitutes a breach of the undertaking given by the Spanish Government (my telegram No. 48, paragraph 2, of 14th June).

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 48.)

[C 7398/5847/28] No. 65.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Gascoigne (*Tangier*).

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 4, 1940.

YOUR telegram No. 94 [of 27th June : Jurisdiction powers of Spanish forces at Tangier].

In practice, our attitude would depend largely on whether the Spanish military authorities confine themselves to taking jurisdiction in cases where there really had been an offence against the Spanish force or its security, or whether they attempt to extend their jurisdiction over British subjects in an unjustifiable manner.

2. You should therefore reserve the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the event of these powers of military jurisdiction being applied in practice so as to affect adversely the rights of British subjects.

3. Please report cases affecting British subjects as and when they arise.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 477.)

[C 7398/5847/28] No. 66.

Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Hoare (*Madrid*).

(No. 478.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 4, 1940.

MY telegram to Tangier, No. 72 [of 4th July : Jurisdiction powers of Spanish forces at Tangier].

Please inform Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government assume that the Spanish forces of occupation at Tangier will take no action based on the note of 25th June to President of Committee of Control inconsistent with the assurances contained in Minister for Foreign Affairs' note of 14th June (see your despatch No. 256).

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 73.)

[C 7398/5847/28] No. 67.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 146.)
My Lord, *Tangier, June* 14, 1940.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 45 to 50 of the 14th June, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan, concerning the occupation of Tangier by Spanish (Moorish) military forces.

2. The reasons for the occupation given by General Asensio, as set forth in paragraph 3 of Mr. Monypenny's despatch, are not convincing. The situation in Tangier since Italy's entry into the war on the 11th June has remained absolutely quiet, and it seemed likely to continue to be so. The Spanish "Red" elements were longing only to be left alone, and, as far as I know, the natives had no arms. If some of them had arms, they had probably received them from Spanish provocateurs. The Italian elements were behaving properly, and no friction had occurred between the Italian colony and the colonies of the other belligerent countries. The fact that there was to be a change of administrator had caused little surprise, but it is true that a delicate situation might have arisen when the time came for the Spaniard to take over charge; on this one point General Asensio is not so wide of the mark.

3. The occupation of the town took place between 7 and 9 o'clock this morning. It was carried out unobtrusively, and by 11 A.M. Moorish soldiers were to be seen strolling unarmed through the streets gazing with longing eyes at the plentiful stocks of food in the shop windows. Later in the day Spanish military bands paraded through the streets and all the Spanish buildings were smothered with the national flags. At 6·40 P.M. I was informed that a squadron of Spanish aeroplanes would fly over Tangier to celebrate the occasion; but thanks chiefly to my French colleague's intervention this did not in the end take place. Any elementary courtesies, such as prior notification to the Allied members of the Committee of Control, of the intended occupation were entirely lacking. The *España* states this morning that the Spanish Consul-General had previously warned my French colleague and myself of what would take place. Not only did he do nothing of the sort, but all my efforts to gain contact with him between the hours of 7–11 when I received his note (copies of which I enclose herewith) were fruitless.

4. There seems no doubt that the Spanish authorities, encouraged by the Allies' set-backs in France, and probably pressed by the Italians and Germans in the Spanish Zone, decided to take the bit between their teeth and to carry out this operation at a moment's notice after securing the implied consent of the French authorities.

5. From the local viewpoint it is difficult at present to see the wood for the trees, possibly this action by Spain may have been taken as a preparatory one to a declaration of war against the Allies, for at the moment it looks as if she intends to consolidate her position in Tangier against any future eventualities. It is true that no heavy guns have yet been brought up, but I understand that the occupation is by no means complete and that at least 2,000 more infantry will arrive shortly.

6. Should Spain come into the war and the forces of the French Protectorate march into the Spanish Zone, my French colleague estimates that they should be able, striking from the south, to reach and retake Tangier in some eight days. I do not know anything of the French military plans, but in view of the substantial defences which the Spaniards have, I understand, erected on the southern frontiers of the zone this seems to be an optimistic forecast.

7. To sum up. Spain's occupation of Tangier, even if it was, in fact, effected with the full agreement of the French Government, has been cast on the German model. The absence of any prior notification to the representatives of the Statutory Powers, and the frothy displays which took place in the streets during this afternoon, and which were, no doubt, meant to impress the native population, resembled closely those methods so dear to Nazi Germany. I can only say that the manner in which the Spaniards have executed their triumphal entry has made a painful impression upon my Allied colleagues and upon myself

and that we look with forboding upon what the future of this occupation may have in store for us.

8. Copies of this despatch are being forwarded to His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid, and to his Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-chief, Gibraltar.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 67.

Consul Monypenny to Mr. Gascoigne.

(No. 83.)
Sir, *Tetuan, June* 14, 1940.

I HAVE the honour to report that I saw the Spanish High Commissioner this morning, at his request, and received from him the following communication:—

2. Under instructions from his Government last night, he had sent a force of Mehallah troops to Tangier to "strengthen the security of that zone within the framework of its statutes." The operation, he said, had fortunately been carried out without incident and all was quiet. It would not in any way affect the present Tangier Administration and régime.

3. General Asensio added that that step had, in his opinion, become necessary because of the exceptional situation now arising in Tangier due to the following factors:—

(*a*) Information had reached the Spanish authorities of possible activities of troublesome Red elements.
(*b*) It was also suspected that some of the natives were in possession of arms.
(*c*) The cosmopolitan nature of the population, composed of different foreign colonies, a large part of whom were citizens of belligerent countries, and the continued presence of the Italian element, would unavoidably cause friction. The possibilities of unrest were enhanced owing to the fact that there was, at this moment, to be a change of the Administrator.

4. The situation created by these various factors might, moreover, he added, cause unrest in the Spanish Zone.

5. He concluded by saying that he felt it his duty to explain the situation to His Majesty's representative in Tetuan, adding that the temporary interruption of road traffic to and from Tetuan, imposed only for a couple of hours to avoid alarmist rumours, had been removed and that everything was again normal.

6. General Asensio was obviously anxious to represent the despatch of troops to Tangier as in no way an aggressive act, but merely an unavoidable step taken in the general interest to maintain order without interfering with the existing civil administration.

7. Incidentally, in the course of conversation, the High Commissioner stated that he thought Comandante Miguel was to be the new Administrator in Tangier.

8. After the first moment of surprise the event appears to have caused little excitement in Tetuan, where the situation at present is quiet.

I have, &c.
R. G. MONYPENNY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 67.

The Spanish Consul-General to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tangier.

(Translation.)
Mr. Minister and dear Colleague, *Tangier, June* 14, 1940.

THE military occupation of Tangier and its zone has been carried out by troops of the Shereefian Mahallah in the name of the Sultan of Morocco and with the exclusive object of securing the strict neutrality of Tangier and its zone in the present circumstances.

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FO 371/24787
RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

I am pleased in the name of my Government to bring to your notice that this occupation has a provisional character, and that all the rights of interested Powers and established services will be respected.

I take, &c.
MANUEL AMIEVA,
Minister Plenipotentiary Consul-General for Spain.

[C 7398/5847/28] No. 68.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 8.)

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, July* 8, 1940.

MY telegram No. 94, paragraph (*f*), and your telegram No. 72.

Notice containing particulars of crimes to be dealt with by the Spanish military courts was published in *España* this morning. Crimes cover wide field, but consist mostly of offences committed directly against the occupying force or members of that force.

2. All will depend upon the manner in which the Spanish implement military jurisdiction, which could, if abused, form a dangerous weapon against our people. So far, cases brought before the court have been dealt with leniently.

3. I am causing the notice to be brought to the attention of British subjects. Copy by post.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 71.)

[C 7677/7677/28] No. 69.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 135.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, July* 8, 1940.

FOLLOWING from Consul-General, Rabat:—

"Residency notifies me of decision of Vichy Government that British Consuls at ports of French zone and staffs must leave for England from Casablanca at date to be communicated later, but understand to be in two or three days. Marrakesh and Fez not affected. May I ask United States Consul-General place seals on rooms containing Government property archives, &c., at places concerned?"

[C 7922/85/28] No. 70.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 23.)

(No. 164. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Tangier, July* 1, 1940.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the annual report on the heads of foreign missions at Tangier.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

Enclosure in No. 70.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Tangier.

Belgium.

M. Francis Janssens was succeeded on the 19th June, 1939, by M. Marcel Polain, consul-general, with the personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

M. Polain's last post was that of first Belgian representative to General Franco's Government. Previously he served for many years in Japan

and Siam. M. Polain seems to be sincerely Anglophile, and he is a friendly and intelligent colleague. Both he and his wife speak excellent English, and Mme. Polain, a native of Ypres, was partly educated in England.

M. Polain indulges to some extent in the night life of Tangier, and local gossip has it that he may shortly be divorced from his wife.

France.

M. Charles Avonde Froment, consul-general since the 28th December, 1936, with the personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

I have found M. Avonde a helpful colleague. While he is conceited and egotistical, it must be admitted that he has immense knowledge regarding the French and Spanish Protectorates of Morocco, and he thoroughly understands the intricacies of the international administration of this port.

Mme. Avonde, who is his second wife, is the daughter of a "Front populaire" politician, and was a typist in a French Government office. She belongs to the middle strata of French society, and is much imbued with her own importance. Albeit, she is extremely active in looking after her large colony, and has been friendly to my wife and myself.

Italy.

M. Pierfilippo de Rossi del Lion Nero, consul-general since September, 1935, with personal rank of minister plenipotentiary, left Tangier on the 1st March on appointment as minister to Norway. M. de Rossi was succeeded by M. Mario Badoglio, Duke of Addis Ababa, who had, prior to coming to Tangier, served as Italian Consul-General at Istanbul.

M. Badoglio, who is a son of the well-known marshal of Italy, took up his duties on the 7th April, and from that date until the entry of Italy into the war on the 11th June my relations with him were, if not cordial, at least correct. As far as I could tell during this short period, M. Badoglio seemed more broad-minded than the average Italian diplomat, and he is conciliatory and reasonable.

M. Badoglio is not greatly enamoured of Tangier, and complains that it is "too limited" for him and that his colony are difficult. Certainly the Fascio here are strong and independent, and the Italian Consul-General has, therefore, a "rough ride."

The Duchess of Addis Ababa, a good-looking young Italian lady, should, in normal times, prove an asset to the society of Tangier. She is quiet and agreeable, and does not, I am told, enter into politics.

Netherlands.

M. F. Gerth van Wijk, consul-general since January 1925, with personal rank of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

Although undoubtedly Germanophile, M. van Wijk has been extremely friendly to me, and I consider that he is an astute and reliable colleague. His only daughter was married to Lord Bute's youngest son in July 1939.

Portugal.

M. Gaston Barjona de Freitas, consul-general since 1930, with personal rank of minister plenipotentiary, died at his post on the 7th April, 1940.

M. Barjona's successor is M. Luiz Ferreira de Castro, consul-general, with personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

M. de Castro assumed his duties in Tangier on the 23rd June, 1940. He came from London, where he served as commercial counsellor to the Portuguese Embassy and Portuguese Consul-General for many years. My first impressions are good; he seems to be friendly and Anglophile, and he professes deep regret at leaving London. He served as Portuguese Consul in Liverpool during the major part of the first German war.

Spain.

M. Juan Peche y Cabeza de Vaca was transferred at the end of 1939 to be an Under-Secretary in the Foreign Ministry at Madrid. He was succeeded on the 1st January, 1940, by Dr. don Manuel Amieva y Escandon, a local surgeon, as consul-general, with personal rank of minister plenipotentiary. Dr. Amieva had been in charge of the Spanish Hospital in Tangier for many years.

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A13787
RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

I have maintained the most friendly relations with Dr. Amieva, who has gone out of his way on occasion to assist me in regard to local matters.

Dr. Amieva was the personal representative in Tangier of General Franco throughout the Spanish civil war and, as such, he was able to perform a deal of useful work in connexion with the Spanish colony. At the end of the civil war he gave out that all Spaniards who had shown sympathy with the Republican side would be pardoned, that the past must be forgotten, and that all Spaniards must work together for a united Spain. His appointment as consul-general was, therefore, hailed with genuine delight by the large Spanish colony, the majority of which is composed of "Red" elements. It was thought that the policy adopted by M. Peche, for the gradual deportation of "Red" sympathisers from Tangier to Spain, would cease, and that a new era would begin. In this, however, the colony was disappointed, as Dr. Amieva was forced by his superiors at Madrid and Tetuan not only to continue in M. Peche's policy, but to accentuate it.

Mme. Amieva is an amiable lady of the Spanish *bourgeoisie* who does not seem to care for society.

United States of America.

Hon. Maxwell Blake, diplomatic agent and consul-general.

Mr. Blake has been here since 1915, with the exception of the period between 1922 and 1925, which he spent in Albania and Australia. Owing to the fact that the United States have not adhered to the Tangier Statute, Mr. Blake holds himself aloof from the majority of the affairs which interest his colleagues.

Mr. Blake is a very obliging colleague, and he is always ready to give his advice when I have occasion to ask for it. He enjoys the unique position here of being the only "diplomatic" representative. As he takes no part in the Committee of Control, he is relieved of the chief burden of this post, and he devotes most of his time in redecorating a new house in the old part of the town, on which he spends large sums of money.

[C 7985/5847/28] No. 71.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 320.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of note from His Majesty's Ambassador to Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 9th July, 1940, and a copy of a translation of note from Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador of the 12th July, 1940, respecting the occupation of Tangier and terms of a communication dated the 25th June addressed to the president of the Committee of Control at Tangier by the Officer Commanding the Forces occupying Tangier.

Madrid, July 18, 1940.

Enclosure 1 in No. 71.

His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated July 9, 1940.

Your Excellency.

WITH reference to your Excellency's note No. 204 of the 14th June regarding the occupation of Tangier, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the attention of His Majesty's Government has been drawn to the terms of a communication dated the 25th June, which was addressed to the president of the Committee of Control at Tangier by the Officer Commanding the Forces occupying Tangier. The purpose of that communication was to state that the occupying forces would exercise judicial powers in the trial and judgment of specifically military offences and of offences against public order and authority within the area of occupation, in accordance with the Spanish Military Code.

I am now instructed to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government assume that, notwithstanding the terms of the communication referred to above, the Spanish forces of occupation at Tangier will take no action inconsistent with the assurances contained in your Excellency's note of the 14th June, of which His Majesty's Government have taken due cognisance.

I avail, &c.
SAMUEL HOARE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 71.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid, of July 12, 1940.

(Translation.)

Señor Embajador,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your communication of the 9th July referring to the note addressed by the Officer Commanding the Forces of Occupation at Tangier to the president of the Committee of Control, indicating that crimes of a specifically military nature and those committed within the occupied zone against public order and authority were subject to the dispositions of the Spanish Code of Military Justice.

I am pleased to inform your Excellency that the Spanish Government entirely share the point of view of His Majesty's Government on this subject and have full confidence that the terms of the communication referred to from the Officer Commanding the Forces of Occupation at Tangier will not give rise to any consequence incompatible with the assurances given in the note which I had the honour to address to you on the 14th June, of the contents of which, as your Excellency states, His Majesty's Government have taken due cognisance.

All the less basis is there for fears to the contrary, referred to in your Excellency's note under reply, since during the analogous situation which arose in the Spanish Zone of Morocco at the beginning of the National Movement in Spain there was no friction or conflict with any foreign authority or representation whatever.

I avail, &c.
JUAN BEIGBEDER.

[C 10030/7277/28] No. 72.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 407.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September 13, 1940.*

MOROCCO is now the centre of the Spanish picture. This being so, it may be useful to your Lordship if I resume in a few sentences the reasons that have brought it into such vital prominence. Until I came here, I had little idea of the importance that the present rulers of Spain attached to the future of the protectorate. Since then the numerous telegrams and reports that I have sent to London upon Moroccan questions are evidence of the burning interest taken by Spaniards in the problems created in North-West Africa by the French collapse. There is ample justification for Spanish anxieties, and there is also a historical background against which these anxieties stand out in very clear relief. It was a Spaniard, the remarkable Cardinal Cisneros, who conquered Ceuta and Melilla in the 15th century. Subsequent generations of Spaniards have vacillated very much as we vacillated on the North-West Frontier between a forward and a backward policy until the 19th and early 20th century, when the general tendency of Spanish Governments was towards indifferentism. The new men, General Franco, Colonel Beigbeder and the rest, are determined that the new Spain shall once and for all abandon a Cobdenite outlook upon North African colonies and a fatal indifference that lost Spain many opportunities of establishing its claims in the international conferences of the last forty years. "We are all Moors," Colonel Beigbeder repeats to his friends. By this he means that the rulers of Spain have in many instances made their careers in Morocco and regard Moroccan questions as the most important in the world.

2. The result is that I now never see the Minister for Foreign Affairs in my almost daily visits without the conversation coming back sooner or later to Morocco. It is clear to me from these repeated talks that, whilst he does not believe that Gibraltar need become a *casus belli* between Great Britain and Spain, he is much more nervous lest Moroccan problems should embroil our two countries. His anxieties have passed through two phases. At the time of the French collapse, he was convinced that French morale would at once crumble in Morocco, that the tribes would rise, and that in the confusion Spain would be forced to intervene in the interests of order. Your Lordship will remember the telegrams that I sent to you at the time and my suggestion that it was a suitable moment at which the Spaniards should be allowed to occupy the zones that had been assigned to them by the French in 1904. This suggestion came to nothing, for from that time to this Colonel Beigbeder has received no answer from the Pétain Government to his request that the zones should now be occupied by Spain. Incidentally it is worth mentioning that M. de la Baume, the French Ambassador, has throughout this period been insistent in his support of the Spanish Government's request. In the meantime the Spaniards have taken no overt action with the exception of the entry of a Spanish garrison into the Tangier zone made with the agreement of the French and British Governments. Colonel Beigbeder claims great credit for the correctitude of Spanish action. I believe myself that he is genuinely anxious to avoid trouble with the Pétain Government, but I am also clear that the military preponderance of the French upon the frontier has had a good deal to do with Spanish inaction. The fact is that in this period Spanish expectations were not realised, French power did not collapse and the Italians, as Señor Beigbeder observed to me on the 10th September, have missed their opportunity for disarmament of the French.

3. The chapter that is now beginning is more difficult and obscure. It is not now a French collapse that the Spaniards envisage so much as a French resistance to which Great Britain would give its help. Colonel Beigbeder, a soldier rather than a politician, has often discussed with me the dangerous possibilities if Africa becomes a central battlefield in the war. It is clear, from what he has said, that he is terrified of a Moroccan conflagration. So strongly does he feel as to the Moroccan danger that I must again draw your Lordship's attention to the arguments that he presses upon me. Firstly, he does not believe that General de Gaulle will be able to consolidate the French forces in Morocco. Only a man of General Weygand's status will be able to counteract the wiles of General Nogués and unite the French forces. From this assumption he draws the conclusion that a de Gaulle movement will fail in Morocco, but that it will be effective enough to stir up trouble and to light a flame that will spread into the Spanish zone. He is impressed by the very full information at his disposal showing that there is much political unrest in the Moroccos and that the tribes on both sides of the frontier are incensed by the lack of necessities such as tea and sugar and of markets in which to sell their produce. Serious trouble, therefore, will undoubtedly spread if a spark is put to this inflammable material, and one of the results will be a clash between the French and Spanish forces. This will be the moment when the Germans will intervene, possibly after some Spanish reverse and certainly after an intensive campaign to stir up still further the troubled waters. In this situation the Spaniards will see their future aspirations endangered, whilst the Germans will be telling them that the threat comes from Great Britain and that it is the British intention to seize once and for all both sides of the Straits. Upon this field, perhaps the only field of unity that exists in Spain to-day, all Spanish opinion will be solid. The Germans will offer their help and will ask for the right of passage through Spain. At this point Colonel Beigbeder does not dot the i's or cross the t's, but it is clear to me that the conclusion to which his description inevitably leads is that no Spanish Government will be strong enough to resist the demand.

4. Whilst the Cabinet has at its disposal immensely more information than I have, and I naturally regard the situation primarily from the Spanish angle, these possibilities are worthy of serious attention. The one comment that I would venture to make is that with these great risks on one side it is wise to take no contrary action until we are sure of the strength of our military position in Morocco. An abortive movement would be the worst of all possible results. Supposing, however, a successful movement were possible, I think that it would be wise to arrange immediately after the *coup* for the cession of the zones to

Spain. Such an act might go some way to moderate Spanish opinion and to prevent any wild action. It is essential also, if we are to meet this very dangerous situation, that we should at once make economic arrangements with the Spaniards for such French Moroccan exports as phosphates on the lines already urged by Mr. Eccles. For in this way we shall remove a constant irritant from Anglo-Spanish relations over French Morocco.

5. The overriding factor, however, must be great military strength. Without it we run the risk of provoking a critical situation. Only with it should we have a deterrent sufficient to stop the German march through Spain and the almost certain embroilment of Spain in the war.

I have, &c.
SAMUEL HOARE.

[C 10254/14/28] No. 73.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received September* 25.)

(No. 208.)
My Lord, *Tangier, August* 6, 1940.

WITH reference to previous correspondence ending with your Lordship's telegram No. 87 of the 18th July, I have the honour to report that Señor don Manuel Amieva y Escandon, a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Spanish Diplomatic Service, who since the 1st January, 1940, has been Spanish Consul-General at Tangier, has been appointed Administrator of the Tangier Zone in succession to M. P. le Fur. Dr. Amieva has taken over his new post as from to-day.

2. It remains to be seen how Dr. Amieva will be able to deal with the delicate problems of this International Administration, one of the chief of which will be the question of the food supplies for the zone—as the French Protectorate of Morocco, whence almost all Tangier's essential commodities are now drawn, will not be likely to be able to continue to furnish during the coming winter the full quotas of food-stuffs required.

3. Dr. Amieva has accepted his new appointment with the greatest reluctance, for, apart from the onerous nature of the post, the salary is a poor one. While in conversation with him on the subject a few days ago he admitted to me confidentially that he had not understood his Government's policy in the matter. "It would have been much better," he added, "to have left M. le Fur to carry on until the end of the war." The fact that Dr. Amieva will continue to reside in the Spanish Consulate-General has caused some comment, and it is not yet known what arrangements will be made for the new Spanish Consul-General, whose name has not been disclosed here.

4. From the point of view of local Spanish prestige it will, of course, be essential that the new administration under Spanish leadership should prove a success, and I have no doubt that the Spanish authorities at Madrid and Tetuan will do all in their power to make it so. The British members of the Administration, and our representatives in the Legislative Assembly, will all endeavour to co-operate with the new incumbent to the fullest possible extent.

5. The first "assistant" administrator's post, which had been held by a Spaniard, now goes to a Frenchman, the successful candidate being Captain Charles Luizet, formerly French Military Attaché at Tangier. He is a capable man and an experienced Staff Officer of the "Intelligence" branch. I understand that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs raised an unofficial protest regarding his nomination on the grounds that a French agent of the "deuxième" bureau should not take up an appointment on an International Administration. Colonel Beigbeder did not, however, persist in his objection, and Captain Luizet was finally elected unanimously. The third and fourth "assistant administrators," Messrs. Goligher, Director of Finance (British), and Marchegiano, Director of Legal Matters (Italian), have been re-elected to their respective posts.

Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid and the Governor, Gibraltar.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 10257/16/28] No. 74.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received September* 25.)

(No. 219.)
My Lord, *Tangier, August* 13, 1940.

AS your Lordship is aware, the Spanish High Commission in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco, under the leadership of the present Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, was moved during the years of the Spanish Civil War (1936–38) to make many concessions, and promises of concessions, to the Moorish population.

2. Soon after the termination of the war Colonel Beigbeder repaired to Madrid to take up his post in the Government, and he was replaced by General Asensio, the present High Commissioner.

3. General Asensio's position *vis-à-vis* the Moors has not been an easy one. He has continually been receiving from many of the Moorish leaders unpleasant reminders of the promises made by his predecessor which have never been fulfilled. Indeed, not only have these not been honoured, but certain concrete concessions, such as the payment of subsidies to the tribes, made in the heat of battle, have been withdrawn. There is, therefore, a feeling abroad in Moorish circles in the towns that Spain has not dealt justly by them, and as the months go by they see their hopes of receiving from Spain any concessions, or even quasi autonomy, receding into the background. On the other hand, Moorish opinion is continually being worked upon by German propagandists, who promise freedom for the Moors after the German victory.

4. The above represents generally the political atmosphere which has permeated the towns of the Spanish Zone since the end of the civil war in March 1939. At first the Moorish leaders, either from fear of reprisals or because they hoped that something would ultimately be done to satisfy their aspirations, refrained from vocal expression of their desires. Since, however, the French capitulation, an event which was at first believed by the Moors to be destined to prove the final act of the war, there have been several articles in the Moorish press of Tetuan and Melilla which furnish a guide showing the trend of contemporary Moorish opinion. The vast majority of Moors, both the Arab Moors of the plains and the Berbers of the Riff country, believe that Germany will be finally victorious. They further believe that a German peace will shortly be at hand, and they hope that at this peace they will obtain, in accordance with the oft-repeated German promises, if not autonomy at least a much larger degree of liberty than they enjoy at present. The weakness, however, of the leaders consists in the fact that they are a divided family, each one jealous of the other, and each having divergent interests.

5. As an illustration of the general trend of Moorish aspirations, I enclose herewith copies(1) in translation of articles recently published in the *Unidad Marroquí* and the *Libertad*, Moorish newspapers of Tetuan. Your Lordship will observe from the article in the *Libertad* of the 25th July that a parallel is drawn between the present position of Gibraltar and that of Melilla and Ceuta (the two Spanish presidios), and that some strong words are used regarding the question of the incorporation of the Tangier Zone into Spanish territory. As a result of the publication of this outspoken article the *Libertad* was suspended by the Spanish authorities for eight days.

Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid to his Excellency the Governor at Gibraltar, and His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE

(1) Not printed.

[C 8179/16/28] No. 75.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received September* 25.)

(No. 220.)
My Lord, *Tangier, August* 13, 1940.

IN my despatch No. 178 I had the honour to invite your Lordship's attention to certain articles which had been published in the Moorish press of the Spanish Zone claiming that there should be a new and united Morocco under Moorish rule.

2. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of an interesting despatch dated the 6th instant which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan relative to the Moorish question in the Spanish Zone, together with a short memorandum which comes from the pen of His Majesty's Consul-General at Rabat, who is now in Tangier, on the situation obtaining in the French Protectorate.

3. As regards the Tangier Zone, the majority of the Moors are Arabs of the plain, but in many of the villages outside the port there are also Berbers, who have come in during recent years from the Riff mountains of the Spanish Zone. Generally speaking, Moorish opinion in Tangier has been since the beginning of the war, and still continues to be since France's capitulation, loyal to our cause. Such outstanding figures as the Mendoub, Si Mehdi-el-Menebhi and other influential members of the local Moorish community, who are whole-heartedly on our side, are instrumental in assisting in the dissemination of the publicity which is being carried on by Colonel Ellis, the representative of the Ministry of Information.

4. As regards the Spanish Zone, your Lordship will observe that, in Mr. Monypenny's opinion, Moorish sympathy might be attracted to our cause if, like Germany, we were willing to undertake an extensive programme of propaganda. But, unfortunately, this is not possible at present, owing to the antagonism and suspicion with which any activities on our part are regarded by the local Spanish authorities. When we succeed, however, in scoring a concrete success in the field, we shall do all that is possible to promote British publicity in Tetuan and also in the two Spanish *presidios* of Ceuta and Melilla. An armed victory would, I am convinced, do much to bring the local authorities and the Moors of the Spanish Zone round to our side, and when that turning-point is reached we should, I feel, not leave any stone unturned to push our publicity and our trade interests through Spanish Africa to the utmost possible limit.

Copies of this despatch, with enclosures, are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid and to his Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

Enclosure in No. 75.

Consul Monypenny to Mr. Gascoigne (*Tangier*).

(No. 112. Secret.)
Sir, *Tetuan, August* 6, 1940.

WITH reference to the memorandum on the Moroccan question, of which you handed me a copy, I have the honour to submit the following observations on the situation in Spanish Morocco as it appears to be at present:—

2. The collapse of France has been welcomed by the Moors of this zone, where the French are definitely disliked. Anti-French propaganda has been current in Spanish Morocco for many years, where Moorish political exiles from French Morocco have taken refuge and have spread stories of French severity and harshness towards the natives. Such anti-French agitation has always been welcome to, and encouraged by, the Spanish authorities.

3. The Spaniards, on the other hand, do not appear to be unpopular among the Moors, but they are not held in much respect. They are easy-going and slack, and therefore preferable to the French, but the average Moor considers himself as good as the Spaniard and is inclined to despise him.

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4. The Germans are admired for their power and efficiency. Moorish troops learned to respect German military prowess during the civil war in Spain, and the spectacular successes of the German war machine in the present war have naturally made a deep impression. German propaganda is also extremely active. German money is freely spent; and the Spanish press is untiring in support of the claims of Germany to invincibility. Germany has, moreover, not scrupled to intervene in Moorish internal affairs and to promise the Moors complete independence, and many natives feel that their future status depends as much on the will of the Germans as on that of the Spaniards.

5. The attitude towards the British appears to be not unfriendly, especially among the small semi-educated class, who favourably contrast British methods in Egypt, Iraq, India, &c., with Italian methods among the Moslems of Libya and French methods in French Morocco. The granting of independence to Egypt in particular is held by the more enlightened Moors to constitute evidence that England is more to be trusted than other colonising Powers. But interest in England is naturally not as great as in France and Spain, the Powers more directly concerned with Morocco, and the absence of propaganda on any effective scale has placed us at a disadvantage as compared with Germany. Nevertheless, interest in England has not been entirely extinguished and British naval power is recognised, the recent action at Oran being, for the Moors, a striking indication of that power.

6. During the Spanish civil war, General Franco drew large numbers of troops from Morocco, and these troops played an important part in the Nationalist victory. Spanish policy towards the Moors during that period therefore was dictated by the necessity to keep the Moors content at all costs. This was effected largely by lavish promises of benefits to come and of an ever-increasing measure of independence after the civil war. These promises have not yet been fulfilled and there is an inclination on the part of some sections of the native population to show resentment at the failure of the Spaniards to implement their promises. Moreover, it is not unusual to hear complaints that Spain has never done anything to encourage agricultural progress in Morocco and, indeed, that she has deliberately abstained from doing so in order that the peasants and tribesmen may be compelled to seek a livelihood in the ranks of the army.

7. It is also said that the Spaniards resent any occupation by Moors of posts higher than that of labourer or servant in Moroccan commercial and administrative life. It is only lately that Moors have been accepted even as chauffeurs. Moors hitherto have not been allowed to rise above the station of an underling.

8. Colonel Beigbeder, lately High Commissioner and now Spanish Foreign Minister, was himself principally responsible for the many promises made to the Moors during the civil war. He openly supported Nationalist organisations and newspapers and ostensibly identified himself with the aspirations of the people for eventual independence. In essence, however, the agitation he encouraged was anti-French, and by supporting several rival Nationalist parties in this zone he aimed at fostering internal dissension and thus dissipating the energies of the movement. Colonel Beigbeder did not, in fact, hesitate to admit, in private, that, in allowing the Nationalist Moors to give vent to their grievances, and in promising them all manner of benefits in the future, he was merely, as he put it, administering chloroform to a restive patient.

9. To judge, however, from articles now appearing in the native press, the Nationalist spirit is developing faster than the Spanish authorities expected. For instance, the Arabic newspaper *Hurria* has just been suspended for eight days for publishing an article written by a young Moor at Tangier protesting against the action of both France and Spain in Morocco and claiming the right of self-government for the Moors. Two days later the *Rif*—another native paper—condoled with its colleague and, when giving the reason for its suspension, practically repeated the arguments of the original contributor.

10. There has, in fact, recently been a campaign in the native press in favour of an independent and united Morocco. Since the surrender of France and the military occupation of Tangier by Spain, there is growing evidence of a desire among the Moors for a discontinuance of such terms as "French Morocco," "Spanish Morocco" and "International Zone," &c., and a recognition of the essential unity of Morocco as a whole under a Sultan free from foreign control.

11. As already stated, the Nationalist movement has not taken shape in one united party demanding independence. The Spanish authorities, and especially Colonel Beigbeder, have seen to it that internal jealousies among would-be Nationalist leaders have been encouraged, with the result that there are some three or four rival organisations. The Nationalist Reform party, for instance, which has perhaps most influence in the towns, is under Abdel Khalek Torres, a young impulsive individual with Fascist sympathies. Torres's party, with its green shirts, its parades and its money supplied from both Spanish and German sources, appeals chiefly to the youth in the towns. He is paid by the Spaniards in order to keep his activities under control, and by the Germans for propaganda purposes. His value as a leader of any genuine nationalist movement is problematical.

12. The leader of the other main nationalist party, the Moroccan Unity party, is Si Mekki-el-Naciri, a more enlightened and level-headed politician. While Torres is for direct action, Naciri hopes to gain his ends by persuasion. Naciri is in touch with Egypt through the Moroccan House of Studies in Cairo, a centre to which Moorish students from this zone are sent to pursue their studies. Colonel Beigbeder found Naciri, whom he described as a "renard dangereux" more difficult to handle than Torres, and was of the opinion that he might play a big rôle in future in Morocco. The Moroccan Unity party, as its name implies, stands for unity of the Moroccan people as a whole, including French Morocco and the Tangier Zone, whereas Torres has concentrated more on the claims to independence of Spanish Morocco, and interests few Moors outside the zone. Now, however, under German influence, Torres's plans are wider and embrace not only all Morocco but even a part of Andalusia!

13. There are one or two other less influential parties, such as the Hizb-el-Agrar—a recent creation under the leadership of the Pasha of Larache—and a religious party in Tetuan, which are encouraged by the Spanish and probably in their pay in order to counter the influence of Torres and Naciri.

14. Another organisation which should be mentioned, although it seems to be unimportant at the moment, is the so-called Bureau de Défense nationaliste, under Ibrahim-el-Ouazzani, who is definitely a German and Italian agent. Ouazzani has been in touch with the Syrian Nationalist Shekib Aralan, and was, at our instigation, expelled from Egypt and Iraq during a recent visit to the Near East.

15. These various political parties, however, touch only a section of the more enlightened Moors in the towns. The bulk of the Moorish population is still in a fairly primitive state of tribal existence. It is men from the Rif tribes who supply the majority of the fighting men who were so useful to General Franco in the civil war. They are poor and warlike, and easily attracted to the colours by the prospect of regular pay and food. They form, therefore, a very valuable supply of fighting material for the power in occupation of their country. Indeed, contemporary Spanish leaders appear to be interested in this zone mainly as a recruiting ground for their military forces and little is done to develop the country's economic resources or to educate the Moors. As an illustration of the attitude of the official Spanish mind, a remark by Colonel Beigbeder when High Commissioner in Tetuan is perhaps not without interest. Colonel Beigbeder had been talking of the fighting qualities of Moslems and of the immense help General Franco had received from the Moorish troops. From a population of less than 1 million Moslems in Spanish Morocco, he said Spain had drawn an army of many thousands of first-class fighting men. What an immense and magnificent army Great Britain could raise from the 80 million Moslems of India! With such an army the British could conquer the world. It seemed such a pity that here again Great Britain was indifferent to the wonderful opportunities thus available to her.

16. Too much importance should no doubt not be attached to a view expressed by the High Commissioner at an informal dinner party, but it would seem to confirm the impression that the Spaniards are more interested in exploiting the fighting qualities of the Moors than in developing the country for the benefit of the natives. Indeed, Colonel Beigbeder frankly admitted that he was not in favour of instilling too much European education in the younger generation of Moors. He thought that England and France had made a serious mistake in sending students from their colonial empires to London and Paris to study. Most of our troubles in India, Egypt, Syria and other colonies were due

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to the pernicious doctrines imbibed by the young native students in Europe. To avoid a repetition of such mistakes in Spain, and at the same time to meet the growing demand among the Moors for education, Moorish students were being sent to Egypt, where they could acquire an Islamic culture more suited to their circumstances. In pursuance of this policy the "House of Moroccan Studies" had been established in Cairo and batches of students were being sent there rather than to Spain. The Khalifa's son was also until the outbreak of the present war sent to Cairo and not to Spain for his studies. On the outbreak of war, however, the Khalifa's son returned to Morocco, and since then has been to Spain to study, but only because of the risk involved in travelling to Egypt.

17. The effect in this country of the contact through Moorish students with Egypt remains to be seen, but it seems reasonable to hope that it will not be detrimental to British prestige. Interest in Great Britain has for many years not been actively fostered in Spanish Morocco, but it has, nevertheless, not entirely disappeared. There is a minority strongly opposed to Spain and France, who would welcome a more vigorous British policy in this part of the world. Certain well-disposed Moors even hint that, if the need arose, a few of the tribes would turn against their present masters if encouraged to do so with arms and money. But, in the absence of any effective contact with these tribal elements, such statements must be accepted with the greatest reserve. Nevertheless, there is a vague wide-spread respect for Britain, which could be made use of if Britain, like Germany, were willing to undertake an intensive programme of propaganda among the Moors.

I have, &c.
R. G. MONYPENNY.

Sub-Enclosure.

State of Feeling of the Native Population of the French Zone of Morocco as in the Middle of July 1940.

THE French collapse and armistices had had singularly little visible effect upon the native population of the French Zone of Morocco up to the time of my departure on the 15th July.

2. Before proceeding to amplify this statement and to consider possible future developments, a brief description of the composition of this population may be helpful.

3. The great majority of the Moors (Arab and Berber) live in the countryside—mountain, plain and desert—and follow the agricultural and pastoral pursuits of their ancestors, and with methods scarcely changed. Illiteracy is the rule; rumours of doings of the outside world reach them deviously by word of mouth. Industry, mining and commerce absorb but a small percentage of the Moslem population, though this percentage is increasing and the famine of three years ago set in motion a drift to the towns. The main concerns of this pastoral and agricultural majority revolve around the sale-price of barley, hard wheat, maize, live-stock, wool and hides, the purchase price of sugar, tea and Japanese piece-goods. Fez, with its university and colleges, breeds an *intelligentsia* class, small in numbers but disproportionately vocal and influential. It is they who, three years ago, attempted with a certain initial success to raise the standard of revolt against the French and clamoured for independence. General Noguès struck hard, and they subsided into a silence which has not since been broken.

4. If any lack of reaction amid the rural population to French reverses and and the French collapse causes no surprise, the same can scarcely be said of the intellectuals of Fez and Salé, who might have been expected to seize their opportunity. It may be that the sound administration which—to give him his due—Noguès has built up since his arrival in the autumn of 1936 still holds good for a little while longer. It may be that the Nationalists are biding their time.

5. The attitude of the Sultan has been very satisfactory and he has shown himself to be made of sterner stuff than the Resident-General, whom he would have wished to see resist. He is credibly reported to have expressed his determination not to become a puppet of the Germans in no uncertain terms.

6. The better-class Moors have, many of them, expressed right up to the time of my departure very friendly sentiments as regards England. A number of them have expressed a wish for British protection over Morocco, and there is no reason to doubt their genuineness in the matter even though they have probably not thought the case out very deeply.

7. The rural population have had a fair harvest, following on a record one the previous year, and prices of their staple needs were only beginning to rise appreciably when I left the zone.

8. This rise is likely to be steep and rapid. This will breed discontent. The Germans may use this to raise the natives, now or later, against the French, for their own purposes. They may also—and doubtless will—endeavour to blacken the British in native eyes by attributing the cost and probable forthcoming scarcity of tea and sugar to our blockade. Our broadcast in Arabic, though likely to be jammed (the Political Affairs Department at Rabat have a "jamming section"), will doubtless bear in mind this probability and state our case simply.

L. H. HURST.

July 30, 1940.

[C 10261/10261/28] No. 76.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received September* 25.)

(No. 238.)

My Lord, *Tangier, August* 21, 1940.

ON the 31st May, in my despatch No. 135, I had the honour to forward to your Lordship a general political and economic report on the Tangier Zone. Since that date the Continent of Europe has witnessed a number of momentous events, and it may not be amiss if I endeavour to describe their repercussions upon the political and economic situation of this port. I would also venture to add a brief appreciation of the situation in the Spanish and French Zones of Morocco.

2. On the 18th June France capitulated to Germany, thus basely deserting her ally and casting away her world prestige for generations to come. The French colony in Tangier, which amounts to some 4,000 persons, including many retired Government servants, were, with some notable exceptions, mentally "stunned" by the suddenness of the surrender. They looked round for an explanation, and eagerly clutched at the statements made by M. Baudouin, and other members of the Pétain Government, that one of the chief reasons for France's defeat lay in the lack of armed assistance from Great Britain.

3. Thus, from my French colleague downwards, the French population of Tangier, with but few exceptions, accused Great Britain in the most baseless and disgraceful manner of having left France in the lurch in her hour of trial. The ignominious capitulation of Marshal Pétain was, it was said, partially explained by the fact that we had not, from the first, assisted the armies of the republic with a sufficiency of men, guns and aeroplanes. Even the Royal Navy came in for its share of criticism. His Majesty's ships, it was alleged, had left French soldiers to be killed, captured or drowned at Dunkerque. And so a mass of offensive lies were cast in our teeth, and it was for those who, like myself, had always looked upon France as their second country perhaps the saddest and most disappointing period of their lives.

4. The naval incidents of Oran and Dakar followed. Locally, the effect of these was to reduce the majority of my French friends, who had not yet recovered from the sudden blow of defeat, to a state bordering upon hysteria. My French colleague, who happened to telephone to me just after the second engagement at Oran on a trivial matter of routine, took the opportunity, until I put down the receiver, to hurl, in childlike rage, the most offensive epithets at Mr. Churchill, who had just delivered a speech explaining the British standpoint. The Administrator of the Tangier Zone, M. Le Fur, with whom I had always, up till then, been on extremely good terms, cut me deliberately in the street. It seemed impossible to make these people see reason and, for the time being, the only thing to do was to leave them alone. The once famous French logic had vanished.

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5. Several weeks have passed since that painful period and, at the moment of writing, the French here, while still sullen, angry and fearful of what the future may hold in store for them, seem for the most part to be regaining a more normal mental equilibrium. I have resumed relations with my French colleague, although, by common consent, we keep off world politics when we meet; and with a number of other French friends one is able now to talk. If they do not agree with our point of view they at least show some inclination to listen to our arguments; albeit our blockades of Metropolitan France and French North Africa form, of course, new complaints, which they are being incited by their Government to use to the utmost against us.

6. With a view to presenting to the French population the standpoint of His Majesty's Government, the *Tangier Gazette* has since the 1st July been published each evening in French, and it is satisfactory to note that its circulation amongst French people here is increasing substantially. I cannot personally look upon this sudden flare of French hatred against us as anything but temporary. When in due course our forces once again take the offensive against Germany and it becomes evident to Frenchmen in general that Hitler's boasts of conquest are hollow and unfounded, the majority, both here and in French Morocco, will, I sincerely believe, rally to our cause. Indeed, all my information goes to show that in French Morocco the major part of the French civilian population and the junior ranks of the armed forces (with the possible exception of the navy) are already turning away from Vichy and placing their faith in Great Britain.

7. Italy entered the war against Great Britain on the 11th June. The effect upon Tangier was, politically, slight. The Italian colony, which now numbers some 600, has remained quiet, thanks, possibly, in great measure to the Spanish occupation of Tangier, which took place on the 14th June. In the economic realm, however, the closing of the Mediterranean to shipping will prove in the months to come a hindrance to Tangier's trade. It is hoped, however, that food-stuffs and other commodities will be imported from Great Britain in larger quantities, and the Portuguese market is at present supplying certain commodities which formerly came from countries on the eastern Mediterranean seaboard.

8. The Spanish occupation of Tangier, which took place with the consent of the French Government, was described in my despatch No. 146 of the 15th June. Since the arrival of the Moorish troops there has been no trouble worth mentioning in Tangier. These troops have behaved on the whole extremely well and, as I said above, it may even be argued that their presence has afforded security against possible trouble from the truculent Italian colony. The introduction of military jurisdiction in connexion with certain crimes committed against the Moorish troops (my despatch No. 176 of the 8th July) has not so far been put into effect in connexion with British subjects. Its application has been almost entirely confined up to now to street incidents between Spanish civilians and Spanish soldiers. Albeit, the Spaniards hold in this a weapon which, *le cas échéant*, they can at any time employ against British subjects by some trumpery charge.

9. There were many who thought that the Spanish occupation of Tangier was destined to be the forerunner to an almost immediate incorporation of the Tangier Zone into the Spanish Zone. I consider that the Spaniards might possibly have gone beyond a simple "police" occupation if it had not been for the opposition of Italy, who, after a preliminary agreement with the Spanish move, showed that she did not intend to agree to what was in theory only a temporary measure developing into a complete seizure of the zone. In this connexion it is interesting to note that my Italian colleague and the Italian members of the Legislative Assembly are at present showing the same energy as we are ourselves in endeavouring to keep to the spirit of the statute.

10. Great Britain's relations with Spain in the Tangier Zone have throughout this period of change remained good. This is in great measure due to the sympathy and understanding of my Spanish colleague, Dr. Amieva, who has always been ready to assist in unravelling any small difficulties which have arisen between us. Since, however, the Spanish occupation, the deportation from Tangier of those members of the Spanish colony who formerly sympathised with the Republican régime has greatly increased. The "Gestapo" have been at work, and numbers of these unfortunate people have been taken from their beds in the middle of the night and transported in military police wagons to the Spanish Zone.

11. Early in June France gave her consent to the appointment of a Spanish Administrator in Tangier. This appointment, which had been so eagerly sought for by Spain since the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1935, was naturally greatly appreciated by the "Falangist" element here. Spain's nominee for this difficult post is Dr. Amieva, the former Spanish Consul-General, and it is no exaggeration to say that he looks forward to his new duties with great foreboding. He has taken over at a critical period in the history of this International Zone, for, *inter alia*, the question of Tangier's supplies of food-stuffs presents a formidable problem, now that French Morocco will, owing to our blockade, and for other reasons connected with France's capitulation, no longer be able to furnish Tangier with the same quotas as before. It remains to be seen how he will tackle the problems which are bound to arise. For the first time in the history of International Tangier Spain plays the leading rôle. It would, indeed, be detrimental to her prestige if she failed to make it a success. In any case Dr. Amieva will enjoy the loyal co-operation of the British members of the Administration and that of our delegates on the Legislative Assembly. For my own part I shall do all in my power to assist him.

12. The reaction of the international situation upon Tangier's economy is naturally becoming more marked as the war continues and the number of belligerents increase. Up to the date of writing the actual supply of the necessary commodities of life has been adequately maintained. These have come for the most part from French Morocco, and certain quotas from Portugal. We shall, however, be faced in the future with restrictions and rationing, and many important necessaries, such as petrol, flour, sugar, tea, pharmaceutical products, &c., will be likely to become extremely scarce. The finances of the zone, which up to the present have been maintained satisfactorily, are bound also increasingly to suffer from the lack of imports, although the rise in the value of all imports will in some measure compensate for the diminution in the quantity of the goods imported (*ad valorem* system). The Director of Finance, however, does not feel apprehensive regarding the immediate future.

13. I have on several occasions approached your Lordship's department regarding the question of the British import trade into Tangier. Apart from the trade standpoint, which I fully realise is, in so far as the comparatively small Tangier trade is concerned, quite unimportant from our point of view. the political advantage to be derived from sending supplies to this port is not so negligible. If we could furnish evidence, in the shape of substantial and regular consignments of British goods, that our export and carrying trade remain unaffected by the war, the effect upon the European and Moorish inhabitants of the port would be most salutary. During the coming winter, after the German "Blitzkrieg" over Britain has subsided, I greatly hope, therefore, that our trade may be substantially increased. The question of financing it is not at present a difficult one, as sterling is available locally in sufficient quantities; the export regulations of the United Kingdom, coupled with the difficulties of sea transport, form the chief hindrances under the present circumstances. I hope, however, that the latter question will be solved by the forwarding of goods to Tangier, either through Lisbon, where they may be transhipped into Portuguese bottoms, or via Gibraltar. Communication between Tangier and Gibraltar is about to be resumed by a weekly service each way, and it is hoped that this will continue throughout the winter.

14. As regards the situation in the Spanish Zone it will be remembered that the Moorish population respect the Germans for their strength, efficiency and their objective way of doing things. The Moors in this area dislike the French and despise the Italians; the entry of the latter into the war was hailed, however, both by the Spanish and Moorish populations with satisfaction. Much speculation has been taking place regarding the possible attack from the Spanish Zone upon the French Protectorate, and substantial reinforcements of Spanish troops have lately arrived at Ceuta. The most recent information obtained by His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan from various sources is that the Spanish authorities are becoming more and more inclined to the opinion that the French authorities at Rabat may try to cut away from the Vichy Administration and establish an autonomous régime in the protectorate. His Majesty's Government, they suspect, might, in the event of such a political move on the part of General Noguès, send a Franco-British expeditionary force to French Morocco, which would constitute a threat to the Spanish Zone. Active preparations are reported to be in course

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for the defence of the coasts of the Spanish Zone against any attacks which may occur.

15. Finally, concerning the general attitude of the French in the protectorate. As your Lordship will remember, His Majesty's Consul-General at Rabat and His Majesty's Consul at Casablanca were ordered to leave the zone after the incident of Oran. The order also included the vice-consul at Mazagan. His Majesty's Consul at Marrakesh and His Majesty's Consul at Fez were, however, allowed to remain *in situ*, although none of the ordinary facilities of communication were granted to them. These latter officers, however, were, after some two weeks' interval, also ejected from their posts at short notice, and at the moment of writing all our consular representatives for French Morocco, in addition to those for Tunisia and Algeria, are in Tangier awaiting further instructions. The attitude towards us of the French inhabitants of the French Protectorate seems to be improving. The naval elements in Casablanca are still bitterly opposed to Great Britain, for they refuse to accept our explanations regarding the necessity, from the point of view of the Allied cause, for the neutralisation or destruction of the French fleet. The military and flying corps personnel, however, are not so bitterly inclined, and " the man in the street " is now coming round to our point of view. Our main difficulty as regards the French Protectorate is the detention by the French authorities of a large number of Allied ships, which were formerly working for the cause under the British flag. It is hoped that some arrangement will be arrived at with the French authorities whereby our consular representation will be renewed and the ships released in return, perhaps, for some barter trade deals.

16. I am sending a copy of this despatch to his Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-chief, Gibraltar, to His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid, and to His Majesty's Consul, Tetuan.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 11378/5847/28] No. 77.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 615.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, October* 30, 1940.

THREE batteries of Spanish artillery (twelve guns in all, said to be of 75- or 77-centim. calibre) arrived in Tangier Zone at 13 hours to-day from Spanish Zone and are taking up their positions along westerly coast of former zone in neighbourhood of Cape Spartel.

2. It is expected that further batteries will arrive soon and will be placed along northern coast of this zone in the neighbourhood of Cape Malabata.

3. Reason for these reinforcements to existing Moorish Mahalla infantry and cavalry troops occupying [? group omitted] is not yet clear.

4. I shall telegraph further details as soon as possible.

(Repeated to Governor of Gibraltar, No. 213, and Madrid, No. 189.)

[C 11378/5847/28] No. 78.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 618.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, October* 30, 1940.

MY telegram No. 48 and my telegram No. 615 of 14th June and 30th October respectively.

You will appreciate that the action of the Spanish authorities in sending these batteries of Spanish artillery into Tangier Zone is a big advance on, if it is not actually in conflict with, the statement reproduced in the first paragraph of my telegram No. 48. The personnel of these batteries appears to be nearly all Spanish (not Moorish), and there is no valid reason for introducing these guns into this zone. In addition to this, neither the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires (my

Spanish colleague is in Madrid) nor the Officer Commanding Troops of Occupation, have had the common courtesy to inform the representatives of the statutory Powers [? group omitted] intended to take such action.

2. Under the circumstances, we could well protest, either here or in Madrid, and ask the reason for this sudden influx. But under the present conditions action of this kind would not be likely to be of practical use.

3. The advent of these guns has naturally caused a good deal of excitement amongst certain circles in Tangier, who fear imminent attack from some quarter unknown—but that will soon die down.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 190, and Governor of Gibraltar, No. 214.)

[C 11761/5847/28] No. 79.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 3.)

(No. 646.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, November* 2, 1940.

I SUBMIT following for favour of your urgent consideration :—

My Belgian and Dutch colleagues received at noon to-day a curt note from the High Commissioner of the Spanish Zone " demanding " their presence at Tetuan at 5 P.M. this evening.

2. On arrival, the High Commissioner, General Asensio, told them that his Government had instructed him to order them to cease their official functions immediately in Tangier and the Spanish Zone (both have exequaturs for the Spanish Zone as well as for Tangier). Courtesy had prompted [? group omitted] to give them twenty-four hours' delay and accommodation [? had] been reserved for them at his residence in Tetuan. Reason for this was that Spain had weighty responsibilities *vis-à-vis* the belligerents, and, as their countries were now occupied by Germany, they were in a special position.

3. My two colleagues protested that, whereas their exequaturs for the Spanish Zone were delivered by the Spanish authorities, the powers conferred upon them as regards Tangier Zone flowed from the Sultan of Morocco and did not depend upon Spain. They, moreover, asked whether Spain had, indeed, broken off diplomatic relations with the Belgian and Dutch Governments.

4. General Asensio denied all knowledge of these matters and said that he would telephone to Madrid. After speaking to Señor Suñer himself, General Asensio admitted that his Government had not broken diplomatic relations either with Brussels or with The Hague, and he there and then admitted that they should be permitted to continue to exercise their consular functions in the Spanish Zone and in Tangier, on condition that they would agree not to continue sitting on the Committee of Control. Documents were thereupon drawn up and signed by the three parties concerned to this effect, and they were permitted to return to Tangier.

5. The Committee of Control therefore functions in future minus two of its members, and, as there is not one particle of legality about this extraordinary Spanish move, I request instructions whether I should attend its meetings in future. Not to [? group undecypherable] would be to play Spain's game, although, as far as my share in the local affairs of this zone is concerned, I might, if I do not continue to do so, just as well come home. On the other hand, with two of its members absent, the Committee of Control will not be a legally constituted body, and to [? hold] share in its labours would imply tacit admission by us of these disgraceful Spanish methods.

6. Matter is particularly urgent, as there is to be a meeting of the committee on 4th November. If I do not hear from you by the morning of that day I shall attend, as, in view of the delicacy of our relations with Spain, I do not feel justified in taking responsibility of staying away. Dutch and Belgian Governments will no doubt approach you on this question.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 198.)

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[C 11761/5847/28] No. 80.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 3.)

(No. 647.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, November* 3, 1940.

MY telegram No. 646, paragraph 4, of 2nd November.

Following is text of document which High Commissioner of Spanish Zone and my Belgian and Dutch colleagues signed yesterday evening :—

" The High Commissioner has stated to us that, in view of the situation of Belgium and Holland, which are occupied by the enemy, and also in view of the position in which Spain finds herself *vis-à-vis* the various belligerent countries, he insists that representatives of Belgium and Holland should cease to exercise their functions on Committee of Control. It is agreed, however, that said representatives shall be able to exercise consular functions at Tangier and in Spanish Morocco."

2. It is easy to criticise after the event, but I cannot help thinking that my colleagues have made a serious mistake in selling the pass like this. The alternative to their agreeing not to fulfil their functions on the Committee of Control here was that they should be incarcerated in High Commissioner's house at Tetuan for an unlimited period.

3. If, as is always possible, I receive a similar summons from Asensio, I shall proceed to Tetuan (he has the right to summon me as consul of his territory), but I shall absolutely refuse to sign *any* document whatever pending such instructions as you may send me. Nevertheless, the fact of their signing this paper cannot in any way, I presume, commit their respective Governments, and they tell me that they explained this, but only verbally, to Asensio.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 199.)

[C 11678/5847/28] No. 81.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 4.)

(No. 652.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, November* 3, 1940.

MY telegrams No. 646 and No. 647.

Spanish Consul-General requested my French and my Portuguese colleagues and myself to meet him at 9 P.M. this evening and made the following statement :—

2. It had been decided, " owing to international situation," that Legislative Assembly, the Committees of Control and Mixed Bureau Information (see article 10 of final protocol of Tangier Convention) would be " suspended." Officer commanding troops of occupation would become " Governor " of Tangier. Mixed Tribunal would also probably be suspended in due course. This new régime would come into force " probably " to-morrow morning.

3. I asked Miranda whether he was acting under direct orders from Madrid and he replied : " No; Colonel Yuste informed me of this on my return from Spain this evening." I then asked him under whose orders Colonel Yuste was acting, but he would give no reply. Nor would he give us any further particulars regarding new régime excepting that the present international administration would continue to function under Yuste's orders.

Please see my following telegram. Please repeat immediately to Admiral and Chief [*sic*].

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 200, and Gibraltar, No. 224.)

[C 11678/5847/28] No. 82.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 4.)

(No. 656.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, November* 4, 1940.

FOLLOWING is text of order published in *España* this morning :—

" Don Antonio Yuste Sigura, Colonel of Infantry, Officer Commanding Column of Occupation in the Zone of Tangier, orders : ' As from the publication of this notice and by reason of the present situation, Committee of Control, Legislative Assembly and Mixed Bureau of Information will cease to function. In these circumstances, I myself take charge of the Zone of Tangier under the title of Governor and as delegate of the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco. Dated Tangier, 3rd November, 1940.—Signed, ANTONIO YUSTE."

[C 11833/5847/28] No. 83.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 5.)

(No. 956.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, November* 4, 1940.

TANGIER telegram No. 652.

Having read the Tangier telegrams I felt I ought, if possible, to forestall any sudden action by Spanish Government and to warn Minister for Foreign Affairs of the consequences. I accordingly told him this morning that according to my information from Tangier things were happening that looked like the beginning of a Spanish *coup*. I had, I made clear, no instructions from His Majesty's Government, but as a friend of Spain I was anxious to avoid a situation that would embroil Spanish relations with Great Britain and United States at the very moment when we were resuming economic negotiations. I therefore asked him whether he wished to tell me anything about the position. He responded with more than an hour's talk about Spanish aspirations in Morocco in general and Tangier in particular. As to Tangier, he said when war started Tangier was in reality a French protectorate. After entry of Italy and collapse of France this position became both dangerous and intolerable. In addition, Holland and Belgium once occupied by Germany ceased to have a justifiable *locus standi* in Government settlement. Result was a continual danger of conflagration, particularly from the side of Italy. As Spain was determined to be the predominant power in Tangier in future she could not allow a situation to continue that might compromise her position. I replied that Great Britain had shown her readiness to consider new facts in the world by agreeing to change in Spanish [? domination]. We had also never disguised our sympathy with the Spanish desire to play an important rôle in North Africa. But was it not better to attempt to reach agreement by discussion rather than by what would seem to Great Britain and United States a new act of aggression? Minister for Foreign Affairs took what I said in good part, particularly my warning about United States. I repeated that I had been speaking without instructions, but that no doubt I should soon receive some from London, when I would resume the discussions with him.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 35.)

[C 11833/5847/28] No. 84.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 5.)

(No. 957.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, November* 4, 1940.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs ended by pressing me to regard what he was going to say as very confidential. It was to the effect that if Great Britain would treat with sympathy and comprehension Spain's aspirations in Tangier, a new

chapter would open in Spanish and British relations. He added that as a decision could not wait until the end of the war discussions should begin immediately. There was no intention of any hostile act against France. I said I was glad to hear this. France and Spain were the two guarantees and our main interest was to see that our enemies, neither in Tangier nor Morocco, obtained any advantage by any changes of *status quo*.

I now await your instructions. Subject to them my present advice would be to start discussions without delay on Tangier position and changes brought about in it by the war. If we could reach an understanding with Spain it might well be the most effective instrument for keeping them out of German *bloc*. Meanwhile, I have been feeling that my words of warning and particularly my reference to United States may prevent things going further than they have already gone.

[C 11628/5847/28] No. 85.

Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Hoare (Madrid).

(No. 997.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 5, 1940.*

I HAVE received your telegrams Nos. 956 and 957 [of 4th November: Tangier] and approve your action.

2. We have legitimate cause of complaint against the action of the Spanish Government in three respects. These are, first, the action of the Spanish representative at Tangier in seeking independently to modify and suspend, without notice, the institutions of the international régime at Tangier as laid down by the convention regarding the organisation of the statute of the Tangier Zone of 18th December, 1923, and by the final protocol of the Conference for the Amendment of the Tangier Statute, signed at Paris on 25th July, 1928. Secondly, the manner in which the Spanish forces occupying Tangier have been greatly increased without any notification to the parties to the statute. Thirdly, the manner in which the question of the reintroduction of the peseta as legal tender at Tangier, which was already the subject of amicable discussion between the representatives of the Governments concerned, has been decided on the authority of the officer commanding the Spanish occupying forces, without further reference to the international administration of the Zone.

3. We are entitled to protest to the Spanish Government on all three points, of which the first is much the most serious. We have the more grounds for doing so in that the Spaniards have acted without prior consultation with us, although we have in the past made it clear that we appreciate the importance of Spanish interests in Tangier and acquiesced in the occupation of the Zone by Spanish troops earlier in the year. We would recall that the Spanish Government gave assurances on that occasion that the international administration would be maintained.

4. I shall be glad if you will place our formal protest on record in such terms as you may think most appropriate and reserve the rights of His Majesty's Government under the international instruments in question. The Netherlands Government have informed us that they wish to make a protest and you should concert with your Netherlands colleague.

5. At the same time I have fully in mind the exchange of views reported in your telegram No. 957, and should be quite willing for you to accompany the protest by an intimation of our willingness to start discussions with the Spanish Government on the position at Tangier, making plain that we do not fail to appreciate special interest of Spain in Tangier, and that object of such discussion would be to reach an understanding as to the best way to regularise the position.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 307; Lisbon, No. 840; Stockholm, No. 855; and Washington, No. 2947.)

[C 11833/5847/28] No. 86.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 983.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, November 7, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 997.

I carried out your instructions this morning with Minister for Foreign Affairs. I began by saying that His Majesty's Government had already made it clear that we were not unsympathetic to Spanish aspirations in North Africa. We had shown our readiness to face a new situation when we had acquiesced in the strengthening of Spanish garrison in June. We were, therefore, the more surprised that we had not been consulted about recent *coup*. We objected to Spanish action of this kind in face of international agreements. Moreover, friendly negotiations were already in progress over the question of currency. If the Spanish Government acted in this way over currency negotiations, what hope was there for future negotiations of other kinds? His Majesty's Government were bound to protest and to reserve their rights for the future. This, however, did not mean that we were not prepared to discuss the future or would ignore Spanish aspirations. Would Minister for Foreign Affairs give me his comments upon points that I had raised and enable me to say anything that would reassure His Majesty's Government? Word for word he answered, Spain had to act quickly, and that if they had embarked upon negotiations nothing would have come of them. He had purposely consulted none of the Powers concerned. If he had consulted anyone Italy would undoubtedly have blocked negotiations. When he spoke of Italy it was clear to me that he had chosen a moment for *coup* when Italy was fully engaged. It was, he continued, in his view, too dangerous to leave the Tangier situation as it was. It was a temptation to combatants. If Great Britain won the war it would be to our advantage to have Spain established in Tangier. If we lost it, it was even more important for us to have Spain there rather than Italy or Germany. Spain had taken action solely in her own interests and *coup* was not intended either to help or injure any of the combatants. As to the question of negotiations, he was doubtful whether they were possible in view of the fact that Italy would demand a share in them. He would, however, like to discuss the question further with me.

3. At this point I had to leave Minister for Foreign Affairs for my appointment with General Franco. I therefore ended the interview by expressing my anxiety at Spanish action and my desire to resume the conversation with him to-morrow or the next day. It seemed clear to me throughout the interview that he was determined that somehow or other Tangier should be Spanish.

4. I should be grateful for your further instructions.

[C 11833/5847/28] No. 87.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 488.)
My Lord, *Madrid, November 5, 1940.*

IN my telegrams Nos. 956 and 957 of the 4th November, I had the honour to report the substance of my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday morning regarding the new Spanish move in Tangier, in the course of which I gained the impression that the action I had taken with Señor Serrano Suñer, in advance of any instructions from your Lordship, might at least have the effect of preventing things going further than they had already done.

2. Yesterday evening I learnt from a sure source that instructions had been issued to treat the subject of Tangier as quietly as possible. Seldom has the obedience of the Spanish press to the Government's orders been more obvious than in its treatment of this question.

3. The headlines on the subject in yesterday's evening and to-day's morning papers are exactly the same: "The international organisms cease to function in Tangiers." The same report, supplied by the official Cifra home news agency, is reproduced in the whole press: it states that "as a result of present

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circumstances, the Officer Commanding the Column of Occupation in the zone of Tangiers has given orders for the Control Committee, the Legislative Assembly and the Joint Bureau of Information to cease functioning. The officer in question takes over the zone of Tangiers in the capacity of Governor and as a delegate of the Spanish Commissariat in Morocco."

4. The comments are similarly all identical. They refer to the enthusiasm displayed by the Spanish people on the 14th June last, when the Spanish Government came to the decision of taking control over the town and territory of Tangiers, and stress the fact that this step is but a logical consequence of the action then taken. Spain, they point out, has been since the 14th June the sole authority in Tangiers, and the international offices now, therefore, no longer have any *raison d'être*.

5. The papers also emphasise that Spain has come into her own " in the most natural manner, in agreement with history, geography and logic." " Nobody can talk of a third party's rights," adds *Arriba*, " for the simple reason that of contracts there can be no question where there exists a national right." *Informaciones* refers to Tangiers as a " Little Geneva," and states that " it was set up by the democracies to maintain, against the rights of Spain, a state of agitation, an espionage centre, and a hotbed of immorality."

6. Particular mention is also made of the fact that the decisions taken on the 14th June and on the 4th November have met with the complete and tacit acquiescence of the whole world, thus proving how well-founded was Spain's right.

7. Only *Arriba*, the Falange party organ, which devotes its editorial to the question of Tangiers, mentions fleetingly that the only exception to the " respectful manner of accepting this action in our foreign policy " is France. " France (to whom the paper does not refer by name) has "—says the leading article—" recently offered her friendship to European nations. The sincerity of this offer does not tally with her protest against a revindication which Spain has just claimed with the eloquent silence of the nations of the whcle world."

8. No comments on the matter by the Spanish correspondents in Rome and Berlin have yet been published.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon, and to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tangier.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
A. F. YENCKEN.

[C 11833/5847/28] No. 88.

Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Hoare (Madrid).

(No. 1046.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 11, 1940.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 983 and 990 [of 7th and 8th November : Spanish action at Tangier].

I approve your language to Minister for Foreign Affairs and appreciate the Spanish Government's views regarding their interests at Tangier.

2. Bilateral discussions between His Majesty's Government and the Spanish Government cannot, of course, in themselves serve to regularise the position. We are only one of several Governments interested in the international régime, and we could not reach any decision with the Spanish Government without these Governments also being consulted.

3. You might put this difficulty to Señor Suñer, who on his side appears to admit it. You can assure him that His Majesty's Government have never regarded the régime at Tangier, or for that matter any other international arrangement, as incapable of modification. His Majesty's Government, so far as they are concerned, are willing to concede that the Spanish Government have a special interest in the Tangier Zone. They were bound to protest against the recent Spanish action, and they have reserved all their rights; but they are prepared at any time to consider sympathetically any proposals which the Spanish Government may desire to put forward to them and to other parties interested

in the international régime for the purpose of regularising the situation created by the Spanish action. You should make it clear that His Majesty's Government attach great importance to the maintenance of the neutrality of the zone and to the avoidance of any action which might be harmful to British interests. They would regret any further tampering with the international administration, or with the functioning of the Mixed Tribunal, and they therefore trust that the Spanish Government will seek to make no further changes in the Tangier régime without proper consultation. This appears already to have been done in the case of the international gendarmerie.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 328.)

[C 12236/5847/28] No. 89.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 765.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, November* 19, 1940.

FOLLOWING is translation of decree referred to in paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 760 of 19th November :—

" Decree of the Chief of State, dated 9th November, published in the *Boletín Oficial* of 13th November : ' The organisation of the statute having been suppressed in the Zone of Tangier, the Governor Delegate of the High Commission of Spain in Morocco has provisionally assumed the functions of Government and Administration thereof until there is extended thereto the general régime established for the Spanish Protectorate; and this juridical situation being incompatible with the character previously held by the former diplomatic representation of Spain in the said zone, I decree on the proposal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs : Article 1. That from the time of publication of the present decree and as a consequence of the incorporation of Tangier in the zone of the Spanish protectorate, the consulate-general of Spain established there shall have the characteristics and functions of the other consulates of our protectorate.' "

[C 12774/5847/28] No. 90.

Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Hoare (Madrid).

(No. 1164.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 26, 1940.

MY telegram No. 1046 [of 11th November : Spanish action at Tangier].

1. I am disturbed at the further tampering by the Spanish authorities with the International Administration of Tangier, which appears to be in progress without prior consultation with His Majesty's Government or with at least the majority of the parties to the Tangier Statute. Tangier telegram No. 756 [of the 18th November] indicates that the fortification of the zone is proceeding rapidly, while Tangier telegram No. 765 gives the text of a decree of 9th November foreshadowing the incorporation of Tangier into the Spanish Protectorate.

2. In view of attitude which we have adopted, we can hardly let further violations of the statute which may be contemplated go by default. Although in practice we can do nothing to hinder the absorption of Tangier into the Spanish Protectorate, we should continue to maintain that the Spanish authorities cannot modify the Tangier Statute without prior consultation with the parties. Unless you see objection, you should therefore make our position plain to Spanish Government on each occasion in which the statute is infringed. You should, in particular, draw their attention to the wording of the decree of 9th November (Tangier telegram No. 765), which seems to foreshadow incorporation of Tangier into the Spanish Protectorate, and refer to your original protest. You should also revert to the question of the import of war material and heavy artillery into the zone, which is now reaching proportions obviously incompatible with the terms

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of article 3 of the statute, and going beyond any reasonable requirement of an occupying force (my telegram No. 341 to Tangier).

3. You may think it desirable to convey a hint to the Spanish Government that His Majesty's Government's attitude in regard to their actions in Tangier might be different if the Spanish Government were to consult them before changes are effected.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 351.)

[C 12896/5847/28] No. 91.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 355.)

My Lord *Tangier, November* 25, 1940.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 327 of the 9th November, I have the honour to report that since that date the situation in this zone has remained mainly static. The only new incident, which occurred on the 9th November, was the suppression by the "Governor's" orders of the Tangier gendarmerie (see my telegram No. 708 of the 9th November).

2. As regards the fortifying of the Tangier Zone, this is still proceeding along the coasts, especially in the neighbourhood of Capes Malabata and Spartel, where trenches and gun emplacements are being made. Moreover, a large number of guns of small calibre, described to me as anti-aircraft guns, have recently been brought into the zone.

3. On the 13th November a decree, copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith for convenience of reference, was published in the *Boletín Oficial* of Madrid providing for the reduction of the status of the Spanish representation in Tangier to that of a consulate in Spanish-protected Africa. The said decree further foreshadowed the definite incorporation of the Tangier Zone into the Spanish Zone of Morocco. It is interesting to note in this connexion that I have it on the best authority that this decree was telegraphed to the *España*, the local Spanish daily newspaper of Tangier, by the authorities in Madrid with instructions that it should be published therein on the 14th November. It was actually set up in type at the *España* office when an urgent telegram arrived early in the morning of the 14th forbidding its publication. The reasons for this action are not known, but I would hazard the opinion that the B.B.C. broadcast made at 19·00 hours (16 metres) on the 13th November that His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid had stated to the Spanish Government that "steps would be taken" to ensure that Tangier remained unfortified may have been partly instrumental in causing the Spanish authorities to think twice before proceeding further with their nefarious designs. Other reasons may have been—

(*a*) That the Spanish mechanism required for the replacement of the administrative organs of Tangier was not yet complete; and

(*b*) That those responsible for the foreign policy of Spain were hesitating between incorporating the Tangier Zone into Spanish Africa, or annexing it outright, thus creating a third Spanish presidio in Africa. The latter move would be advantageous to Spain, as, *inter alia*, if Tangier were to become Spanish soil, we should presumably not claim the implementation of our capitulatory rights, privileges which we should, I presume, enjoy if Tangier were to form part of Spanish Morocco, where we have never ceased to possess such rights. At the same time, the stealing of Tangier from the Sultan, its rightful owner, would be greatly resented by the Moors.

4. I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my telegram No. 773 of the 23rd November upon the instructions emanating from the Spanish authorities which were given to the Mendoub (the representative of the Sultan in Tangier) to relinquish his functions here. The Mendoub, apparently with the backing of my French colleague, resisted this demand and replied that, as the servant of the Sultan, he would take instructions from none other than His Majesty. At the time of writing the matter rests there, and Mohamed Tazi, who is a personal

friend of Mr. Vice-Consul Spinney of Mazagan (now in residence in Tangier), told the latter yesterday that, failing orders from the Sultan, he would only permit himself to be relieved of his official functions by force. Naturally, all this high-handed action *vis-à-vis* the local representative of the Sultan has caused considerable annoyance and indignation in Moorish circles here—the Moors are now almost entirely anti-Spanish and are mostly pro-British.

5. I should be failing in my duty if I did not express my view to your Lordship (these are admittedly necessarily narrowed by the limited vision available from Tangier) regarding the dangers which may lie ahead as the result of a complete Spanish hegemony over this zone and port.

6. So far, the introduction of men and war material into the zone by Spain has not been of a very serious nature. The guns are, as far as I can ascertain, of small calibre, and the reserves of ammunition for these guns, either in Tangier or the Spanish Zone, is, I believe, scarce. The Spanish troops, who, with the exception of the artillery and one battalion of Spanish infantry, are still for the greater part Moors of the Khalifian forces of the Spanish Zone, while they might form good fighting material and are of sturdy physique, are poorly armed. Their rifles are not of modern manufacture, and the automatic weapons with which they are supplied are also, I believe, out of date. As for the guns themselves, the largest calibre seems to be 105 mms., although rumours are abroad that there are some 210 mms. which have been brought here in pieces and have not yet been mounted.

7. But if the present fortifications are not such as could be effective in connexion with the closing of the Straits we cannot guarantee that, with German and Italian assistance, long-distance weapons may not be imported and established such as might seriously impede maritime traffic entering the Mediterranean from the Atlantic. Furthermore, there is a good opportunity in the Tangier Zone for the establishment of a large aerodrome, which might serve as a base for Axis aircraft destined to be used in attacks on Gibraltar.

8. I feel, therefore, strongly that, even if His Majesty's Government do not impede Spain's incorporation (or annexation) of the Tangier Zone, some definite guarantee should be obtained from the Madrid Government regarding its preservation as an unfortified zone. There has never existed any valid excuse for Spain militarily to fortify Tangier as she has done, but once the latter becomes a part of Spanish territory she will no doubt, take it as her right to proceed with any military works which she may require. It would, therefore, seem well to obtain such guarantee before or simultaneously with the incorporation or annexation takes place.

9. Finally, a word concerning the reaction of the events of the recent weeks upon the population of Tangier. The Moors are united in their dislike of and disgust at the Spanish move. They know well how their brothers are faring in the Spanish Zone, and they are haunted by the spectre of starvation which may come to Tangier in the wake of an inefficient and bankrupt Spanish Administration. Nor do they relish the prospects of a régime flavoured with the Hispano-German Gestapo methods, and these are beginning to make their appearance here. Lastly, the insult which has been offered by Spain to the Sultan (Tangier's landlord) is immensely resented. As for the Spanish colony, there are a great many who will resent Spanish hegemony, for as I have mentioned to your Lordship previously, many of the Spanish population (amounting in all to some 14,000 persons) were formerly adherents of the Republican régime, and they are therefore apprehensive of the treatment which will be meted out to them by the lieutenants of General Franco. The French colony are as ever completely "mous." They number some 4,000, and are composed of retired officials and traders of various kinds. Some of the richest are already busily engaged in removing their capital which had been snugly esconsed within the vaults of the Banque d'Etat du Maroc and other Tangier banks, and it is to be supposed that they will gradually dwindle, as the French do not flourish under Spanish rule.

10. The British colony, which now amounts to some 1,700 persons, including the Gibraltarian evacuees, has maintained a commendable equanimity. As your Lordship is aware, there are here many retired civil servants and members of the forces who reside in or near Tangier. Many of these persons have co-operated most loyally with me during the crises of the past few months, and these have materially assisted in quietening the more nervous elements of our community. On the whole, I am glad to be able to report that one of the most important factors

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in the present situation here—the relations between the British colony and the Spanish elements—has been on the whole excellent up to now, and I do not see why they should not remain so in the future.

Copies of this despatch are being forwarded to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid, and to his Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-chief, Gibraltar.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Decree of the Chief of State, dated November 9, *published in the* Boletín Oficial *of November* 13.

"THE organisation of the Statute having been suppressed in the Zone of Tangier, the Governor Delegate of the High Commission of Spain in Morocco has provisionally assumed the functions of Government and Administration thereof until there is extended thereto the general régime established for the Spanish Protectorate; and this juridical situation being incompatible with the character previously held by the former diplomatic representation of Spain in the said zone, I decree, on the proposal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, article 1, that from the time of publication of the present decree and as a consequence of the incorporation of Tangier in the Zone of the Spanish Protectorate, the consulate-general of Spain established there shall have the characteristics and functions of the other consulates of our protectorate."

[C 12954/5847/28] No. 92.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 1144.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, November* 29, 1940.

I TO-DAY carried out instructions in your telegram No. 1165. I repeated protest and reservations that I had previously made and said that we attached great importance to the retention of the neutral character of the zone.

I then asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether any further changes were contemplated. His answer was "No." I then asked whether that meant that the international character of Tangier would be retained. His answer was that action already taken had *de facto* made Tangier an ordinary part of the Spanish Protectorate and that administration in the future would not differ from that of other Moroccan towns. As to diplomatic representation, it meant that it would now become simply consular. I told him I would convey this information to His Majesty's Government, but that I felt sure that they would disagree with what he had said. It would have been much better in their view to have had consultation about these questions, and in particular there were a number of difficult economic problems that would have to be settled. He then said that he would add some further information to what he had already given to me. It was the fact that in his talks with M. Laval, and from what he heard of the French activities in Tangier and Morocco, it was evident that the French wished to re-establish their predominant position in Tangier. This was out of the question. To support this view, the French had placed a number of troops on the frontiers of the Spanish Zone in dispositions that were offensive and not defensive. Spain therefore had feared an attack upon the Spanish Zone. In the Minister for Foreign Affairs' view, it was essential that not only Spanish interests, but also the interests of peace, should be safeguarded. As long as belligerents were in control of Tangier, there was constant danger of trouble. As it was, Spain would guarantee peace and had no intention of attacking French Morocco. As to fortifications, now that Tangier was regarded as a part of the Spanish Zone, there was no reason for differentiating its special position. So

far as economic questions were concerned, he guaranteed the rights of all foreigners and said that he would be ready to discuss such questions in detail. I tried throughout to give him the impression that I regarded what he said as involving serious implications, but that I would not make any further comment until I had your instructions.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 47.)

[C 12943/5847/28] No. 93.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 1157.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, December* 2, 1940.

YOUR telegram No. 1197 and Tangier telegram No. 812.

Official bulletin of 1st December published a law, dated 23rd November, establishing juridical régime of Tangier Zone. Article 1 states that as from 1st December juridical measures issued in respect of Spanish Protectorate in Morocco will also apply to the Tangier Zone, and article 2 states that as from 1st January next Spanish and Hispano-Khalifian law, which prior to coming into force of the present law was valid in the protectorate, shall also apply to the Tangier Zone. The above law makes the zone a juridical part of the Spanish Protectorate.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 48.)

[C 13056/5847/28] No. 94.

Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Hoare (Madrid).

(No. 1231.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1940.

YOUR telegram No. 1166 [of 3rd December: Economic assistance to Spain].

Attitude of Spanish Government appears satisfactory except in regard to Tangier. Your telegrams Nos. 1144 and 1157 crossed my telegram No. 1212, and this fresh action by the Spanish Government will make it difficult for us to justify provision of help to a Government which is entirely disregarding its international obligations in Tangier and ignoring our representations and our own interests in the zone. It is by no means unlikely that for this reason public agitation may develop here against our plan of assistance, and I fully approve language you used to impress on Señor Suñer the serious implications which this action might have (your telegram No. 1144).

2. I should be glad therefore if you could see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again and make it plain that the reports of this decree and the explanations which he gave to you on the 29th November have made a most unfavourable impression on me, showing as they do disregard of the views and representations of His Majesty's Government. Conduct of the Spanish Government in this matter makes me wonder whether it will be possible to hope for improved relations and confidence between our two Governments. Public opinion here will not understand why we are assisting a Government which is acting in this manner, and the attitude of the Spanish Government bids fair to prejudice the whole action which we are contemplating to help Spain.

3. I realise that it may be impracticable to get this decree withdrawn, but it is essential that its operation should be suspended pending discussion with ourselves, for which we should be ready at any time; that the international character of the administration should not in principle be set aside; and that we should be in a position to make this clear to our public opinion. It should also be understood that the Moroccan franc should continue to be legal tender in Tangier. You should put these points to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

4. I do not wish to be deflected from the policy which we have decided to adopt towards Spain by the Spanish action in Tangier, where the maintenance of the international régime cannot be regarded as of substantial importance for the successful prosecution of the war. But, quite apart from the illustration it gives of the state of mind of the Spanish Government, it will also have a very bad

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effect on parliamentary and public opinion, which, ill-informed on the strategic questions involved, is still highly critical of the policy of giving assistance to Spain in any event. For your own information, I am thinking of recalling Mr. Gascoigne for consultation, and he could come home via Madrid. Though of course we cannot modify a multilateral treaty by a bilateral treaty with Spain, I am anxious that any alterations in which we acquiesce shall be consequent on discussion between the Spanish Government and ourselves.

5. A separate telegram is being sent to you about supplies of wheat.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 375.)

[C 13103/5847/28] No. 95.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 6.)

(No. 1180.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, December* 5, 1940.

MY telegram No. 1166.

I agree Spanish attitude most unsatisfactory, and I am arranging to see Minister for Foreign Affairs. Before, however, I see him, I should welcome more detailed instructions. Position as I see it is as follows. As reported in my telegram No. 1178, I have acted on your telegrams Nos. 997, 1046 and 1164, and have left Minister for Foreign Affairs in no doubt as to His Majesty's Government's attitude. I have also acted on your telegram No. 1212, making it clear that further credits may be possible after 2 million credit, but that these will depend on Spanish behaviour, and I specifically mentioned Tangier. I have therefore made a firm protest and reserved all our rights for the future.

2. When I first suggested to you the possibility of a bilateral discussion with Spain you pointed out in your telegram No. 1046 that bilateral discussions between His Majesty's Government and Spanish Government could not in themselves serve to regularise the position, and Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequently implied that such discussions were impracticable in connexion with a multilateral agreement. I therefore did not press the suggestion, but restricted myself to carrying out your instructions (see my telegram No. 1144) to press for consultation [two groups undecypherable] further action, and especially on economic and financial problems arising out of Spanish action. Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed with this proposal as far as it affected the economic and financial problems, and said that he would guarantee the rights of all foreigners, and that he would be ready to discuss such questions in detail. He further said that Spain would guarantee peace and had no intention of attacking French Morocco. What further subjects do you now contemplate should be discussed? Spanish Government will not, as you say, withdraw the decree that has already unilaterally repudiated statute. Nor I suppose are we prepared to impose sanctions generally [group undecypherable: ? on] them. Are we then not on stronger grounds in standing upon our protest and our general refusal to recognise the validity of anything that has been done, rather than in entering upon discussions, possibly with the assistance of Mr. Gascoigne, that will excite expectations in England, irritate the Spaniards and lead either to nothing or a formal acceptance by us of an unsatisfactory position? Whole of Spain, [group undecypherable: ? our] friends as much as others, are delighted with what has happened, indeed so delighted that generals are saying it has had the effect of restraining any further aspirations of Spain in French Morocco. I suggest that in this atmosphere the firm protest and reservation such as we have made are of great[? er] importance than embarking on negotiations, which we are not in a position to see through and which will almost certainly fail. Within this protest, however, I can at once take up such questions as French franc and treatment of British firms with Minister for Foreign Affairs, but upon broader issue of international status I suggest it is worth your considering whether we are not on stronger grounds in repeating what I have already said rather than in attempting to stop what has already happened.

3. Please do not think I am disputing His Majesty's Government's decision. I am merely asking you to give me more precise instructions before I see Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I am sending you these suggestions in case

they may be useful to you in drafting them. As regards economic policy His Majesty's Government have decided to adopt towards Spain, I agree with you in thinking we should not be deflected from it by Spanish action in Tangier. We are in fact definitely committed by my conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Commerce (see my telegrams Nos. 1166 and 1172). High, and even extravagant, hopes are being based upon our offer, which has effected a remarkable change of attitude here already, and any [group undecypherable] that we were trying to back out would be disastrous.

[C 13205/5847/28] No. 96.

Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Hoare (Madrid).

(No. 1255.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 7, 1940.

YOUR telegram No. 1180 [of 5th December] and my immediately preceding telegram [economic assistance for Spain and situation at Tangier].

Latest attitude and action of Spanish Government as regards Tangier and recent developments there (see Tangier telegrams Nos. 840 and 845) have raised serious political difficulties here which must inevitably influence our attitude in fulfilling our offer of wheat and other economic assistance to Spain. In my telegram No. 1212 [of 1st December] I said that further development of our policy of assistance to Spain would be facilitated by abstention of Spanish Government from further unilateral abrogation of international régime at Tangier. That telegram crossed one from you (No. 1144) disclosing a complete disregard of our representations on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This was followed by the publication on 1st December of a law, the effect of which is to incorporate the International Zone in Spanish Morocco. Tangier telegram No. 845 suggests that this may have serious effects upon our position at Tangier and that of British subjects in the zone. The statement in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 1212 that the only express condition we attached to economic assistance to Spain was adequate publicity was made before we learned that the Spanish Government had decided to pay no heed to our representations and before the Italian attack on the Post Office, which has had a very sharp reaction here.

2. My immediately preceding telegram shows that we are now in a position to offer Spain immediate shipments of wheat from Canada and the Argentine, but I am bound to say that, in view of the unfavourable reactions in parliamentary and public opinion to the overriding of our rights at Tangier by the Spanish Government as well as the two recent incidents at Tangier (attack upon British premises and prolonged stay of Italian submarines), I shall be hard put to it to secure approval for a policy of economic assistance to Spain unless the Spanish Government show their goodwill by meeting us as regards Tangier. This does not mean that we are going back on our offer. But we are compelled to retain some liberty as to its execution.

3. I agree that we cannot ask the Spaniards to put the clock back and to rescind the legislation they have enacted. But we are entitled to ask them to suspend its application where it adversely affects our interests, and to consult us before undertaking any further step likely to damage those interests. While therefore we must maintain our protest and reserve our rights and decline to give formal recognition to the action the Spanish Government have taken, we must take account of the undoubted fact that the Spaniards are in effective occupation at Tangier and therefore, in fact, responsible for the maintenance of law and order and of the neutrality of the zone. We are thus entitled to hold the Spanish Government responsible for the due disposal of the two Italian submarines which have been at Tangier since 3rd and 4th November and for the apprehension and punishment of those responsible for the attack on the British Post Office.

4. I am impressed by the argument in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 1180 [of 5th December] and what I had in mind in speaking of bilateral discussion was not as much a full regularisation of the position, which obviously for the reason you give cannot be so effected, but rather the avoidance of prejudice to British rights on which, pending clarification of situation, we have a right to insist. I am glad to note that Minister for Foreign Affairs himself said that he would guarantee the rights of all foreigners and would be ready to discuss such questions in detail.

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5. What we should require of the Spanish Government might therefore be stated as follows:—

6. In the first place, assurances from the Spanish Government, to which public reference would have to be made in Parliament, that, pending ultimate clarification of the juridical position, the special rights enjoyed by British subjects and other foreigners in the Tangier Zone under the instruments of 1923 and 1928 would be maintained. I have in mind, for example, the following:—

(*a*) Personal rights, including freedom to enter, reside and travel in the zone, to own and dispose of property and to have recourse to the mixed tribunals on all legal issues.

(*b*) Commercial rights, including economic equality (which can, of course, be claimed even outside the instruments of 1923 and 1928) and freedom to import and export under conditions no less favourable than those previously enjoyed and subject to the existing rates of duty.

(*c*) Political rights, including the maintenance in their posts of all British officials at present employed in the Tangier Zone, in accordance with the instruments of 1923 and 1928, and the maintenance of the British Post Office.

(*d*) The maintenance of the Moroccan franc as legal tender in Tangier.

7. In the second place, we should require satisfaction as regards the submarines and the attack on the Post Office and other British premises.

8. In view of the attitude of the Minister for Foreign Affairs as reported in your telegram No. 1159, I trust that the Spanish Government will agree to the immediate departure or internment of the submarines, and if the Spanish Government do not themselves effect this in response to the further representations which you have been instructed to make in my telegram No. 1243 [of 6th December], His Majesty's Government will have to reserve full liberty of action in regard to the submarines and as regards their offer to supply wheat.

9. We must also be in a position to say, in answer to a Parliamentary Question on 11th December, that satisfactory measures are being taken for the apprehension and punishment of those responsible for the recent attack on the British Post Office and other premises at Tangier and for the prevention of similar incidents in future.

10. I also attach importance to the question of the militarisation and fortification of Tangier, on which I am asking for the views of the Chiefs of Staff. You should keep this question before the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but should for the present avoid entering into details.

11. In speaking to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the above lines, you should add that he need not delay the despatch of Spanish ships to load wheat in the Argentine and North America. Between now and the date of their arrival in American ports there will be ample time for the Spanish Government to provide evidence of the spectacular change in the Spanish position which you thought not impossible in your telegram No. 1172 [of 4th December] by giving us satisfaction on the above points. But you should also say that, in default of substantial satisfaction, His Majesty's Government would have to consider countermanding the arrangements for delivery of this wheat in American ports.

12. I must leave the manner of the presentation of this case to your discretion, but I must leave you in no doubt of the necessity, on parliamentary grounds, for obtaining some immediate response from Spain to the generous assistance we are now affording her.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 381.)

[C 13218/5847/28] No. 97.

Mr. Gascoigne to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 327.)

My Lord, *Tangier, November* 9, 1940.

THE International Zone of Tangier has been experiencing a number of vicissitudes during the past week, which I have had the honour to report to your Lordship by telegram. For the purposes of record, I now desire to set forth the position at somewhat greater length.

2. On the 30th October I was informed that two groups of Spanish artillery, complete with Spanish personnel, were moving into this zone from the precincts of Tetuan. Up to that date the number of troops in occupation of Tangier had amounted to some 4,000; these were all Moorish troops of the "Khalifian Mehalla" of the Spanish Protectorate. The fact that artillery was being brought into the zone was, of course, particularly noteworthy. Furthermore, the additional reinforcements consisted of Spanish personnel (not Moorish, and therefore indirectly connected with the Sultan of Morocco, whose territorial sovereignty over the Tangier Zone is recognised by the Powers concerned) and was a further sign that Spain had decided to discontinue her previous attempts to camouflage her intentions. These batteries of 75- and 77-mm. guns were followed by a battalion of the Spanish Foreign Legion, and some aeroplanes of German type landed on the aerodrome. There were, in addition, guns of larger calibre, said to be 105-mm., and several anti-aircraft weapons. These units were placed in part at points along the coasts of Tangier, notably at Malabata and Spartel, particularly strong defences being made at the latter point, which commands the western entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar. No kind of official intimation of these important additions to the existing Spanish force was made to me or to my colleagues, but the chief reason given and ventilated throughout the port was that preparations were being made to repel a possible British landing. Reports regarding the Spanish military movements were contained in my telegrams No. 637 of the 1st November and Nos. 653 and 654 of the 3rd November.

3. Two further moves were made on Saturday, the 2nd November. The Spanish morning newspaper *España* of that day published an order (which had been posted up in all prominent places in the port) to the effect that the Spanish peseta would henceforth resume its legal circulation in Tangier (paragraph 3 of article 23 of the Tangier Convention of 1923). Here, again, no warning whatever was given to my colleagues or to me, and, indeed, we were expecting to discuss this question, which was reported in my telegrams Nos. 443 and 467 of the 1st and 5th October respectively, during the next meeting of the Committee of Control. A copy of the "order," signed by Colonel Yuste, the officer in command of the Spanish troops of occupation, is enclosed herewith, and it is noteworthy that my Spanish colleague and the First Secretary of the Spanish Legation had gone to Madrid, possibly in order to leave the field open for Colonel Yuste to take action. We were naturally disturbed by this extraordinary behaviour. Colonel Yuste had no authority over the administrative affairs of the zone, and his action was at once high-handed and extremely discourteous. My colleagues and myself had discussed the question of the renewed circulation of the peseta in Tangier, and we had all agreed that no objection in principle could be raised by the Committee of Control to rescinding the order which that body had decreed (as far as I can see, illegally) in December 1936 to suspend the peseta's circulation here. What was felt, however, by all of us was that, as the world conditions had greatly changed since the peseta had last been recognised as legal tender (November 1936), it would be more prudent for all concerned, including the Spaniards themselves, if, in the first instance, the question were to be submitted to a small committee of local experts, whose terms of reference would be to make recommendations to the Committee of Control concerning the modalities of its reintroduction.

4. My second surprise came at noon, when I was visited by my Dutch and Belgian colleagues, who arrived in haste to tell me that they had received a summons to report to the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan at 5 o'clock that evening. No explanation had been given to them as to the subject which his Excellency General Asensio wished to discuss. They promised, after seeing him, to inform me at once of the upshot of the interview. At 9 P.M. that evening the two Ministers called and gave me the facts which were contained in my telegrams Nos. 646 and 647 of the 3rd November. Apparently, General Asensio had at first threatened to deprive them of their official rights to function—

(*a*) on the Committee of Control, and

(*b*) as consuls-general in Tangier and the Spanish Zone;

but, after a consultation by telephone with Señor Suñer himself, he had climbed down considerably and had agreed that they should continue to exercise their

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consular functions in Tangier and the Spanish Zone on condition that they agreed to surrender their seats on the Committee of Control. I should add that the general's first words to them were that they should within twenty-four hours pack their belongings in Tangier and proceed to his house at Tetuan, there to live as prisoners for an indefinite period. Owing, however, to what they described as "a happy ending," a description with which I did not agree, they were permitted to remain in residence in Tangier and to continue their normal consular functions. Copy of a literal translation of the paper, which was signed by all three (apparently over drinks and cigars), is enclosed herewith.

5. The fourth and last phase of this Spanish move consists in the sweeping away by Colonel Yuste, who, as I mentioned above, enjoyed no administrative rights in the Tangier Zone, of the controlling organs of the International Administration. On Monday morning, the 4th November, a notice appeared in prominent places in the town, and in the Spanish newspaper *España*, decreeing that the Committee of Control, the Legislative Assembly and the Mixed Bureau of Information would be suspended, and that Colonel Yuste himself would be "Governor" of Tangier. I should here mention that at 7·30 P.M. on the evening of the 3rd November I received a curt request from my Spanish colleague, Count Miranda, to proceed to his consulate-general at 9 P.M. the same evening, where I found on arrival my French and Portuguese colleagues only. Count Miranda, in an evasive and non-committal manner, told us that on his arrival back from Spain the same evening "he had been 'told' by Colonel Yuste that the organs above mentioned would be suspended!" I enquired of him by whose authority this would be done, and he replied by Colonel Yuste. I then asked who had instructed Colonel Yuste to take such high-handed action, but he denied all knowledge of that. We also asked him whether the seven Governments which had signed (or adhered) to the Statute of Tangier were in favour of this, to which he shrugged his shoulders. The meeting was over within five minutes. There was nothing we could do usefully to persuade him of the illegality and, indeed, rashness of such an action, as it had obviously been decided in Madrid, and, after asking him to note that we entered the fullest reserves, we took our leave.

6. The new régime, which has now been in power for six days, is totalitarian in flavour. Colonel Yuste, the "Governor," is personally directing all the remaining component parts of the Tangier administrative machinery. Captain Luizet, the former military attaché to the French Consulate-General here, who is now Acting Administrator in the absence of the permanent incumbent, Dr. Amieva, takes his orders each morning from the "Governor." Indeed, Captain Luizet tells me that Colonel Yuste is becoming from day to day more dictatorial and difficult to deal with, and, as he has but little knowledge of civil administration, I look with anxiety on the material side of the picture. We have been for some time living from hand to mouth in the matter of supplies, which still come in great measure from the French Zone of Morocco, and the authorities at Rabat decided after the *coup* here not to send further consignments to Tangier. They were, however, persuaded to continue to do so by the urgent intervention of my French colleague. Even so, we shall be likely to suffer constant crises in the matter of commodities as the French authorities have, ever since a Spaniard took over the post of Administrator, not been well disposed towards the requirements of this zone. Nevertheless, the essential services are still functioning as usual, and the British members of the Administration—Mr. Goligher, the Director of Finance, Mr. Harrison, the "Receveur" of the zone, and Captain Miller, the Assistant Chief of Police—are fulfilling their functions in the ordinary manner.

7. It is well-nigh impossible to prophesy with any certainty regarding the future of Tangier. The *coup* which has so recently taken place forms, in my opinion, the second stage of a programme which was conceived at the time of the French collapse. As I see it, Spain, now that France (who was, there is no doubt, aggressively predominant in Tangier) is powerless, has seized her chance and, fearful lest another Power should wrest it from her, has decided by stages gradually to incorporate this International Zone into her protected African territory. According to my latest information the Italian Government is extremely displeased by this last *coup*. In June, after the occupation of Tangier by the Spanish (Moorish) troops, my Italian colleague here affected at first to be favourable to the military occupation, but Italy's indignation has ostensibly, at any rate, increased *pari passu* with the gradual whittling away of the Tangier Statute by Spain which has taken place during these last months.

8. As I see it the best policy which we can pursue here under the existing circumstances is to continue, as far as that may be possible, to implement such of the statutory provisions as are left. The time may come, of course, when Spain will take the next step, which will presumably be the complete absorption of this zone into Spanish Africa. His Majesty's Government will no doubt have had under review the serious decisions which may have to be taken if this, indeed, should occur.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid, and to his Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-chief, Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

A. GASCOIGNE.

Enclosure in No. 97.

Order.

ANTONIO YUSTE SEGURA, Colonel d'Infanterie, Chef de la Colonne d'Occupation de la Zone de Tanger.

J'ordonne :

A partir de demain, la monnaie espagnole sera admise dans la circulation avec valeur libératoire.

Les déclarations de valeurs imposables pourront être souscrites en francs marocains et en pesetas espagnoles.

ANTONIO YUSTE.
Chef de la Colonne d'Occupation de la Zone de Tanger.

Tanger, le 1er novembre 1940.

Text of Document signed by the High Commissioner of the Spanish Zone and by the Belgian and Dutch Consuls-General.

THE High Commissioner has stated to us that, in view of the situation of Belgium and Holland, which are occupied by the enemy, and also in view of the position in which Spain finds herself *vis-à-vis* the various belligerent countries, he insists that the representatives of Belgium and Holland should cease to exercise their functions on the Committee of Control. It is agreed, however, that the said representatives shall be able to exercise consular functions at Tangier and in Spanish Morocco.

España, *November* 4, 1940.

FOLLOWING order is published :—

"Don Antonio Yuste Segura, Colonel of Infantry, Commanding the Forces of Occupation in the Zone of Tangier, orders :—

"From the time of publication of this order and by reason of the present circumstances, the Committee of Control, the Legislative Assembly and the Mixed Bureau of Information will cease to function.

"In these circumstances I am taking charge of the Tangier Zone with the title of 'Governor' and as delegate of the High Commissioner of Spain in Morocco."

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[C 13317/30/41] No. 98.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 12.)

(No. 1215.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, December* 11, 1940.

I SPENT two hours this evening with Minister for Foreign Affairs going through the points raised in your telegrams Nos. 1254 and 1255.

2. I began with wheat, emphasising unprecedented efforts that His Majesty's Government was making to help Spain and the imminent danger of these efforts being frustrated if goodwill was not shown on Spanish side. Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed greatly impressed by the offer and asked me to discuss it in detail with Ministry of Commerce and Industry to-morrow.

3. I then explained to him at great length the way in which Tangier situation was endangering our economic programme. I went through every point in your telegram No. 1255 and ended by saying I was speaking as a friend and representative of a Government that had from the first admitted justice of Spanish aspirations in Tangier and North Africa. As things were now going, I foresaw the probability of friction and strife. What could Minister for Foreign Affairs say to reassure His Majesty's Government and British public opinion, both of which were at present very sensitive and suspicious?

4. Minister began his answer by alleging that we were adopting a contradictory attitude. Why, if we recognised Spanish aspirations, had we reserved our rights in the one case in which Spain had, in her view, an irrefutable claim? Other countries had fully accepted the Spanish action. Why did we not do the same? I told him there was nothing contradictory in our attitude, that we had never contemplated Spanish action of this kind, but a general settlement of outstanding questions at the end of the war.

5. He then proceeded to deal with our two immediate complaints: attack on post office and submarines. As to the attack, he showed himself greatly annoyed with what had happened. He told me that he was not yet able to say whether or not the Spanish authorities had acted properly, but that he had telephoned the High Commissioner, making it quite clear that there must be a proper enquiry and punishment of the guilty. High Commissioner had sent for the Italian Consul and had made clear to him his disapproval of what had happened. As to the submarines, Spanish Government would carry out in letter and spirit The Hague Convention. It was not true to say that there had been unnecessary delay with repairs. Both submarines lacked certain essential pieces that could probably only be supplied from Italy, and this was the reason why it had not been possible for them to complete repairs in [group undecypherable] days. They had now been given until 31st December, and Minister for Foreign Affairs had refused the Italian Ambassador's request for an extension until 15th January. Spanish Government wished to be rid of the submarines, either by departure or by internment, and the fact that they had entered Tangier had been a great embarrassment to them.

6. I then pressed him upon the question of rights of British and foreign subjects and warned him repeatedly of the danger of proposed action. He declared categorically that the rights of British subjects, collective and individual, would be fully safeguarded and that he contemplated no hurried economic changes. As to the franc, it was the intention of the Spanish Government to maintain dual currency provided the French did not try to destroy Spanish régime by a currency attack. When I pressed him about mixed tribunal, he said he assumed that it would come to an end, but he could not say when. I asked him what would happen if it were abolished. Would capitulations be extended to zone? His answer was yes. I then asked him about the fortification of the zone, and he gave me categorical assurance that there would be no fortification. Knowing the importance of this question, I pressed twice, and each time had the same answer. As to the general economic and political position, I pressed upon him the need for caution and consultation and asked him to take me more into his confidence over the execution of any changes. He undertook to do this as far as possible.

7. I finally asked him whether His Majesty's Government could use all this information in Parliament. His answer was that it could be used with the exception of details about the interview between High Commissioner and Italian Consul-General and lack of essential parts for submarines.

8. My general impression of the interview was that he was anxious to reassure us within the general framework of the Spanish decree and that he wished to go cautiously and slowly with any economic and financial changes. I left with him detailed aide-mémoires both upon wheat and Tangier position.

9. Please repeat to Tangier Indiv.

(Repeated to Tangier by Foreign Office.)

[C 13361/75/41] No. 99.

Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Hoare (*Madrid*).

(No. 550.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1940.

THE Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State informed the Spanish Ambassador on the 11th December that we were hoping for a settlement of the affair of the two Italian submarines at Tangier and for a proper understanding on the subject of the status of the International Zone at Tangier. Mr. Butler drew the Ambassador's attention to the very strong feeling in Parliament on this question, and said that it would be a great pity if our important economic discussions with the Spanish Government were prejudiced through a short-sighted attitude on the above two matters. The Ambassador said that he would draw the attention of his Government to what Mr. Butler had said. Mr. Butler replied that he thought the whole question had already been fully ventilated by your Excellency at Madrid. Nevertheless, an extra indication of the attitude of His Majesty's Government would be valuable. Mr. Butler told the Ambassador that he was sending him a further letter on the treatment of British subjects, and that he hoped that the Italian roughs who paraded the streets of Tangier would be kept in order by the Administration.

2. The Duke of Alba was most hopeful about the turn in Anglo-Spanish relations, which he seemed to consider was taking place in view of the attitude adopted by ourselves and America on the subject of wheat supplies. He still hoped that Spain would form the bridge between ourselves and Europe.

3. On detailed points, the Ambassador asked whether air passages could be supplied for Señor del Pozo, who had not yet left the country but whose recall had been demanded by the Spanish Government. The Ambassador also wished to secure a passage for the Marquis de Moral, who would take the Spanish bag to Lisbon.

4. The Duke of Alba then asked Mr. Butler for a reply to an official communication made to the Foreign Office through him, the number of which was 225, and which related to the appointment of consuls at Tanganyika and Lagos.

5. The Duke of Alba asked many questions about the offensive in Libya, the situation in Greece, the attitude of Turkey and our strategic position generally. He seemed satisfied with the answers given. He said he thought that in both Greece and Libya the Greek and British offensives would eventually come up against strong positions, but that their psychological importance could not be over-estimated. He was also glad to notice from the press that special interest was being given to the submarine sinkings off the western approaches. He was sure that the "drive" Great Britain was exhibiting at the present time would be noticed and appreciated by the Spanish Government and people.

6. The Ambassador then went on to say that in his view it was not impossible that Señor Suñer might consent to come to England. He would like to work towards this, and indicated broadly that we should put this idea to your Excellency. He hoped that references to Señor Suñer would be friendly, and undertook, if the Spanish Foreign Minister were to visit this country, to look after him to the best of his ability.

7. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tangier.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[C 13317/80/41] No. 100.

Sir S. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 19.)

(No. 541.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Madrid telegram No. 1215 of the 11th December, 1940, has the honour to transmit to him copy of an aide-mémoire left with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 11th December, 1940, respecting administration in Tangier.

Madrid, December 14, 1940.

Enclosure in No. 100.

Aide-mémoire.

THE latest attitude and action of the Spanish Government as regards Tangier have raised serious political difficulties in the United Kingdom which inevitably influence the attitude of His Majesty's Government in fulfilling their offer of wheat and other economic assistance to Spain. His Majesty's Government have always made it clear to the Spanish Government that they appreciate Spanish aspirations in Morocco and the importance of Spanish interests in Tangier, and they acquiesced in the occupation of the zone by Spanish troops in June. The Spanish Government then gave assurances that the International Administration would be maintained.

On the 11th November the British Ambassador, on instructions, expressed the surprise of His Majesty's Government that they had not been consulted over the Spanish *coups* regarding the Committee of Control, Legislative Assembly, Mixed Bureau and the currency question. It was made clear that His Majesty's Government would expect to be consulted before further unilateral action was taken by the Spanish Government. Nevertheless, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Ambassador on the 29th November that the action already taken had *de facto* made Tangier a part of the Spanish Protectorate. This was followed by publication on the 1st December of a law the effect of which is to incorporate the International Zone in Spanish Morocco. This, it is feared, may have serious effects upon the position of His Majesty's Government at Tangier and that of British subjects in the zone.

His Majesty's Government are now in a position to offer Spain immediate shipments of wheat from Canada and the Argentine, but they are bound to point out that the overriding of their rights at Tangier by the Spanish Government has caused serious reaction in Parliament and public opinion in the United Kingdom. These reactions have been made worse by the fact that two Italian submarines took refuge in Tangier on the 3rd and 4th November simultaneously with the unheralded Spanish *coup* against the Tangier Administration mentioned above, and the subsequent prolonged stay of these submarines. A further very sharp reaction has been caused by the Italian attack on the British Post Office and other premises in Tangier on the 3rd December and the failure of the police, after nearly a week, to arrest the culprits—although two of the Italians who were the ringleaders are well known and can be identified. This means that His Majesty's Government may be hard put to it to secure approval of their policy of economic assistance to Spain unless they have more to show than they have at present regarding the goodwill of the Spanish Government. This does not mean that His Majesty's Government are going back on their offer. But they are, in these circumstances, compelled to retain some liberty regarding its execution.

His Majesty's Government do not ask the Spanish Government to put the clock back and to rescind the legislation they have enacted. But His Majesty's Government feel they are entitled to ask the Spanish Government to suspend its application where it adversely affects British interests and to consult them before undertaking any further step likely to damage those interests. While, therefore, His Majesty's Government must maintain the protest they have already made,

they must reserve their rights and decline to give formal recognition of the action of the Spanish Government in this respect. They must take account of the undoubted fact that the Spaniards are in effective occupation at Tangier and therefore responsible for the maintenance of law and order and of the neutrality of the zone. His Majesty's Government are definitely entitled to hold the Spanish Government responsible for the due disposal of the two Italian submarines which have been at Tangier since the 3rd and 4th November, and for the apprehension and punishment of those responsible for the attack on the British Post Office.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has assured His Majesty's Ambassador that he would guarantee the rights of all foreigners and would be ready to discuss the question in detail with him. But His Majesty's Government's desire is to avoid prejudice to British rights and interests, pending clarification of the situation. Firstly, therefore, they feel bound to ask the Spanish Government to give assurances, to which public references would have to be made in Parliament, that, pending the clarification of the juridical position, foreign interests and special rights enjoyed by British subjects in Tangier under the instruments of 1923 and 1928 would be maintained. In this connexion His Majesty's Government have in mind the following :—

(*a*) Personal rights, including freedom to enter, reside and travel in the zone, to own and dispose of property and to have recourse to mixed tribunals on all legal issues.

(*b*) Political rights, including economic equality (which can, of course, be claimed even outside the instruments of 1923 and 1928) and freedom to import and export under conditions no less favourable than those previously enjoyed and subject to existing rates of duty.

(*c*) Political rights, including the maintenance in their posts of all British officials employed at present in the Tangier Zone, in accordance with the instruments of 1923 and 1928, and the franc as legal tender in Tangier.

In the second place, His Majesty's Government must insist upon satisfaction being given as regards the Italian submarines and the attack on the British Post Office and other British premises by the Italians.

His Majesty's Government, above all, attach importance to the question of the militarisation and fortification of Tangier and His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to emphasise this point to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

December 11, 1940.

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RECORD OFFICE, LONDON